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Abstract 
 
 
The sense of agency (SoA) refers to the sense of being in control of one’s actions 
and, through them, of events in the external world. Much research has focused on 
how we link our actions to their outcomes. However, the contribution to SoA of 
processes linking our intentions to our actions has received little attention. The 
present research focused, therefore, on investigating the cognitive and neural 
mechanisms through which action selection processes can prospectively inform our 
SoA. Recent work revealed that influencing action selection through subliminal 
priming can lead to a reduction in SoA. Here, new tasks and manipulations of action 
selection were developed. The generalizability of previous results was demonstrated 
– a consistent reduction in SoA was found when action selection was disrupted.  
This effect was found for: disruptions at different stages of action selection; for 
different levels of awareness of distracting stimuli; and were unaffected by whether 
participants freely chose what to do, or followed an instruction. In other experiments, 
SoA judgements were tested in the context of a computer game, providing a more 
ecological and dynamic context than previous studies. 
Electrophysiological investigations of the neural correlates of agency showed neural 
monitoring of the action itself was reliably associated with judgements of agency, 
independently from and in addition to previously-established neural processes for 
monitoring outcomes. These findings, together with a meta-analysis of available 
studies, support a dissociation between prospective and retrospective components 
of SoA. Finally, the influence of social context on action selection and SoA was 
explored. Under conditions in which outcomes were unambiguously self-caused, the 
presence of an alternative agent who could act instead of oneself led to both reduced 
SoA and attenuated neural processing of those outcomes. The prospective sense of 
agency may be important as an advance predictor of successful action, allowing for 
immediate corrective action, as well as for learning to adapt behaviour in the future. 
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Chapter 1. General Introduction 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
The sense of being an agent in the world, of controlling one’s actions and, through 
those actions, controlling events in the external world, is a fundamental aspect of 
human experience. This sense of agency (SoA) underpins our motivation for goal-
directed actions (Bandura, 1991), and thus our uniquely human capacity to radically 
change the world around us. The phenomenal experience of being an active agent is 
also central to our sense of self (Knoblich, Elsner, Aschersleben, & Metzinger, 2003), 
as it supports the distinction between our bodies and ourselves, and the outside 
world. The sense of agency typically colours the background of our mental lives, but 
we become acutely aware of it when the smooth flow of voluntary action, from 
intention, to action, to outcome, is disrupted (Chambon, Sidarus, & Haggard, 2014; 
Gallagher, 2012). 
For example, I may walk into a dark room while talking to a friend, and flip the light 
switch. If the lights turn on, as expected, I may barely notice that I flipped the switch. 
However, if the lights fail to turn on, I will suddenly become very aware of my action 
and its consequences (or lack thereof). Even when the sense of agency is not at the 
forefront of our conscious experience, our brain is constantly monitoring our actions 
and their consequences, capturing our attention whenever anything goes awry. At 
the same time, we are able to intentionally introspect on our experience of agency. If 
my friend were to stop me while I was flipping the light switch and ask what I was 
doing, I would quickly reply that I was turning on the lights. SoA has a pre-reflective, 
experiential component, as well as a more reflective, evaluative component 
(Gallagher, 2012; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008). 
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1.1.1. Why is it important? 
Learning vs. Expert Control of Behaviour. 
These different aspects of SoA are also salient when learning a new skill. When we 
start learning a new skill, like driving, we are acutely aware of all our movements, 
and of tracking the link between our actions and their consequences. Here, our 
experience of agency, and of learning how to control our environment is central to 
our conscious experience, even when all goes according to plan. As we become 
experts at the task, performing the various necessary actions, e.g. changing gears or 
pressing pedals, becomes more automatic, more fluent, and our SoA tends to be 
less salient. Similarly, expertise can be associated with an experience of “flow” 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), in which one is fully immersed in the task at hand, and in 
perfect control over one’s actions and their consequences. Paradoxically, as a result 
of the strong focus on the task, some people report a loss of self in flow states, which 
leads them to feel out of control. This further highlights the interaction between 
awareness, the sense of agency and the sense of self. 
Interactions with Technology. 
An important challenge in the development of human-computer interfaces lies 
precisely in maximising the agent’s experienced control over the computer (Limerick, 
Coyle, & Moore, 2014). Yet, there may be a simultaneous need to reduce explicit 
awareness of the interface system and of the self, to produce an immersive 
experience, such as in virtual reality settings, in turn blurring the boundaries between 
self and interface/computer. Interestingly, interactions with technology raise another 
issue for SoA – the effects of task automation by computers or machines, e.g. in 
aviation, or factories. While this may be helpful for completing the task, the reduced 
engagement of the user, and increased uncertainty over what the user can control, 
can lead to a reduced SoA (Berberian, Sarrazin, Le Blaye, & Haggard, 2012). This 
has important implications for the behaviour of users, as well as for establishing 
personal and legal responsibility. 
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Responsibility and the Law. 
The belief that people can control their behaviour is not only relevant to individuals, 
but is also at the heart of our societal notions of personal and moral responsibility, 
and thus our legal system (Moretto, Walsh, & Haggard, 2011; Spence, 2009). 
Clarifying the mechanisms underlying SoA can thus potentially inform these 
concepts. Most legal systems are primarily concerned with establishing the facts of 
agency, that is, determining who caused a certain event, or committed a crime. 
Nonetheless, the subjective experience of agency is also considered important. To 
assign guilt, most legal systems take into account: whether there was malicious 
intent; whether the agent could control their actions (vs. coercion, for example); and 
whether they were able to understand the consequences of action. This may result in 
different charges, such as manslaughter for an accidental death, instead of murder. 
Or different defences may be applicable, namely the insanity defence if the agent 
was in a psychotic episode, which affected their understanding of their action 
consequences, or led them to believe they were being controlled by external forces. 
Psychiatric and Neurological Disorders. 
In fact, a number of clinical disorders have been associated with disturbances in 
SoA. Most typically associated is schizophrenia, as patients with delusions of control 
believe that their thoughts and actions are controlled by external forces (Frith, 2005; 
Hauser et al., 2011; Moore & Fletcher, 2012). Moreover, depression can be 
associated with a loss in the sense of control over one’s life and behaviour (Bandura, 
1991); while feelings of incompleteness in the performance of actions have been 
found in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD, Belayachi & Van der Linden, 2010; 
Gentsch, Schütz-Bosbach, Endrass, & Kathmann, 2012). Finally, neurological 
lesions can also result in disturbances in SoA, such as anarchic hand syndrome, 
which can follow to damage to supplementary motor area (SMA), and in which 
patients feel that they cannot control the movements of the hand contralateral do the 
lesion (Marchetti & Della Sala, 1998). Therefore, research on SoA has potential 
implications for the development of new therapeutic targets or interventions.  
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1.1.2. Summary 
The significance and pervasiveness of the experience that people can control their 
actions and are responsible for their consequences is indisputable. Nevertheless, the 
mechanisms that underlie its emergence remain unclear. How do our intentions, 
actions, and their consequences come to be linked in this apparent voluntary causal 
chain? Moreover, we might wonder what parts of this chain are related to SoA. Does 
agency depend on an inference triggered by the perception of the outcome to 
retrospectively link it to our action? Or does agency also rely on internal signals 
associated with the intention itself, such as a metacognitive perception of action 
selection, to prospectively link it with the action? 
Much research has investigated the retrospective link, and shown that SoA is based 
on a comparison between predictions, or expectations, about action outcomes and 
observed outcomes. If these match, SoA is high, but a mismatch leads to a loss of 
agency. While this comparison can involve inferential processes (Wegner & 
Wheatley, 1999), it can also rely on internal, sensorimotor predictive processes 
(Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002). Since the outcome must be known for the 
comparison to take place, both of these mechanisms are essentially retrospective. 
Thus far, literature on SoA had largely neglected the link between intention and 
action, that is, the role of decision making, or action selection, processes. Recent 
studies have indeed shown that the fluent, or easy, action selection is associated 
with a stronger SoA, than dysfluent, or difficult, selection (Chambon, Sidarus, et al., 
2014). This reveals that a metacognitive signal related to the fluency of action 
selection processes can influence SoA. As these processes clearly precede the 
outcome, and even the action itself, they offer a unique window to investigate a 
prospective component of SoA.  
1.1.3. Motivation for this research 
The present research aimed to explore further the prospective aspect of SoA, by 
investigating the role of action selection processes. We focused on situations in 
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which agency is especially relevant and informative for guiding current and future 
behaviour, and which have been largely neglected in the previous literature. For 
example, when interacting with new environments, the instrumental relation between 
actions and outcomes must be learned. When little is known about action outcomes, 
other cues, namely prospective ones, may be used to support our SoA and guide 
instrumental learning. 
Moreover, we often face situations in which there are suggestions for alternative 
actions, or we are unsure about how to make a decision. Metacognitive monitoring of 
action selection can recruit cognitive control processes in order to resolve such 
conflict or uncertainty, and adapt future behaviour. Such signals may additionally 
inform the SoA. Finally, social contexts can increase ambiguity about the authorship 
of outcomes (Frith, 2014; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). However, the presence of 
alternative agents may also challenge the SoA by increasing the complexity and 
uncertainty of decision making processes, as one needs to consider the potential 
actions of others, the outcomes of those actions, and so on. Therefore, prospective 
aspects of SoA may also be implicated in social situations.  
The following literature review will start by considering the ways in which we can 
measure SoA, as this has implications for our models of SoA. Such theoretical 
models of SoA, and the cues that inform it, will then be reviewed. Next, we will 
consider how the SoA may be embedded in psychology in general, and its functional 
interaction with other aspects of the mind. We will then highlight the gaps and 
limitations of the present literature on SoA. Finally, we will demonstrate how the 
present research aimed to enhance our understanding of the cognitive and neural 
mechanisms of a prospective SoA. 
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1.2. Research on Agency 
1.2.1. How can we measure the sense of agency? 
A variety of measures have been used to investigate the subjective experience of 
agency. Before considering them in detail, some conceptual distinctions are needed. 
First, there are two, interacting, levels of the SoA (Synofzik et al., 2008; see Figure 
1.1). The feeling of agency refers to a pre-reflective, non-conceptual representation, 
related to internal sensorimotor signals. The judgement of agency is a reflexive, 
conceptual representation, which draws from the feeling level, but also encompasses 
other cognitive cues such as beliefs and contextual information, and inferential 
processes. This highlights the difficulties found in measuring the SoA, as judgments 
of agency can be assessed through explicit reports, but targeting the feeling of 
agency requires more implicit measures. Moreover, we can distinguish between an 
attributional aspect of SoA, linked to determining the authorship of outcomes (“I did 
that”), and an instrumental aspect of SoA, concerned with the relation between 
specific actions and specific outcomes (“I did that”; Chambon, Filevich, & Haggard, 
2014). 
Explicit measures. 
Many studies have asked people directly to report on their experience, i.e. probing 
judgements of agency. Some have focused on the authorship of action outcomes, 
asking participants to assess how much they felt an outcome was caused by their 
action, vs. by another agent, either with dichotomous responses (Bednark & Franz, 
2014; Farrer, Frey, et al., 2008; Ritterband-Rosenbaum, Karabanov, Christensen, & 
Nielsen, 2014), or with continuous scales (Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 2005; Damen, 
van Baaren, & Dijksterhuis, 2014; Kühn et al., 2011; Sato & Yasuda, 2005; Spengler, 
von Cramon, & Brass, 2009). Yet, even when we know outcomes are caused by our 
actions, we may feel more or less control over them. Thus, other studies have asked 
participants how much control they felt over their action, or action outcome 
(Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Dewey, Seiffert, & Carr, 2010; Linser & Goschke, 2007; 
Metcalfe & Greene, 2007; Nahab et al., 2011; Sebanz & Lackner, 2007). Explicit 
reports are crucial for developing an account of SoA that is in line with our conscious 
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subjective experience. However, they are also known to be susceptible to cognitive 
biases, such as social desirability, and the questions used to elicit the reports are 
subject to interpretation from participants. 
  
Figure 1.1. Two levels of the sense of agency. Sense of agency receives many inputs, but 
different cues are integrated at a non-conceptual level – the feeling of agency, and at a 
conceptual level – judgement of agency. The feeling level forms the basis of the 
judgement level (bottom-up effect), but the judgement level can also influence the feeling 
level, based on beliefs or prior knowledge (top-down effect). Figure adapted from Synofzik 
et al. (2008). 
 
Implicit measures. 
Alternatively, implicit measures, linked to sensorimotor phenomena, have been 
proposed to offer a marker of the feeling of agency. Voluntary actions can lead to a 
sensory attenuation of outcomes (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998), linked to motor 
prediction (see Hughes, Desantis, & Waszak, 2012 for a review). Relative to 
externally-triggered stimuli, self-produced stimuli are associated with an attenuation 
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in perceived intensity (e.g. Desantis, Weiss, Schutz-Bosbach, & Waszak, 2012), as 
well as in neural responses, as seen in fMRI (Blakemore et al., 1998), or in EEG 
(Gentsch & Schütz-Bosbach, 2011; Hughes, Desantis, & Waszak, 2013). Another 
implicit measure of agency is linked to the perceptual compression of the temporal 
interval between action and outcome, termed intentional binding (Haggard, Clark, & 
Kalogeras, 2002). Intentional binding was stronger when participants chose freely 
when to act, relative to baseline, and to TMS induced movements (see Moore & 
Obhi, 2012 for a review). Finally, cortico-spinal excitability has also recently been 
suggested to index SoA, as it is enhanced for visual feedback matching intentional 
actions (Weiss, Tsakiris, Haggard, & Schütz-Bosbach, 2013). 
Relation between explicit and implicit measures. 
Interestingly, explicit and implicit measures of SoA can sometimes be dissociated 
(Ebert & Wegner, 2010; Moore, Middleton, Haggard, & Fletcher, 2012). They can 
also be dissociated when comparing different tasks to probe individual differences in 
SoA (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014; Saito, Takahata, Murai, & Takahashi, 2015), even 
when comparing different implicit measures (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014). As 
mentioned before, the SoA is complex and multifaceted, thus different measures 
may reflect different aspects of the experience of agency. Combining them in the 
same study may offer new insights into the mechanisms that underlie SoA. 
1.2.2. How does the sense of agency come about? 
1.2.2.1. Linking Intentions and Outcomes 
Instrumental learning. 
In the early 20th century, the notion of operant behaviour, was established by 
Thorndike in his Law of Effect (Thorndike & Bruce, 1911). This referred to the ability 
of animals to learn associations between certain actions and outcomes. Positive 
outcomes reinforced a link with the respective causal behaviour, whereas negative 
outcomes weakened such associations. Although often neglected in the agency 
literature, this is the core ability that underlies our agentic capacities. This 
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instrumental learning mechanism allows animals and humans to drive their 
behaviour on the basis of desirable goals, and intervene in the environment 
autonomously, i.e. not only in reaction to a stimulus (de Wit & Dickinson, 2009). 
Hence, on this widely held view, compatible with our common sense experience of 
agency, goals or intentions initiate the appropriate actions in order to obtain desired 
outcomes. 
Ideomotor theory. 
Similarly, William James’ ideomotor theory (1890) proposed that the representation 
of a desired outcome was a necessary precondition for voluntary actions, and that, in 
fact, it was the anticipatory representation of the outcome that drove action selection 
and execution. Recent versions of this proposal emphasise that action and 
perception share representational resources (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Schütz-
Bosbach & Prinz, 2007). In this view, as we learn about contingent actions and 
outcomes, their association becomes bidirectional, such that activation of one 
enhances activation of the other. This proposal can account well for known 
interactions between motor and perceptual systems. A limited capacity in the system 
can impair the co-activation of action- and perceptually-related representations and 
cause a reduction in task performance (Musseler & Wuhr, 2002). Conversely, studies 
have shown that the two representations can be assimilated and actually boost task 
performance when there are small temporal asynchronies between the two. An 
example is given in response priming induced by stimuli that were previously learned 
as effects (Kiefer, Sim, Helbig, & Graf, 2011; Nikolaev, Ziessler, Dimova, & van 
Leeuwen, 2008; Schubö, Prinz, & Aschersleben, 2004; though see Grosjean, 
Zwickel, & Prinz, 2009). Thus, this theory provides another account of how intentions 
become associated with their outcomes. 
An inferential account of sense of agency. 
Another more recent view that stresses goal representations stands, however, in 
stark contrast with these previous accounts by proposing that the experience of 
agency is really an illusion (Wegner, 2004). In his theory of “apparent mental 
causation”, Wegner (2004) argues that, rather than relying on privileged access to 
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internal action-related signals, SoA results from a retrospective inference about the 
causal relationship between anticipatory thoughts and action outcomes. This is 
guided by 3 principles: the thought should precede the outcome (“priority”) and be 
consistent with it (“consistency”), and there should be no other obvious cause for the 
outcome (“exclusivity”). This theory is based on a number of studies demonstrating 
that people can hold erroneous beliefs about their agency over certain events. For 
example, in the “I Spy” experiment, participants moved a pointer around a screen 
containing various images together with a confederate and stopped occasionally. 
Participants were also incidentally exposed to words that could refer to objects on 
the screen. Results showed that if there was consistency between a word they had 
recently heard and the image at which the pointer stopped, participants could self-
attribute the stopping event, even though a confederate had caused it (Wegner & 
Wheatley, 1999). Therefore, a match between preceding thoughts and outcomes 
leads to self-agency attributions; while mismatches lead to a reduced sense of 
authorship over outcomes. These findings are important for theories of SoA as they 
highlight that we can make errors in determining our agency. However, this account 
only addresses a high-level cognitive process of attribution of action consequences 
to particular actors. 
The accounts described above emphasise the role of the external consequences of 
action. Internal signals associated with selecting and executing the action are 
neglected. In other words, these accounts focus on the representation of the end, or 
goal, states, while downplaying the representation of the means by which the ends 
are achieved. Therefore, these accounts imply that SoA depends on the monitoring 
of external outcomes, rather than on monitoring internal signals. Moreover, recent 
frameworks of SoA emphasise that it can involve a graded sense of controlling one’s 
actions and their outcomes, in addition to self vs. other causal attributions 
(Chambon, Sidarus, et al., 2014; Farrer, Valentin, & Hupé, 2013; Pacherie, 2007; 
Synofzik et al., 2008). This sense of control depends on internal signals related to 
action, thus reclaiming the role of the means through which we achieve desirable 
ends as a constitutive part of SoA. 
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1.2.2.2. Linking Actions and Outcomes 
The comparator model of sense of agency. 
In fact, the contribution of implicit and embodied signals involved in action control 
and monitoring to the SoA have been well established (Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 
1999; Sato, 2009; Tsakiris, Haggard, Franck, Mainy, & Sirigu, 2005); for a review see 
Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009). Computational models of sensorimotor control have 
provided a useful framework for understanding how sensorimotor signals might be 
relevant to agency. A model by Wolpert and colleagues proposes the following 
(Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995; see Figure 1.2 below for the schematic of an 
extended model). Intentions or goals are transformed into motor commands in 
planners or inverse models. The motor commands are then sent to muscles in the 
body, but an efference copy, i.e. a copy of the motor command, is passed to a 
forward model, which predicts the sensory consequences of the movement. In motor 
control, this predictive mechanism is critical for rapid movement corrections as it can 
bypass the time delay of sensory feedback. Additionally, sensory predictions are 
passed to a comparator, which also receives actual sensory feedback. This subtracts 
the prediction from sensory feedback. Therefore, activity in sensory systems is 
proportional to prediction errors. This prevents sensory systems from becoming 
overloaded with uninformative sensory input. Moreover, this results in a sensory 
attenuation for predicted sensory stimulation. 
This model has subsequently been extended beyond action control to account for 
how we can distinguish self-generated from externally-triggered sensory stimulation 
(Blakemore et al., 1999; see Figure 1.2). According to the model above, self-
triggered sensory stimulation will be attenuated because we can predict it based on 
our action, whereas externally-triggered stimulation cannot be predicted as 
accurately. Hence, the absence of an error signal produced by the comparator 
implies that I caused the sensory stimulation; whereas prediction errors, due to 
mismatching sensory input and predictions, may indicate that I did not cause that 
sensory event. 
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Figure 1.2. Schematic of the computational model for sensorimotor control. Adapted from 
(Blakemore et al., 1999). The output of the comparator can be used to determine the cause 
of sensory input. If prediction and feedback match, there is no error signal, and I can self-
attribute the cause of the sensory stimulation. But if prediction and feedback mismatch, a 
prediction error signal will indicate that I was not the cause of the sensory input. 
 
In a seminal study, Blakemore and colleagues (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998) 
investigated why people cannot tickle themselves, by contrasting the neural 
activation for self- and externally-produced tactile stimulation. They found that activity 
in the somatosensory cortex was reduced for self-produced stimulation. Moreover, 
they reported that increasing the temporal asynchrony between the subject making a 
left-hand movement and receiving tactile stimulation on the right hand also increased 
subjective ratings of “ticklishness”. Many studies have provided support to the role of 
sensory attenuation in self-other distinctions. Similar effects have been shown in the 
auditory domain (Baess, Widmann, Roye, Schröger, & Jacobsen, 2009; Kühn et al., 
2011; Weiss, Herwig, & Schütz-Bosbach, 2011), as well as for visual stimuli 
(Gentsch, Kathmann, & Schütz-Bosbach, 2012; Gentsch & Schütz-Bosbach, 2011; 
Hughes & Waszak, 2011, see Hughes, Desantis, & Waszak, 2012 for a review). 
Therefore, sensory attenuation has been proposed to reflect an implicit, pre-reflective 
feeling of agency (Blakemore et al., 2002; Gentsch & Schütz-Bosbach, 2011; Sato, 
2009; Synofzik et al., 2008). 
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Another relevant aspect of this sensorimotor model to SoA is that the output of the 
comparator could be used not only to detect but also measure the discrepancy 
between predictions and outcomes. Therefore, the output of the comparator can 
serve to index the degree of control experienced over action outcomes, and not only 
for making self-other distinctions (see Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008 for a 
review). Consistently, increases in the discrepancy between action and visual 
feedback are associated with a reduction in perceived control (Dewey et al., 2010; 
Metcalfe & Greene, 2007; Nahab et al., 2011). 
A hierarchical framework of intention specification and monitoring. 
This “comparator model” of SoA has proved useful beyond low-level sensorimotor 
control, as intentions, action, and outcomes can be conceived at different levels. 
Pacherie (2008) proposes three levels of intention can be distinguished in the 
process of action specification. Distal intentions regard distal goals, such as turning 
on the lights in a dark room. Proximal intentions regard the more proximal means 
available to satisfy the distal goals, like flipping a light switch. Finally, motor 
intentions consist of the motor commands necessary to enact the proximal 
intentions. The author further proposes that these different, hierarchically organised, 
levels of intentions are associated with different levels of monitoring and control 
processes, and thus multiple levels of predictions and observed outcomes to 
compare. 
Metacognitive contributions to sense of agency. 
Importantly, monitoring at these different levels of intentions and outcomes can have 
different influences to SoA. Using a videogame-like computer task, Metcalfe and 
colleagues (Metcalfe, Eich, & Miele, 2013) manipulated proximal and distal outcomes 
of action independently. The task required catching falling Xs while avoiding Os, by 
moving a box along a horizontal bar, with the computer mouse. When an item was 
caught, it disappeared, and auditory feedback indicated the accuracy of the catch. 
Adding a discrepancy between the movements of the mouse and the movements of 
the box on the screen interfered with proximal outcomes (i.e. the action at the distal 
level). Distal outcomes were manipulated by reducing the contingency between 
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touching the item with the box and the item disappearing, from 100% to 75%. 
Results showed that disruptions at the proximal level of action led to a large 
reduction in judgements of agency, whereas only a small reduction was observed 
when the distal outcomes were not consistently achieved. Moreover, results showed 
that judgements of agency were also positively related to the perceived overall 
performance in the game, in terms of how many Xs were caught (cf. Metcalfe & 
Greene, 2007). The authors argued that the SoA is metacognitive, as it involves 
monitoring internal signals associated with sensorimotor and cognitive processes, 
rather than only relying on the perception of external events (see also section 1.3.1 
below). Importantly, these findings further emphasise the importance of the means 
through which our goals are achieved (see also Caspar, Cleeremans, & Haggard, 
2015). 
The evidence reviewed in this section clarifies the link between action and outcome, 
and reinforces the importance of internal sensorimotor signals in the experience of 
agency. This research has shown that we have (some) direct access to internal 
bodily signals, and do not only rely on conceptual, inferential processes to assess 
our agency. However, this does not preclude the influence of any inferential 
processes to SoA. Nevertheless, these accounts of agency are still dependent on a 
representation of the outcome. Only when the outcome is known can it be compared 
with a prediction. Therefore, these processes can only inform SoA retrospectively. 
Moreover, the accounts discussed so far fail to recognise the importance of decision 
making, or action selection, processes to SoA. For example, if an archer releases 
her arrow accidentally, e.g. due to a loud noise, and hits the bulls eye, she will likely 
not feel in control of that outcome, even though it matches her goal, and she knows 
she caused it. Consequently, we can hypothesise that there is a prospective 
component of agency associated to the process of linking our intentions to our 
actions. 
 
 
Chapter 1. General Introduction 
33 
1.2.2.3. Linking Intentions to Actions 
Prospective contributions to sense of agency. 
Prospective cues to agency do arise even before action execution. Recent studies 
have found that action selection processes can influence the SoA (Chambon & 
Haggard, 2012; Chambon, Moore, & Haggard, 2014; Chambon, Wenke, Fleming, 
Prinz, & Haggard, 2013; Sebanz & Lackner, 2007; Sidarus, Chambon, & Haggard, 
2013; Wenke, Fleming, & Haggard, 2010; Wenke, Gaschler, Nattkemper, & Frensch, 
2009, see (Chambon, Sidarus, et al., 2014). For example, subliminal priming can be 
used to manipulate action selection (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2003; Lingnau & 
Vorberg, 2005; Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 2003). When 
primes are congruent with targets, action selection is easy, but when primes are 
incongruent with targets, action selection is impaired, as evidenced by slower 
reaction times (RTs) and more errors. In one study, participants responded to 
directional arrows, which were preceded by subliminal primes (Wenke et al., 2010). 
Actions triggered the appearance of coloured circles, after a variable delay. 
Participants were instructed to attend to the relation between actions and outcomes. 
Results showed that participants gave lower judgements of agency for outcomes that 
followed incongruently primed actions, compared to congruently primed actions. This 
shows that dysfluency, or difficulty, in selecting a correct response leads to a 
reduction in SoA. 
Importantly, this effect is independent of outcome monitoring, as outcomes were 
equally predictable across priming conditions. Moreover, fluency effects cannot be 
explained by RT monitoring (Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Chambon et al., 2013; 
Sidarus et al., 2013). In subliminal priming, a short interval between prime and target 
induces the effects previously described, termed “positive compatibility effect” (PCE). 
However, a longer prime-target interval can lead to a “negative compatibility effect” 
(NCE), wherein congruent priming leads to slower RTs and more errors than 
incongruent priming (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2003; Lingnau & Vorberg, 2005). 
Taking advantage of this divergence of effects, Chambon and Haggard (2012) 
showed that under both PCE and NCE conditions, incongruent priming led to a 
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reduction in SoA, compared to congruent priming. The influence of action selection 
on SoA is not linked to RT monitoring. 
These studies show that a metacognitive signal about the fluency of action selection 
processes can inform SoA prospectively. It has been suggested that the fluency of 
action selection may serve as an advance predictor of successful action (Haggard & 
Chambon, 2012). We may learn through experience that easy and well performed 
actions are more likely to yield the desired, or expected, outcomes than difficult or 
disrupted actions. Indeed, expertise is associated with better outcome prediction, 
e.g. in expert baseball players (Gray, Beilock, & Carr, 2007). We may learn to use a 
metacognitive feeling (Arango-Muñoz, 2010) of fluency as a heuristic device for 
estimating our SoA before the outcome is known. 
1.2.2.4. Integrating Multiple Cues 
As reviewed above, a number of processes have been found to influence the SoA. 
Recent frameworks highlight the integrative nature of SoA, which is informed by a 
variety of cues (Gallagher, 2012; Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009; Moore & Fletcher, 2012; 
Synofzik et al., 2008). In addition to inferences, beliefs and contextual information, 
internal signals are a critical component of SoA (see Figure 1.1 above). Moreover, 
different internal signals can arise at different times in the voluntary action chain 
(Chambon et al., 2013; Farrer et al., 2013). 
Moore and Fletcher (2012) have proposed that Bayesian cue-integration models 
may help in understanding this integrative process. Here, cues would be weighted 
differently according to their reliability and availability. These models have proved 
useful in understanding the integration between sensorimotor predictions and 
inferential processes (Wolpe, Haggard, Siebner, & Rowe, 2013). However, the 
reliability of cues may change over time, for example during instrumental learning. 
For example, under conditions of ambiguity in agency attribution, it has been shown 
that self-agency reports were associated with recent self-agency experiences 
(Bednark & Franz, 2014). Moreover, these proposals still cannot account for the 
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integration of cues over time (Farrer et al., 2013), nor for how the specific value of a 
cue may alter its weighing function (Sidarus et al., 2013). 
1.2.2.5. Neural Substrates of Sense of Agency 
Finally, it is worth briefly considering the neural substrates of our experience of 
agency (see David, Newen, & Vogeley, 2008 for a review). Many studies have 
implicated the regions in the parietal cortex in detecting mismatches between 
predicted and observed sensory feedback (Fink et al., 1999; Miele, Wager, Mitchell, 
& Metcalfe, 2011; Spengler et al., 2009, 2009; Sperduti, Delaveau, Fossati, & Nadel, 
2011; Yomogida et al., 2010), namely the angular gyrus (AG; Chambon, Moore, et 
al., 2014; Farrer et al., 2003; Farrer, Frey, et al., 2008; Farrer & Frith, 2002; 
Khalighinejad & Haggard, 2015; Nahab et al., 2011; Spengler et al., 2009; Tsakiris, 
Longo, & Haggard, 2010). Interestingly, increased activity in the AG was related to 
the conscious experience of a loss of agency, in association both with prospective, 
i.e. dysfluent action selection (Chambon et al., 2013), and retrospective cues to SoA, 
i.e. prediction-outcome mismatch (Farrer, Frey, et al., 2008). This suggests the AG 
may be involved in the online monitoring of agency. These findings support a view of 
self-agency as a default, with disruptions in the smooth flow from intentions, to 
actions, to outcomes, resulting in a loss of agency. 
Additionally, regions associated with initiating and monitoring voluntary action have 
been implicated. Disruption of the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) has 
been linked to a reduction of SoA (Cavazzana, Penolazzi, Begliomini, & Bisiacchi, 
2015; Javadi, 2015; Moore, Ruge, Wenke, Rothwell, & Haggard, 2010). This 
suggests a role for the pre-SMA in supporting a strong SoA (Tsakiris et al., 2010), 
similarly to the SMA (Kühn, Brass, & Haggard, 2012; Yomogida et al., 2010), and the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC; Chambon et al., 2013; Khalighinejad, Di Costa, 
& Haggard, 2016). 
Finally, other frontal regions have been implicated in the more reflexive aspects of 
SoA. The anterior PFC has been associated with stronger judgements of agency 
(Miele et al., 2011), and was previously implicated in metacognition of action 
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(Fleming & Dolan, 2012; Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees, 2010), as well as self-
knowledge and theory of mind, i.e. attributing mental states to others, more generally 
(Amodio & Frith, 2006). On other hand, the dorso-medial frontal cortex has been 
linked to external agency attributions (Spengler et al., 2009; Sperduti et al., 2011), 
consistent with its involvement in mentalizing tasks, i.e. attributing mental states to 
others (Amodio & Frith, 2006). 
1.3. Sense of Agency and Other Mental Functions 
In the above literature review on SoA we saw that much has been learned about how 
we link actions to outcomes, and self-attribute agency over those outcomes. 
However, the role of executive functions such as planning, decision making and 
cognitive control have been largely neglected, even though these are typically 
considered critical for the exercise of our agentic capacities (Schiffer, Waszak, & 
Yeung, 2015). The field of metacognition, in particular in relation to decision making, 
has been concerned with understanding how we monitor our cognitive processes in 
order to flexibly adapt our cognition and behaviour (Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). 
Recent work on prospective SoA highlights the need to bridge these two fields for a 
more complete understanding of human agency. Furthermore, the literature 
discussed above has also largely neglected how social context may influence SoA, 
and behaviour. The present section will briefly review these two topics, which are 
implicated in the research conducted for this thesis. 
1.3.1. Metacognition 
Metacognition can be simply defined as involving a meta-level cognitive process 
which is about an object-level cognitive process (Nelson & Narrens, 1990). It has 
been suggested that there are two interrelated levels of metacognition: a) a lower-
level involved in the monitoring and control of cognitive processes; and b) a higher-
level meta-representational level that interprets behaviour based on beliefs and 
theories (Arango-Muñoz, 2010; Koriat, 2000). “Epistemic feelings” may arise from 
monitoring processes and can be used to adjust behaviour online (Proust, 2008). 
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However, while both levels may be associated with explicit, conscious 
metacognition, monitoring and control processes may remain implicit (Fleming & 
Dolan, 2014). 
1.3.1.1. Conflict Monitoring 
Monitoring action selection allows the recruitment of cognitive control processes 
when needed, in order to adjust subsequent behaviour. For example, when a target 
stimulus appears surrounded by incongruent distractors, which activate a competing 
response alternatives, this response conflict leads to a slowing of RTs (e.g. Eriksen 
& Eriksen, 1974). Yet, this congruency effect is reduced in trials following response 
conflict, relative to following easy, congruent trials (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992; 
see Egner, 2007 for an overview). That is, detection of response conflict triggered 
behavioural adaptation, in order to improve performance. Although debate is on-
going, some studies have shown that conflict adaptation can also occur for 
unconsciously triggered response conflict (Atas, Desender, Gevers, & Cleeremans, 
2015; van Gaal, Lamme, & Ridderinkhof, 2010, but see Desender, Van Lierde, & 
Van den Bussche, 2013). Interestingly, a recent study, using unconsciously triggered 
conflict, suggested that a conscious experience of conflict, or difficulty in action 
selection, was necessary for conflict adaptation (Desender, Opstal, & Bussche, 
2014). 
Neural markers of conflict. 
At a neural level, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is thought to be involved in 
conflict monitoring, and to trigger cognitive control functions associated with more 
frontal regions, such as the dlPFC (Botvinick & Braver, 2015; Holroyd & Yeung, 
2012). Moreover, ACC-mediated conflict monitoring can also be identified in event 
related potentials (ERPs; for a review, see Larson, Clayson, & Clawson, 2014). In 
ERPs locked to target onset, response conflict leads to a large N2 component, a 
negative potentials peaking around 250-300ms after the target, at fronto-central sites 
(Kopp, Rist, & Mattler, 1996). This N2 component is thought to index conflict 
detection and resolution (Larson et al., 2014). 
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Error monitoring. 
Conflict monitoring theory has also been used to explain error monitoring and 
detection (Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). As accumulation of evidence for the 
correct response may continue after selecting a given action, post-decisional 
processing can reveal that the chosen response was incorrect, resulting in a conflict 
between the correct and the executed response (Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). In 
ERPs locked to the action, an error-related negativity (ERN) component emerges 
immediately after error commission (0-100ms), in comparison to correct responses 
(see Larson et al., 2014 for a review). In correct trials, a correct-related negativity 
(CRN) has been associated with task difficulty/uncertainty (Pailing & Segalowitz, 
2004; Scheffers & Coles, 2000). Errors and the ERN have also been associated with 
ACC activity (Carter et al., 1998; Charles, Van Opstal, Marti, & Dehaene, 2013). 
Therefore, it has been suggested that the target-locked N2 and the action-locked 
ERN components reflect pre- and post-decisional conflict monitoring, linked to the 
ACC (Larson et al., 2014; Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). 
1.3.1.2. Confidence 
In contrast to research on error monitoring, models of confidence judgements have 
typically emphasised a role for pre-decisional processing (Yeung & Summerfield, 
2012). Confidence is related to the speed of accumulation of evidence, as well as to 
the balance of evidence between response alternatives at the time of action (Kiani, 
Corthell, & Shadlen, 2014). However, post-decisional processing also influences 
confidence (Boldt & Yeung, 2015; Resulaj, Kiani, Wolpert, & Shadlen, 2009; 
Scheffers & Coles, 2000), showing that confidence judgements and error monitoring 
can both draw on the same post-decisional processing. For example, a study (Boldt 
& Yeung, 2015) varied the difficulty of a perceptual discrimination task, and obtained 
judgements on a six-point scale, ranging from certainly correct, to maybe correct, to 
certainly wrong. Results showed that increasing confidence in having made an error 
was associated with more negative CRN/ERN amplitude, as well a more positive Pe 
amplitude (another error-related ERP component found around 300ms after action). 
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Moreover, models of confidence judgements have often neglected the role of action 
and the motor system, where evidence accumulation can occur in parallel to 
perceptual processing (Cisek, 2007). A recent study showed that TMS stimulation of 
the premotor cortex associated with the unchosen response disrupted metacognitive 
accuracy in perceptual confidence judgements (Fleming et al., 2014). Moreover, 
these effects were found for stimulation both before and after the action. Therefore, 
confidence judgements rely on late-stage metacognitive processes, which are 
influenced by action-specific signals. These findings are particularly relevant to the 
present thesis, as they are consistent with the aforementioned influence of fluency in 
action selection to the sense of agency, which has also been linked with post-
decisional processing (Chambon, Moore, et al., 2014).  
1.3.1.3. Fluency 
Finally, the research considered above is also relevant to the widely studied effects 
of fluency on a variety of judgements, such as confidence, liking or familiarity (Alter & 
Oppenheimer, 2009). These effects have been associated with fluency at many 
levels of processing, such as perceptual, cognitive, linguistic, or memory-based. The 
experience, of feeling, of fluency is thought to be based on a qualitative signal about 
information processing, and can be broadly defined as a continuum, ranging from 
fluent or effortless, to dysfluent or effortful processing. Note that response conflict 
can lead to a conscious experience of dysfluency (Desender et al., 2014; Morsella et 
al., 2009). These experiences, or feelings are often vague, especially about their 
sources (Winkielman, Ziembowicz, & Nowak, 2015). Therefore, fluency/dysfluency 
experiences can “leak” into judgements, even if they may not be a relevant cue. It 
has also been argued that conflict (or dysfluency) may serve as an aversive signal 
(Botvinick, 2007). Consistently response conflict can lead to more negative affective 
judgements of subsequent neutral stimuli (Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013). Importantly, 
when fluency experiences can be attributed to an irrelevant source, they no longer 
influence judgements (cf. Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). Therefore, while fluency may 
often be a useful heuristic cue (Whittlesea & Leboe, 2003), it will not be taken into 
account if considered uninformative. 
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The work on metacognition reviewed in this section offers some insight into how 
action selection fluency influences the SoA. The work on conflict monitoring suggests 
that neural signals associated with response conflict detection and resolution could 
form the basis of the cue to SoA. Relatedly, the work on confidence suggests that 
similar, post-decisional, metacognitive processes may inform both confidence and 
agency judgements. Moreover, fluency effects on SoA could be linked to a general 
heuristic that would enhance SoA, or due to the affective consequences of response 
conflict. 
1.3.2. Social Aspects of Agency 
The experience of agency can be especially relevant in social contexts, as the 
presence of other agents can increase ambiguity in agency attribution. Moreover, 
concepts of personal and moral responsibility become more salient. These 
contextual effects may thus have important consequences to our SoA, as well as to 
our behaviour. In fact, the influence of social context on behaviour is well 
documented in the social psychology literature. For example, in emergency 
scenarios, the likelihood of someone helping decreases with the number of 
bystanders (Darley & Latane, 1968); when working in a group, people put in less 
effort than if they were working alone (Karau & Williams, 1993). These effects are 
thought to result from a diffusion of responsibility, in which individuals feel the 
responsibility for action lies with others (Bandura, 1991). Yet, this could merely 
reflect a post-hoc justification, related to self-serving biases, such as maintaining a 
positive self-image, rather than involving online changes in SoA. 
Interestingly, a recent study has shown that being coerced into giving electric shocks 
to others leads to a reduction in intentional binding, and an attenuation of outcome 
processing, relative to a free choice condition (Caspar, Christensen, Cleeremans, & 
Haggard, 2016). This shows that social context can influence low-level, implicit 
aspects of SoA, in a condition in which social desirability and self-serving biases 
were thought to underlie a reported reduction in responsibility. Under coercion, 
responsibility is displaced onto another agent (Bandura, 1991), thus agency 
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attribution may become more ambiguous. This is clearly also the case in a group 
work scenario. However, the help of one person may suffice in emergency situations, 
therefore, changes in decision making processes may be more relevant than 
attribution ambiguity. Social situations are associated with more complex decision 
making, and uncertainty, since the potential behaviour of other agents needs to be 
considered. Consequently, in line with the fluency effects mentioned above, it could 
be hypothesised that an increased difficulty in decision making could result in a 
reduction in SoA, and in the motivation to act. 
1.4. Limitations of the Previous Literature 
1.4.1. Focus on retrospective agency attribution 
The literature on SoA reviewed above shows that the role of action selection 
processes has been largely neglected. In particular, most of the literature that 
directly discusses “agency” involves explicit retrospective judgements to attribute 
agency to the self or others, often creating ambiguity through social situations. This 
is the easiest aspect of agency to measure, but it is only one of several varieties of 
agency experience. Our subjective experience of agency shows us that we can feel 
more or less in control of our actions and their outcomes, even when we know we 
have caused them. Moreover, many studies on SoA fail to adequately distinguish 
between different levels of goal and action representations. Thus, the apparent 
action in some studies (e.g. moving a cursor on a screen to reach a target) may be 
considered an outcome in others. A hierarchical organisation of intentions, actions 
and outcomes, linked to successive levels of action specification (e.g. Pacherie, 
2008), may help gain a better understanding of the interaction between different 
levels, and cues to agency. Finally, previous models imply that SoA only can only 
arise once the outcome is known. This ignores the possibility that SoA involves an 
online monitoring of multiple cues, which can become available at different times in 
voluntary action, and the subjective experience that SoA begins already during 
action selection. In general, this review of the literature shows that our understanding 
of the sense of agency has been largely like looking for one’s keys under the 
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streetlamp, irrespective of where one lost them. The concept of agency has become 
restrictively defined by the most intuitively obvious method of measuring it, namely 
explicit agency attribution. As a result, other varieties of agency experience, and 
other contributors to sense of agency, have been under-emphasised. 
1.4.2. Current prospective models remain unclear 
Recent work has revealed a prospective contribution to SoA, linked to action 
selection fluency. However, the concept of fluency remains unclear, especially since 
it has been dissociated from monitoring RTs (Chambon & Haggard, 2012). It also 
remains unclear which stages, or aspects, of action selection could contribute to 
SoA. In addition to pre-motor response conflict, could processing fluency, or 
uncertainty also influence SoA? Additionally, the integration between prospective, 
action-related, and retrospective, outcome-related, cues remains poorly understood 
(but see Sidarus et al., 2013). Finally, can such fluency effects on SoA be found if 
conscious stimuli are used to manipulate action selection? 
1.4.3. Does agency reflect fluency or effort? 
A recent study combined subliminal and supraliminal priming (Damen et al., 2014). 
Result showed that congruency effects were similar to those discussed earlier for 
subliminal priming (see section 1.2.2.3), but were reversed when primes were 
supraliminal. This would be consistent with other suggestions that effort could 
enhance SoA (Demanet, Muhle-Karbe, Lynn, Blotenberg, & Brass, 2013; Lafargue & 
Franck, 2009). However, this study only used free choice trials, and the effects of 
priming on action were minimal. The authors (Damen et al., 2014) instead suggested 
that actions that were consciously biased were associated with a reduction in 
perceived freedom, and thus a reduction in SoA. In line with an influence of choice 
on SoA, increasing the response space available to choose from, i.e. from 1 to 7 
buttons, has been associated with an increase in SoA (Barlas & Obhi, 2013). 
Nonetheless, “choice overload” effects have also been shown, in which having too 
many response options (e.g. 24) has a negative effect on motivation, behaviour, and 
preference judgements (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). These findings highlight that 
Chapter 1. General Introduction 
43 
choice, as well as fluency vs. effort can have different effects on SoA depending on 
context, but these contextual effects remain poorly understood. 
1.5. Aims of the Present Thesis 
The present thesis aimed to clarify the cognitive and neural processes underlying 
prospective contributions to SoA, related to the metacognitive monitoring of action 
selection processes. Thus, we aimed to go beyond the current centrality of explicit 
judgements of agency attribution in situations of social ambiguity. We did this by 
focussing on the cognitive processes that precede action, rather than by focussing 
on the consequences of action, as in previous studies. In addition, we used intuitively 
valid, but relatively novel measures of agency, namely explicit ratings of the feeling 
of control over an outcome. With these two key developments, we present a 
systematic family of several behavioural and electrophysiological experiments in 
healthy volunteers, designed to explore whether and how prospective cognitive 
processes contribute to the sense of agency. 
In Chapter 2, we manipulated action selection with supraliminal stimuli across 3 
experiments, to investigate the impact of awareness of conflict stimuli on the of 
selection fluency on SoA. We additionally investigated the influence of having a 
choice in what to do, or following instructions; and the effects of the timing of conflict. 
These studies also allowed us to test the generalisability of selection fluency effects 
on SoA by using a different manipulation of action selection. 
Chapter 3 developed new manipulations of action selection in a more ecological 
setting, a videogame-like task. Across 3 experiments, different stages of action 
selection were manipulated: processing fluency, ambiguity in stimulus categorisation, 
response conflict. This dynamic setting also allowed us to probe the interaction 
between prospective and retrospective cues to SoA. Action selection manipulations 
were factorially combined with introducing a discrepancy between movements and 
visual feedback. 
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Electrophysiological correlates of prospective cues to SoA were investigated in 
Chapter 4. The subliminal priming paradigm was combined with a manipulation of 
whether participants could choose which action to make, or had to follow an 
instruction. We investigated a possible relation between SoA and pre- and/or post-
decisional conflict monitoring ERPs, i.e. target-locked N2, and action-locked CRN. 
Additionally, we considered an ERP index of outcome monitoring, the feedback-
related negativity. This allowed an exploration of whether selection fluency effects on 
SoA were mediated by changes in outcome processing.  
Chapter 5 reports a multi-study analysis of the role of action selection to SoA, 
combining the studies described in Chapters 2 & 4 with other available studies (for a 
total of 7) This investigated the interaction between prospective, action selection 
related, vs. retrospective, outcome-based, cues to SoA. In particular, we assessed 
whether selection fluency effects might change over time, during action-outcome 
learning. 
Chapter 6 investigated the influence of social context, more specifically diffusion of 
responsibility, on action selection and SoA. For this, we developed a task based on a 
helping scenario, where there was no ambiguity about outcome attribution. In 
addition to explicit agency ratings, we measured the FRN in outcome-locked ERPs. 
This allowed us to test whether diffusion of responsibility might be associated with 
online changes in SoA and outcome monitoring. 
Finally, there will be a general discussion aiming to integrate the findings of the 
studies presented here and previous literature. In particular, we will discuss the 
relation between SoA and metacognition, and provide a tentative model of the 
contribution of metacognitive signals to different varieties of agency experience. 
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Chapter 2. Difficult Action Decisions Reduce the Sense of 
Agency: A Study Using the Eriksen Flanker Task 
 
 
 
Previous research on prospective contributions to the sense of agency has mostly 
used subliminal priming to manipulate action selection. It remained unclear whether 
affecting action selection with supraliminal stimuli would have similar effects. Here, 
we used supraliminal flankers to manipulate action selection in response to a central 
target. Experiment 1 revealed that conflict in action selection, induced by incongruent 
flankers and targets, led to lower agency ratings over action outcomes, relative to 
neutral and congruent flanker conditions. Experiment 2 replicated this result, and 
extended it to free choice between alternative actions. Finally, Experiment 3 varied 
the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between flankers and target. Action selection 
performance varied with SOA. Agency ratings were always lower in incongruent than 
congruent trials, and this effect did not vary across SOAs. Sense of agency is 
influenced by a signal that tracks conflict in action selection, regardless of the 
visibility of stimuli inducing conflict, whether choosing freely or following instructions, 
and even when the timing of the stimuli means that the conflict may not affect 
performance. 
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2.1. Introduction 
Much research on the sense of agency has focused on the process of retrospectively 
comparing expected and actual action outcomes (Blakemore et al., 2002; Wegner & 
Wheatley, 1999). Recent studies have revealed that a metacognitive signal about the 
fluency of action selection can also contribute to the sense of agency prospectively 
(for a review, see (Chambon, Sidarus, et al., 2014). These studies used subliminal 
priming to manipulate action selection in an agency task (Chambon & Haggard, 
2012; Chambon, Moore, et al., 2014; Chambon et al., 2013; Sidarus et al., 2013; 
Wenke et al., 2010). Participants make left or right actions according to a target 
arrow, which are followed by coloured circles – the action outcomes. Participants are 
then asked to judge how much control they felt over these circles. Unbeknownst to 
the subject, a small arrow – a prime – is briefly flashed before the target. When the 
prime is congruent with the target, and points in the same direction, action selection 
is easy; but when the prime is incongruent with the target, and points in the opposite 
direction, action selection is impaired, leading to slower reaction times (RTs) and 
more errors (e.g. Wenke et al., 2010). Results showed that the sense of agency over 
action outcomes was higher following congruently primed actions, compared to 
incongruently primed actions. 
Importantly, outcomes could not be predicted by the action or the prime alone, but 
depended on the congruency between prime and target. Further, the effects of action 
selection on sense of agency could not be explained by participants relying on a 
retrospective monitoring of RTs. Tellingly, a further experiment manipulated the 
timing of stimuli to induce either a normal priming effect or a “negative compatibility 
effect” (NCE; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998). In the NCE, congruent primes impair 
rather than facilitate motor performance. This manipulation reversed the effects of 
primes on RTs, as expected, but judgements of agency were always higher for 
congruent priming, in both normal and NCE priming (Chambon & Haggard, 2012). 
The authors proposed a model in which the very initial action intention, triggered by 
the prime, could be compared with the executed action. Congruency between the 
initial intention and action would facilitate a metacognitive signal about action 
selection, and thus lead to a higher sense of agency. The later motor inhibitory 
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processes that caused NCE would occur downstream of this metacognitive readout 
of initial intention. 
Since these primes were subliminal, participants were not aware that selection 
fluency was manipulated, and could not strategically decide to use fluency as a cue 
to agency (Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Wenke et al., 2010). Fluency can be thought 
of as a continuum between easy, or fluent, perceptual or cognitive processing, to 
effortful, or dysfluent, processing (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). Response conflict is 
an instance of highly effortful processing (Botvinick & Braver, 2015). Although the 
experience of selection fluency/dysfluency may be relatively weak, people may have 
a sense of “something going right/wrong” in congruent or incongruent trials 
respectively, without being able to identify why they have this feeling (Chambon, 
Sidarus, et al., 2014; Pacherie, 2008). It has been shown that people can reliably 
introspect on their experience of ease/difficulty in action selection, using a similar 
subliminal priming task (Desender et al., 2014), as well as with conflicting 
supraliminal stimuli (Morsella et al., 2009). This feeling could then become 
associated with subsequent events, such as action outcomes (Fritz & Dreisbach, 
2013; Winkielman et al., 2015). Interestingly, similar effects are found when 
measuring agency at the end of a trial (e.g. Chambon & Haggard, 2012) and at the 
end of a block (Wenke et al., 2010). This suggests that the association between 
fluency experiences and outcomes could build up over time. Alternatively, the 
learning of action-outcome relations may be disrupted by dysfluent action selection. 
In fact, the studies that used subliminal priming to manipulate selection fluency (e.g. 
Chambon et al., 2013; Wenke et al., 2010) differ considerably from previous 
research on the sense of agency, as they are focused on the instrumental learning of 
the relation between specific actions and a number of possible outcomes (Chambon, 
Filevich, et al., 2014). From this perspective, expertise with a given environment 
leads to a growing sense of ease, or flow, in selecting an action, which becomes 
associated with more predictable outcomes. On the other hand, research on the 
sense of agency has often focused on the attribution of agency. In such studies, 
action-outcome associations are often well known (Elsner et al., 2002), and may be 
Chapter 2. Studies with the Eriksen Flanker Task 
50 
violated (Kühn et al., 2011), and/or there may be ambiguity about “who” caused a 
specific outcome, i.e. me vs. another agent (e.g. Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). 
Response conflict induced by conscious stimuli has been shown to lead to a reduced 
sense of agency over one’s actions (Morsella et al., 2009). However, it remains 
unclear whether conscious stimuli that influence action selection might also alter the 
sense of agency over action outcomes. One suggestive study set out to manipulate 
the visibility of primes, while measuring judgements of agency over outcomes 
(Damen et al., 2014). Participants were aware of some primes, but not others. Prime 
words (“left” vs. “right”) were presented for a short or long duration, producing 
subliminal or supraliminal priming, respectively. Participants freely chose whether to 
press a left or right key once the following mask disappeared. Their action triggered 
a high or low tone after a variable delay, and participants judged their agency over 
the tone. For the subliminal priming condition, judgements of agency followed the 
pattern previously reported, i.e. higher ratings for trials in which the action was 
congruent with the prime, relative to prime-incongruent actions. However, for 
supraliminal primes, the effects were reversed, and higher ratings were found for 
prime-incongruent actions. The authors argued that awareness that one’s choice 
might have been biased by external input would reduce one’s sense of freedom and, 
in turn, one’s sense of agency. 
Importantly, Damen et al.’s (2014) study showed effects of priming on the sense of 
agency, despite showing little or no effect of either subliminal or supraliminal primes 
on reaction times. Priming of choices was only found for supraliminal primes, in one 
of two experiments. Thus, there is little evidence that primes influenced action 
selection processes in their study. This contrasts with previous reports in which even 
subliminal primes reliably biased free choices (Kiesel et al., 2006; Klapp & Haas, 
2005; Klapp & Hinkley, 2002; O’Connor & Neill, 2011; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004; 
Wenke et al., 2010). Instead, Damen et al. (2014) argued that action primes might 
influence agency judgements independently of influencing action selection, by 
affecting higher-order, conceptual representations of action and agency. 
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The present study aimed to clarify the contribution of action selection processes to 
sense of agency, using supraliminal stimuli to manipulate action selection across 3 
experiments. To additionally test the generalizability of these effects, a novel task 
was used – the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). This is widely used to 
induce response conflict, and assess cognitive control dynamics. The flanker task 
was adapted and combined with the design from the aforementioned subliminal 
priming studies (Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Wenke et al., 2010). Participants 
responded according to a target letter (e.g. left for S, right for H), which could appear 
flanked by congruent (e.g. HHHHH) or incongruent flankers (e.g. SSHSS). A 
coloured circle appeared after a variable delay, and participants judged their control 
over that colour. In the incongruent flanker condition, the presence of flankers 
associated with the alternative action should lead to response conflict, and thus an 
increase in RTs and errors. 
Experiment 1 aimed primarily to test how supraliminal stimuli relevant to action 
selection would affect the sense of agency in a situation where each action could 
produce one of a number of outcomes. Damen et al.’s results might suggest that the 
highest sense of agency would be found in the incongruent condition, when 
participants had to overcome conscious response conflict. However, if selection 
fluency has a general effect on the sense of agency then the highest sense of 
agency should be found in the congruent flanker condition. Additionally, we included 
a neutral condition, with task-irrelevant flankers (i.e. OOHOO) to try to distinguish 
facilitation and conflict effects on action (Kopp et al., 1996; Mansfield, van der Molen, 
Falkenstein, & van Boxtel, 2013; Taylor, 1977), and on the sense of agency. Finally, 
some previous studies measured agency ratings at the end of each trial, while others 
measured agency ratings at the end of a block. In this study, we exploratorily tested 
half of the participants with each method, though we did not have any strong 
prediction about interactions involving rating method. 
Importantly, free vs. instructed choice could modulate how awareness of priming 
stimuli would influence the sense of agency. For subliminal priming, having a higher 
or lower proportion of free choice trials, relative to forced choice, did not interact with 
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the effects of action selection on agency (Wenke et al., 2010). However, this may be 
different for conscious priming. A participant who consciously perceives a prime 
might recruit cognitive control resources to resist its influence, potentially increasing 
their sense of agency. This possibility was assessed in Experiment 2. Forced choice 
(i.e. instructed) trials were randomly intermixed with free choice trials. A task-
irrelevant target letter indicated a free choice trial, and appeared surrounded by task-
relevant flankers (e.g. HHOHH). Hence, actions could be congruent or incongruent 
with the flankers, whether the action was instructed by the central, attended stimulus, 
or was endogenously chosen. 
Additionally, the timing of stimuli affecting action selection, and thus response 
conflict, could be important. A sufficient amount of time may be needed between the 
appearance of biasing information and an instruction/go-signal to develop a clear 
awareness that one is either following or going against that information. One might 
then come to have a stronger sense of agency for overcoming external biases. 
Similarly, if there is enough time, cognitive control processes can inhibit the 
automatic motor activation induced by primes or flankers, thus abolishing their 
effects on motor performance (Flowers, 1990; Wascher, Reinhard, Wauschkuhn, & 
Verleger, 1999). In this case, choosing to go against the prime does not require any 
additional effort over choosing to go with the prime. Nonetheless, awareness of an 
external suggestion could still influence one’s sense of agency. 
To test the impact of the timing of conflicting stimuli, Experiment 3 parametrically 
varied the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between flankers and target. Flankers 
could precede the target by 500 ms (-500 SOA) or 100 ms (-100 SOA), be 
simultaneous with the target (0 SOA), or follow the target after 100 ms (+100 SOA). 
Maximal congruency effects on performance are found for -100 and 0 SOA 
conditions, but only small or no effects are found for the -500 and +100 SOA 
conditions (Eriksen & Schultz, 1979; Flowers, 1990; Taylor, 1977; Wascher, 
Reinhard, Wauschkuhn, & Verleger, 1999; Willemssen, Hoormann, Hohnsbein, & 
Falkenstein, 2004). We hypothesized that the -500 SOA condition would allow 
sufficient time for suppression of the flankers, and potentially alter effects of conflict 
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on sense of agency. The -100 SOA condition was expected to still show important 
effects on action selection, but the clear precedence of the flankers to the target 
might alter the subjective experience of conflict and agency. The 0 SOA condition 
should replicate our previous effects. In addition, the +100 SOA condition would 
serve to assess whether the temporal precedence of flankers or target might 
influence agency processing. If congruency between a first intention and the action 
performed is the important comparison for agency, as suggested by Chambon & 
Haggard (2012), then this condition should not affect agency even if it showed minor 
effects on performance. Since choice did not interact with fluency effects on agency 
in Experiment 2, only forced choice trials were used. 
2.2. Experiment 1 
2.2.1. Materials and Methods 
2.2.1.1. Participants 
The study was approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee. Twenty-five 
participants (13 female, mean = 23.62, SD = 3.98) were recruited, based on an a 
priori power calculation. For this, we used previous reports of prime compatibility on 
agency in ratings in operant reaction-time tasks (Chambon et al., 2013), since no 
previous study to our knowledge had investigated flanker congruency effects on 
sense of agency over action outcomes. With a Cohen’s dz of 0.66 (Chambon et al., 
2013), power = 0.8, and alpha = 0.05, a minimum sample size of 21 was indicated, 
but a slightly larger number were recruited, in anticipation of possible attrition. 
Participants gave written informed consent to participate in the study and received 
payment of £7.5/h. All were right-handed, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
did not suffer from colour blindness, and had no history of psychiatric or neurological 
disorders. There were two groups of participants: odd-numbered participants rated 
agency on every trial, while even-numbered participants rated agency at the end of 
each block. One participant in the block-wise rating group was excluded due to 
difficulties in distinguishing outcome colours. 
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2.2.1.2. Apparatus and Materials 
Participants were seated approximately 50 cm from a computer screen. The 
experiment was programmed and stimuli delivered with Psychophysics Toolbox v3 
(Brainard, 1997; Kleiner, Brainard, & Pelli, 2007; Pelli, 1997), running on Matlab 
(MATLAB 8.1, The MathWorks Inc., Natick, MA, 2013). During a trial, stimuli were 
presented in a mono-spaced font, Lucida Console. A fixation cross was presented in 
18 point font size. Target letters consisted of S’s or H’s, while flankers consisted of 
S’s, H’s or O’s. These were presented in 30 point font size, with the 5 letter array 
subtending 3.2° visual angle. Participants responded by pressing one of two keys on 
a keyboard. Outcome stimuli consisted of a circle of 2.8° presented in one of 6 
colours (red, blue, green, yellow, orange and pink). Different colours were used in 
the training phase.  
All participants gave agency ratings on a 9-point Likert scale. The trial-wise ratings 
group completed the rating procedure on the computer. For the block-wise ratings, 
participants were first asked to rank order the coloured circles (cut-outs) on a sheet 
of paper, and then gave a Likert rating for each colour. 
2.2.1.3. Design and Procedure 
The task involved making actions in response to targets, which were surrounded by 
distracting flankers. The action triggered the appearance of a coloured circle – the 
action outcome. Participants were instructed to pay attention to the relation between 
their actions and the outcomes that followed, as they were required to judge these 
relations at the end of each trial or each block, for the respective group. Participants 
had to respond with a left or right key press according to a central target letter (S or 
H, respectively). The assignment of target letters to a left or right action was 
counterbalanced across participants. Participants were instructed to ignore the 
flankers and focus on the central letter. Flankers could be congruent with the central 
target – e.g. HHHHH, and thus with the required action; incongruent – e.g. SSHSS; 
or neutral – e.g. OOHOO (Matchock & Mordkoff, 2007; Taylor, 1977). Flanker-target 
congruency was randomly varied across trials. 
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Outcome colours were dependent on both the congruency condition and the action 
performed. Thus, each action (left vs. right) was associated with three outcomes, 
one for each congruency condition (cf. Wenke et al., 2010). The condition-to-colour 
mapping varied across the blocks, so participants had to learn the action-outcome 
relations anew in each block, and were informed of this. The six outcome colours 
were rotated in a Latin square across the 6 blocks, and the block mapping was 
randomised. Each colour appeared once in each experimental condition, thus 
cancelling out any idiosyncratic colour preferences. To ensure that the frequency of 
each coloured outcome was equal despite differences in error rates across flanker-
action congruency conditions, error trials were replaced at the end of a block. 
Additionally, the action-outcome interval was varied orthogonally to the congruency 
factor. This was not a variable of interest, but served as a dummy variable, ensuring 
that participants were exposed to a range of experiences, varying from low sense of 
agency (for delayed outcomes) to high sense of agency (for less delayed outcomes; 
Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; Wenke et al., 2010). 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Timeline of an example incongruent trial, with trial-wise ratings. Participants 
responded according to a central target letter, surrounded by distractors. This triggered 
the appearance of a coloured circle, after a variable delay. Participants gave agency 
ratings at the end of each trial, for the trial-wise rating group; or completed a ranking/rating 
procedure at the end of each block, for the block-wise rating group. 
 
Participants were asked to judge how much control they felt over the coloured circles 
that were triggered by their actions (Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Wenke et al., 2010). 
For the trial-wise rating group, a 9-point Likert scale was presented at the end of 
each trial, where 1 was labelled “No Control” and 9 was labelled “Total Control”. The 
block-wise ratings group completed a ranking and rating procedure on a paper sheet 
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at the end of each block. Participants were instructed to rank order coloured circles 
on the sheet across 6 rankings, from “Most Control” to “Least Control”. After ranking, 
participants gave a rating of their sense of control on the Likert scale described 
above. 
The study started with a training block of 24 trials, to allow participants to get 
acquainted with the experiment and the agency ratings procedure. Participants were 
given a chance to ask questions and repeat the training if desired. To avoid colour 
mapping repetitions, different colours were used during the training and experimental 
phases. At the end of the study, participants completed a short debriefing 
questionnaire. 
2.2.1.4. Timeline 
Each trial started with a fixation cross presented for 500 ms. The flankers and target 
array appeared for 100 ms (Gratton et al., 1992; Rodrı́guez-Fornells, Kurzbuch, & 
Münte, 2002). Participants responded to the target within a 1.2 second window. If the 
response was correct, an outcome colour followed the response after a variable 
delay of 100, 300 or 500 ms. Outcome duration was 300 ms. If an incorrect response 
or no response was given, a black cross was presented for 300 ms. For the trial-wise 
rating group, the agency rating scale appeared after 800 to 1200 ms, and remained 
on the screen until a response was given. For both groups, the inter-trial interval 
varied randomly between 1 and 1.5 seconds. Each block consisted of 72 trials, and 
there were 6 blocks overall. At the end of each block, the block-wise rating group 
completed the ranking/rating procedure. All participants were allowed to take short 
breaks between blocks. 
2.2.1.5. Data Analysis 
For the block-wise ratings group, rating sheets were coded and the data 
computerised. Any blocks where mistakes were made in the ranking/rating 
procedure were excluded from analysis. Mistakes could involve mismatches between 
the ranking and rating, or the repetition of a colour name. This resulted in the 
exclusion of 1 block in 2 participants, and 2 blocks in another participant. 
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Reaction times (RTs), error rates and agency ratings were submitted to a 2 x 3 
mixed-design analyses of variance (ANOVA). The between-subjects factor was 
group: trial- or block- wise ratings group; and the within-subjects factor was flanker-
action congruency: congruent, neutral or incongruent. Planned comparisons were 
used to test differences between congruency levels. For the block-wise ratings 
group, agency ranks were submitted to a Friedman’s non-parametric test to assess 
the main effect of flanker-action congruency. Wilcoxon pairwise tests were used for 
planned comparisons. Within subjects 95% confidence intervals were obtained for 
the main effect of congruency (Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
2.2.2. Results 
2.2.2.1. Action Selection 
Analyses of RTs showed a significant effect of flanker-action congruency 
(F(2, 44) = 64.46, p < .001, ƞ!! = .75; see Figure 2.2.a), but no effect of group nor 
interaction (Fs < 1). Planned comparisons revealed that RTs were significantly 
slower (ps < .001) in the incongruent condition (mean = 514.78, SD = 67.84) 
compared to the neutral (mean = 487.42, SD = 70.99) and congruent conditions 
(mean = 475.02, SD = 65.25). RTs were also significantly slower in the neutral 
compared to the congruent condition (p = .004). 
Analyses of error rates revealed a significant main effect of congruency 
(F(2, 44) = 18.55, p < .001, ƞ!! = .46, Greenhouse-Geiser correction; see Figure 2.2.b). 
Planned comparisons showed that participants made significantly more errors in the 
incongruent (mean = 9.82%, SD = 8.39%) compared to neutral (mean = 5.79%, 
SD = 5.65%; incongruent vs. neutral: p = .001), and congruent conditions 
(mean = 4.29%, SD = 4.79%; incongruent vs. congruent: p < .001). The neutral 
condition also led to significantly more errors than the congruent condition (p = .017). 
Additionally, there was a significant main effect of group (F(1, 22) = 5.73, p = .026, ƞ!! = .21), as the trial-wise ratings group made significantly more errors than the 
block-wise ratings group. This presumably reflects higher task difficulty for the trial-
wise rating group, as they had to give agency ratings in each trial, which meant they 
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had to press different keys. In contrast, the block-wise rating group could focus 
exclusively on responding to the target, and could keep their fingers on the response 
keys throughout a block. Finally, there was no significant interaction between group 
and congruency (F(1, 22) = 2.65, p = .10, ƞ!! = .11, Greenhouse-Geiser correction). 
However, our study may not have had strong enough power to investigate 
interactions involving the effect of group. 
a. 
  
 
b. 
 
  
 
c. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Results for Experiment 1. Panel a. shows mean reaction times across flanker-
action congruency conditions (collapsed across groups), and b. shows mean error rates. 
Both facilitation and conflict effects can be seen in RTs and error rates. c. Mean agency 
agency ratings show only an effect of conflict, such that agency ratings were significantly 
reduced following incongruent relative to neutral and congruent trials. Error bars show the 
within subjects 95% confidence intervals for the main effect of congruency. 
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2.2.2.2. Agency Ratings 
The ANOVA on agency ratings revealed a significant main effect of congruency 
(F(2, 44) = 4.70, p = .014, ƞ!! = .18; see Figure 2.2.c). Planned comparisons confirmed 
that the incongruent condition (mean = 5.13, SD = 1.57) led to significantly lower 
ratings compared to the congruent (mean = 5.66, SD = 1.74; incongruent vs. 
congruent: p = .013), and the neutral condition (mean = 5.42, SD = 1.63; incongruent 
vs. neutral: p = .039), whereas the congruent and neutral conditions were not 
significantly different (p = .21). There was no significant effect of group (F(2, 44) = 1.29, 
p = .29, ƞ!! = .013), nor a significant group x congruency interaction (F(1, 22) = 0.30, 
p = .59, ƞ!! = .055). 
For the block-wise group, agency ranks were also analysed, and results showed a 
significant main effect of congruency (χ2 (2) = 8.73, p = .013). Planned comparisons 
replicated the pattern of results seen for the agency ratings: the incongruent 
condition (median = 3.25, SD = 0.99) led to significantly lower agency ranks than the 
congruent condition (median = 4.00, SD = 0.66; incongruent vs. congruent:  
Z = -2.57, p = .010, r = -0.37), and the neutral condition (median = 3.50, SD = 0.50; 
incongruent vs. neutral: Z = -2.27, p = .024, r = -0.33); whereas there was no 
significant difference between congruent and neutral conditions (Z = -0.99, p = .32, 
r = -0.14).  
2.2.3. Discussion 
Experiment 1 showed that flanker-action congruency influenced action selection as 
predicted. The sense of agency over action outcomes was significantly reduced 
following dysfluent action selection, compared to fluent selection. This replicates 
recent work demonstrating a prospective contribution of action selection processes 
to the sense of agency (Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Chambon et al., 2013; Sidarus 
et al., 2013; Wenke et al., 2010), and generalises the finding across different 
behavioural tasks. So far, most studies used subliminal priming to manipulate action 
selection (Chambon, Sidarus, et al., 2014), or assessed agency over the action 
(Morsella et al., 2009). To the best of our knowledge, the present study is the first to 
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show a reduction in the sense of agency over action outcomes following dysfluent 
action selection, even though participants could consciously perceive the stimuli that 
influenced action selection. 
Previous studies (Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Chambon et al., 2013; Sidarus et al., 
2013; Wenke et al., 2010) used subliminal priming to manipulate action selection in 
order to preclude the explicit awareness that one’s action was manipulated. 
Additionally, this increased uncertainty about the outcomes, since they were 
contingent on both the action and the congruency between the (invisible) prime and 
the action. That is, as the primes were not consciously perceived, the relation 
between prime-action congruency and specific outcomes could not be represented, 
hence outcomes were never fully predictable. In contrast, as participants were aware 
of the flankers in the present study, they could learn the full contingency schedule 
between the letter strings and outcome colours. For example, in a given block, 
participants could learn that the letter array “SSSSS” was followed by a green circle, 
whereas “HHSHH” was followed by a red circle. Debriefing confirmed that most 
participants were aware of this relation. Moreover, the causes of difficulties in action 
selection, i.e. incongruent flankers, were now clearly available to participants. 
Nevertheless, the same effects of action selection fluency on agency ratings were 
found, irrespective of perceptual awareness of the stimulus trigger. 
Moreover, there was no significant difference in the fluency effects on agency across 
the two rating procedures, i.e. trial- vs. block- wise ratings. While the same effects 
had been shown using both procedures, this was the first study to combine them. 
Previous studies suggest that action selection fluency affects agency online 
(Chambon, Moore, et al., 2014; Chambon et al., 2013). Additionally, the association 
between different fluency experiences and ensuing outcomes can be retained in 
memory, at least for long enough to accumulate over the course of a block of trials, 
as seen here and in Wenke et al. (2010). 
The inclusion of a neutral condition allowed us to distinguish an enhanced sense of 
agency due to facilitation of action selection, from a reduction of agency due to 
response conflict. Only the effect of conflict in action selection yielded a significant 
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modulation of agency ratings (see Figure 2.2). When flankers were congruent with 
the central target, participants were faster and made fewer errors, than when the 
flankers were neutral. Additionally, incongruent flankers led to significantly slower 
RTs and more errors, compared to neutral flankers. However, while agency ratings 
were significantly lower following incongruent flankers, compared to neutral and 
congruent flankers, the trend for higher ratings following congruent compared to 
neutral flankers was not statistically significant. 
It should be noted that other baseline conditions, and different tasks, could yield a 
different pattern of facilitation/conflict (Jonides & Mack, 1984). The present study 
used task-irrelevant stimuli as neutral flankers, which yielded both facilitation and 
conflict effects on performance. As congruency effects on agency ratings are smaller 
than for RTs, the absence of a facilitation effect could result from a lack of statistical 
power within-subjects. Additionally, the between-subjects design resulted in a 
smaller sample in each group. Thus, we had low statistical power for between-
subjects effects and interactions. However, these between-subjects effects did not 
form the focus of our predictions. These considerations mean that null between-
subjects effects should be interpreted with particular care. Nevertheless, our key 
results, of congruency effects on agency ratings, are based on within-subjects 
comparisons. Further, they are consistent with those obtained with the subliminal 
priming paradigm (Chambon & Haggard, 2012). There, the reduction in agency 
ratings following incongruent, compared to neutral primes, was larger than the 
increase in ratings following congruent primes, though neither was statistically 
significant. A positive sense of agency may be a “default state” (Blakemore et al., 
2002; Sidarus et al., 2013). Reduced agency may be triggered by disruptions in the 
intention-action-outcome chain, which may produce a salient experience relevant to 
agency judgement (Chambon, Sidarus, et al., 2014). 
Our results contrast sharply with those of Damen et al. (2014). That study reported 
higher agency ratings when participants chose an action incongruent with a 
supraliminal prime, compared to when they chose a prime-congruent action. 
Importantly, free choice trials were used in their study, whereas here participants had 
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to follow the instruction of a central flanker. Experiment 2, therefore, investigated 
whether choice may interact with the effects of flanker congruency on sense of 
agency, when biasing stimuli are consciously perceived. Free and forced choice 
targets were randomly intermixed, such that actions could be congruent or 
incongruent with the flankers, whether the action was instructed by the central, 
attended stimulus, or was endogenously chosen. 
2.3. Experiment 2 
2.3.1. Materials and Methods 
2.3.1.1. Participants 
Participant recruitment and study approval was as in Experiment 1. Twenty-four 
participants were tested (13 female, mean = 21.50, SD = 3.02).  
2.3.1.2. Design and Procedure 
Testing conditions and stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1, except that instead 
of a neutral flanker condition, the letter O now served as a neutral target in free 
choice trials. In free choice trials, the neutral target was surrounded by flankers 
associated with a left or right action. For example, if the array “SSOSS” was 
presented, participants could choose whether to act congruently with the flankers 
and make a left action, or act incongruently with the flankers and choose a right 
action. Thus, flanker-action congruency was not related to the stimuli, but rather 
reflected the participants’ action choice. In forced choice trials, the congruent or 
incongruent conditions were as described in Experiment 1. The new 2 (choice: free 
vs. forced) x 2 (congruency: congruent vs. incongruent) design meant that 8 outcome 
colours were used, 4 associated with each hand, 1 per choice x congruency 
condition. The colours were Latin square rotated across 8 blocks of 64 trials, and the 
condition-colour block mappings were randomised. 
All participants gave agency ratings at the end of each trial, thus the trial timeline 
was the same as the trial-wise group in Experiment 1. Only 2 action-outcome 
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intervals were used (200 and 400 ms), to reduce the overall number of conditions. As 
in Experiment 1, the study began with a training block of 32 trials, and ended with a 
debriefing questionnaire. 
2.3.1.3. Data Analysis 
Reaction times were submitted to a 2 x 2 ANOVA, with choice (free vs. forced) and 
flanker-action congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) as within-subjects factors. 
Agency ratings were submitted to a similar ANOVA, with action-outcome interval 
(200 vs. 400 ms) as an additional within-subjects factor. For free choice trials, the 
proportion of flanker congruent choices was analysed with a one-sample t-test 
against a .05 chance level. For forced choice trials, error rates were analysed with a 
paired-samples t-test comparing congruent and incongruent conditions. Within 
subjects 95% confidence intervals for pairwise comparisons were calculated 
separately for free and forced choice trials (Pfister & Janczyk, 2013). 
2.3.2. Results 
2.3.2.1. Action Selection 
Analyses of RTs revealed no significant main effect of choice (F(1, 23) = 1.65, p = .21,  ƞ!! = .067), a significant main effect of congruency (F(1, 23) = 20.76, p < .001, ƞ!! = .47; 
see Figure 2.3.a), and a significant choice x congruency interaction (F(1, 23) = 5.67, 
p = .026, ƞ!! = .20). Simple effects t-tests showed a significant congruency effect for 
forced choice trials, i.e. slower RTs for the incongruent (mean = 544.28, SD = 88.73) 
than the congruent condition (mean = 513.09, SD = 83.49), and a similar modest 
trend for free choice trials (free congruent: mean = 515.27, SD = 88.85; free 
incongruent: mean = 525.50, SD = 96.85; one-tailed, free: t(23) = -1.72, p = .050, 
Cohen's dz = -.35; forced: t(23) = -4.68, p < .001, Cohen's dz =.96). Additionally, 
incongruent trials led to significantly slower RTs in forced compared to free choice 
(t(23) = -2.18, p = .040, Cohen's dz = .44). Choice did not affect RTs in congruent trials 
(t < 1). 
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In free choice trials, flanker congruent choices were made in 57.47% (SD = 5.72) of 
trials (see Figure 2.3.b). A one sample t-test showed that the proportion of flanker-
congruent choices was significantly different from chance (t(23) = 6.40, p < .001, 
Cohen's dz = 1.31). For forced choice trials, a paired samples t-test on error rates 
showed that the incongruent condition (mean = 19.33%, SD = 11.73) led to 
significantly more errors than the congruent condition (mean = 14.85%, SD = 10.15; 
t(23) = -4.39, p < .001, Cohen's dz = -.90; see Figure 2.3.c). 
2.3.2.2. Agency Ratings 
An ANOVA on agency ratings revealed a significant main effect of congruency 
(F(1, 23) = 12.70, p = .002, ƞ!! = .36). Flanker-incongruent actions (mean = 6.25, 
SD = 1.07) led to lower agency ratings than flanker-congruent actions (mean = 5.80, 
SD = 1.23; see Figure 2.3.d). Critically, there was no significant main effect of 
choice (F(1, 23) = 1.48, p = .24, ƞ!! = .061), nor a significant choice by congruency 
interaction (F(1, 23) = 2.32, p = .14, ƞ!! = .092). 
There was a marginal effect of action-outcome interval (F(1, 23) = 3.65, p = .069, ƞ!! = .14), such that ratings for the long interval (400ms; mean = 6.08, SD = 1.10) 
were higher than for the short interval (200ms; mean = 6.01, SD = 1.12). These 
results are inconsistent with previous findings using other tasks (Chambon & 
Haggard, 2012; Chambon, Moore, et al., 2014; Haggard et al., 2002; Sidarus et al., 
2013). In previous studies, using a wider range of intervals, higher ratings were 
found for shorter intervals, recalling Hume’s concept of temporal contiguity as a cue 
for causation (Hume, 1740). Importantly, action-outcome interval did not interact with 
the factors of interest – choice and congruency (Fs < 1). Since action-outcome 
interval was not a factor of interest, this factor will not be discussed further. 
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Figure 2.3. Results for Experiment 2. a. Mean reaction times for free and forced choice 
trials, and flanker-action congruency conditions. Congruency effects were larger for forced 
choice trials, and RTs in incongruent trials were slower in forced choice conditions. 
b. Percentage of trials in which participants chose the action that was congruent or 
incongruent with the flankers in free choice trials, revealing a bias towards flanker-congruent 
choices. c. Mean errors rates,in flanker-congruent or incongruent actions, for forced choice 
trials, with more errors being made in incongruent trials. d. Mean agency ratings across 
conditions, showing only a main effect of flanker-action congruency, with lower ratings 
following flanker-incongruent actions, for both free and forced choice trials. Error bars display 
the pairwise within subjects 95% confidence intervals, calculated separately for free and 
forced choice trials. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.001 
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2.3.3. Discussion 
Experiment 2 showed that action selection was influenced by flanker – action 
congruency in both free and forced choice trials. Flankers biased choice, such that 
participants were ~ 7 % more likely to ‘freely’ select actions corresponding to the 
flanker suggestion, compared to against it. Similar biases have been found using 
subliminal priming (Mattler & Palmer, 2012; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004; Wenke et 
al., 2010). Flanker-incongruent actions led to significantly slower RTs in forced 
choice trials, with a similar trend in free choice trials. Additionally, incongruent forced 
choice trials led to significantly slower RTs than incongruent free choice trials. 
Hence, the cost on performance of freely choosing an action incongruent with the 
flankers was smaller than the cost of following an instruction with incongruent 
flankers. Consistently, a greater flexibility for changes of mind has been shown for 
free, compared to forced, choices (Fleming, Mars, Gladwin, & Haggard, 2009). 
Crucially, response conflict, induced by supraliminal flankers, significantly reduced 
the sense of agency over action outcomes for both instructed and freely chosen 
actions. 
Our results additionally show that the discrepancy between our findings and those of 
Damen et al. (2014) cannot be explained by whether participants could freely choose 
which action to perform, or had to follow an instruction. Although null effects should 
be interpreted with care, the absence of an interaction between choice and 
congruency seen here is consistent with a previous subliminal priming study (Wenke 
et al., 2010). In Wenke et al.‘s (2010) study, free and forced choice trials were 
intermixed, and free choices were effectively biased by subliminal primes, similarly to 
our results. On the other hand, Damen et al. (2014) found little effect of sub- or 
supraliminal primes on choice, possibly due to the exclusive use of free choice trials. 
This could have allowed participants to decide which action to make before the 
beginning of a trial, and thus before the prime was presented. In fact, it has been 
shown that priming effects seen in blocks of intermixed free and forced choice trials 
are abolished in blocks with only free choice trials (Klapp & Haas, 2005; 
Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004). 
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Nonetheless, Damen et al. (2014) did find priming effects on agency. The authors 
argued that the observed reduction in the sense of agency when following a 
conscious prime could have been due to a reduced sense of freedom. Using only 
free choice trials could have potentially increased the overall sense of freedom 
experienced in the task, relative to mixed conditions, rendering a reduction in that 
perceived freedom, due to conscious biases, more salient. This sense of freedom 
may affect agency at a higher, conceptual level, and independently of action 
selection. 
Another relevant difference between the two studies, which is related to action 
selection, lies in stimulus timing. In Damen et al., the prime preceded the go signal 
by 250 ms in the supraliminal priming condition, and there was no time limit for 
response. In contrast, in our study, flankers and targets were presented 
simultaneously, speed was emphasised, and a tight response window was imposed. 
Hence, a ‘sufficient’ amount of time may be necessary for a realisation that one’s 
actions are being biased, and thus override the normal relation between selection 
fluency and sense of agency. To assess whether the timing of conflict stimuli may 
influence the sense of agency, the interval between flankers and target onset was 
parametrically varied in Experiment 3. 
2.4. Experiment 3 
2.4.1. Materials and Methods 
2.4.1.1. Participants 
Participant recruitment and study approval was as in Experiments 1 & 2. Twenty-six 
participants were tested (13 female, mean age = 23.08, SD = 3.63). One participant 
was excluded as she did not follow instructions, and sometimes used only one hand 
to press the left and right key. 
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2.4.1.2. Design and Procedure 
Testing conditions were the same as in Experiment 2, but with only forced choice 
trials. Additionally, the flanker-target stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) was randomly 
varied across the trials. Flankers could appear: 500 ms before target onset (-500 
SOA); 100 ms before target onset (-100 SOA), simultaneously with the target 
(0 SOA); or 100 ms after the target (+100 SOA). To accommodate the varying SOA 
conditions, target duration was now set to 150 ms (Wascher et al., 1999). Flankers 
were displayed until the target duration elapsed. Action-outcome intervals were also 
changed to 100 and 500 ms to enhance the discriminability of the 2 intervals, while 
keeping the experimental session short. 
Each block included 4 outcome colours, one per action x congruency condition, 
orthogonal to the flanker-target SOA conditions. To obtain a similar number of trials 
per SOA x congruency condition to the previous experiments, 12 blocks of 64 trials 
were used. To ensure that each outcome colour appeared only once for each action 
x congruency condition, 12 colours were used overall in the experiment. These were 
rotated with a Latin square across the 12 blocks, in groups of 4, and the block 
mappings were randomised. The 12 colours were shown to participants at the 
beginning of the study to confirm that they could reliably distinguish them. 
Participants were also instructed that the colours or the relation between action and 
colours could change across blocks, so they needed to learn them anew in each 
block. As in the previous experiments, the study began with a training block of 32 
trials, and ended with a debriefing questionnaire. 
2.4.1.3. Data Analysis 
RTs and error rates were submitted to a 4 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with the 
factors flanker-target SOA (-500, -100, 0, +100) and flanker-action congruency 
(congruent vs. incongruent). Agency ratings were submitted to a similar ANOVA that 
additionally included the factor action-outcome interval (100 vs. 500 ms). 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were used whenever the sphericity assumption was 
violated. Bonferroni adjusted post-hoc tests were used to probe the main effect of 
SOA. The SOA x congruency interactions were investigated with paired samples 
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t-tests, with a Bonferroni adjustment, to test congruency effects across SOAs. Within 
subjects 95% confidence intervals for the pairwise differences between congruency 
conditions were calculated separately for each SOA (Pfister & Janczyk, 2013). 
2.4.2. Results 
2.4.2.1. Action Selection 
Analyses of RTs revealed significant main effects of SOA (F(3, 72) = 240.77, p < .001, ƞ!! = .91), and congruency (F(1, 24) = 60.40, p < .001, ƞ!! = .72), and a significant SOA 
x congruency interaction (F(1, 24) = 9.28, p < .001, ƞ!! = .28). Post-hoc tests to explore 
the main effect of SOA showed that all pairwise comparisons between SOAs were 
significant (ps < .001). As Figure 2.4.a shows, RTs were faster with earlier 
presentation of the flankers. Probing the SOA x congruency interaction revealed 
significant congruency effects at each SOA (ps < .001), except at -500 SOA 
(t(1, 24) = -1.04, p = .31). 
Analyses of error rates showed no significant effect of SOA (F(1, 24) = 1.08, p = .36,  ƞ!! = .04), a significant main effect of congruency (F(1, 24) = 31.61, p < .001, ƞ!! = .57), 
and a significant SOA x congruency interaction (F(1, 24) = 5.01, p = .003, ƞ!! = .17). 
Post hoc tests revealed significant congruency effects for -100 and 0 SOA (-100 
SOA: t(1, 24) = -5.08, p < .001, Cohen’s dz = -1.02; 0 SOA: t(1, 24) = -3.54, p = .002, 
Cohen’s dz = .71), but not for -500 or +100 SOA (-500: t(1, 24) = -.39, p = .70, Cohen’s 
dz = -0.078; +100: t(1, 24) = -1.58, p = .13, Cohen’s dz = -0.32; see Figure 2.4.b). 
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Figure 2.4. Results for Experiment 3. a. Mean reaction times across flanker-target 
stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs), and flanker-action congruency conditions. There are 
congruency effects at all SOAs except -500 ms. b. Mean error rates across condition, 
showing a larger congruency effects at -100 and 0 SOAs. c. Mean agency ratings across 
conditions. There was only a main effect of congruency, with incongruent trials leading to 
lower ratings than congruent trials, regardless of flanker-target SOA. Error bars show the 
within subjects 95% confidence intervals for the congruency pairwise differences, for each 
SOA. * - p < .05, ** - p < .001 
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2.4.2.2. Agency Ratings 
Analyses of agency ratings revealed a marginal main effect of congruency 
(F(1, 24) = 3.99, p = .057, ƞ!! = .14), in the predicted direction: incongruent flankers 
(mean = 6.42, SD = 1.57) led to lower ratings compared to congruent flankers 
(mean = 6.67, SD = 1.47; see Figure 2.4.c). Notably, there was no main effect of 
SOA (F(3, 72) = .87, p = .46, ƞ!! = .035), and no interaction between SOA and 
congruency (F(3, 72) = .40, p = .75, ƞ!! = .017). The absence of SOA effects on agency 
ratings can be clearly observed in Figure 2.4.c. 
Finally, there was a trend towards a main effect of action-outcome interval 
(F(1, 24) = 3.27, p = .083, ƞ!! = .12), with long intervals (500 ms; mean = 6.57, 
SD = 1.47) leading to higher agency ratings than short intervals (100 ms; 
mean = 6.53, SD = 1.50). There was also a marginal interaction between 
congruency and action-outcome interval (F(1, 24) = 3.48, p = .074, ƞ!! = .13), which 
was not a focus of prediction, and so was not explored further. The remaining 
interactions were not significant (ps > .18). Both action-outcome interval results are 
inconsistent with previous priming studies (Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Chambon, 
Moore, et al., 2014; Sidarus et al., 2013). Even though the difference between the 
two intervals was increased, relative to Exp. 2, varying the flanker-target SOA may 
have changed the perception of the subsequent action-outcome interval, and 
disrupted its normal effects on agency. Since action-outcome interval was not a 
manipulation of interest, this will not be discussed further.  
2.4.3. Discussion 
Results showed that flanker effects on action selection were modulated by the 
flanker-target SOA. As predicted, flankers had no effect on action selection at -500 
SOA, but incongruent flankers did lead to performance costs with the other SOAs 
(see Figure 2.4.a and b). Additionally, there was a gradual increase in RTs with 
increasing SOA, possibly due to an alerting effect of early flankers, also found in 
previous studies (Flowers, 1990; Taylor, 1977; Wascher et al., 1999; Willemssen et 
al., 2004). Critically, there was no significant interaction between flanker-target SOA 
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and congruency on agency ratings. That is, incongruent conditions led to 
(marginally) lower agency ratings than congruent conditions, but did so similarly 
across flanker-target SOAs (see Figure 2.4.c), including SOAs where flankers had 
no performance effects. 
These results are inconsistent with the hypothesis outlined above of an interaction 
between the timing of conflict during action selection and the direction of fluency 
effects on agency. That hypothesis suggested that SOAs favouring successful 
inhibitory cognitive control might lead to higher agency ratings for incongruent, rather 
than congruent flankers. At -500 SOA, we found efficient inhibitory cognitive control, 
resulting in no congruency effect on RTs or error rates, yet sense of agency was still 
higher for congruent than incongruent trials. Therefore, the results of Damen et al. 
(2014) cannot be explained by a longer time delay between a biasing influence and 
action allowing the recruitment of cognitive control to efficiently overcome those 
biases.  
The dissociation seen here between congruency effects on motor performance and 
on agency ratings is, however, consistent with Damen et al. (2014), where priming 
influenced agency but not action selection. The authors argued that the effects were 
independent of selection fluency, but rather due to priming of conceptual 
representations of action, or to influencing the experience of freedom. A dissociation 
between motor effects and agency was also found in a subliminal priming study, 
using NCE priming (Chambon & Haggard, 2012). It was proposed that congruency 
between an initial prime’s suggestion and the executed action could serve as a 
fluency signal that would increase the sense of agency. 
However, neither of these proposals can fully account for our results, since they 
would predict that only congruency between the first intention and the action should 
matter. Our results show that the appearance of incongruent flankers 100 ms after 
the target still affected the sense of agency, even though the action performed 
remained congruent with the first intention, which was presumably triggered by the 
target. Therefore, it seems that holding conflicting intentions is key for the observed 
reduction in the sense of agency, rather than the precise dynamics of the selection 
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process. Importantly, this condition still led to congruency effects on motor 
performance, consistent with earlier reports (Eriksen & Schultz, 1979; Taylor, 1977). 
Action selection processes take time, and will be susceptible to disruptions occurring 
within a given time window. When using arrow stimuli in the flanker task, no 
performance effects were found with a +100 SOA (Wascher et al., 1999). Thus, the 
window in which action selection can be disrupted may vary depending on whether 
the stimulus is imperative in nature.  
Our results are compatible with a view of the sense of agency as resulting from an 
integration of information about conflict over a wider time-window than the time-
window of action selection. It has been argued that fluency/conflict signals are 
relatively non-specific with respect to their sources, and have only a general 
influence (Winkielman et al., 2015). The temporal sensitivity of such signals, and of 
their integration in the sense of agency, may be low relative to the precise temporal 
dynamics of action selection and execution. To better characterise this window of 
temporal integration, future studies could include more flanker-target asynchrony 
values. In particular, one might ask whether flankers continue to influence the sense 
of agency even when presented so late that they no longer influence reaction times. 
2.5. General Discussion 
Overall, our results suggest that the sense of agency over an action outcome is 
informed by cognitive processes occurring prior to action execution, particularly 
those processes involved in initiating a correct rather than an inappropriate action. In 
many situations, action control requires identifying an appropriate target, and then 
selecting and initiating the corresponding action, while avoiding the influence of 
distractors. The feeling of control over the consequences of action is influenced by 
these processes. Part of the content of agency judgements appears to derive from 
monitoring processes that detect response conflict during action selection. 
Interestingly, we found that sense of agency was insensitive to the specific dynamics 
of conflict at the level of motor performance. Thus, the prospective, premotor signals 
that influence sense of agency appear to signal a disruption in action selection 
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whenever conflict emerges, regardless of whether the conflict is successfully 
resolved, and of how performance is affected (cf. Chambon & Haggard, 2012). 
Additionally, this putative monitoring system can integrate information about action 
selection in a time window that is broader than that which affects selection at a motor 
level. Moreover, the effects of action selection on the sense of agency can be 
independent of the effects of choice, and of the effects of being aware of influences 
on one’s action or choice. That is, regardless of whether we have a choice in what to 
do, and whether we are aware of stimuli that could bias our decisions, dysfluent or 
difficult action selection can lead to a reduction in our sense of agency over action 
outcomes. Finally, we have shown that these effects generalise across tasks. 
Our results imply that the sense of agency depends on some internal signal related 
to selecting between alternative actions. In that regard, our results are compatible 
with ‘metacognitive’ theories of agency (Metcalfe & Greene, 2007). Where might 
these internal signals be found within the motor system? The supplementary motor 
area (SMA) is necessary for triggering the automatic inhibition processes thought to 
underlie NCE priming, whereas upstream regions such as the pre-SMA are not 
(Sumner et al., 2007). Such automatic inhibition processes were not found to disrupt 
the sense of agency (Chambon & Haggard, 2012). The pre-SMA has in turn been 
implicated in monitoring response conflict, elicited both by conscious and 
unconscious stimuli (van Gaal, Scholte, Lamme, Fahrenfort, & Ridderinkhof, 2010). 
Relatedly, the premotor cortex, but not the primary motor area, has been shown to 
contribute to metacognitive judgements of perceptual confidence (Fleming et al., 
2014). More specific to the present findings, an fMRI study (Chambon et al., 2013) 
used the subliminal priming paradigm to study congruency effects on the sense of 
agency. This study showed that the dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex was sensitive to 
response conflict, and was associated with the angular gyrus, wherein higher activity 
was linked to a greater reduction in agency ratings. Together, these studies suggest 
that the metacognitive monitoring of action selection that informs the sense of 
agency, may rely on higher-order action representations in premotor and prefrontal 
areas, rather than low-level motor signals in the primary motor cortex. 
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Importantly, the congruency effects on agency seen here are not due to a 
retrospective inferential process, but rely on prospective signals from action 
monitoring processes. As the flankers were clearly visible, one might be tempted to 
think that the observed effects could result from a retrospective comparison between 
the flankers and the target, or action, namely at a conceptual level. However, this 
would imply that neutral flankers would lead to a loss of agency, as they were visibly 
different from the target. Instead, the effects seen here appear specifically related to 
conflict in action selection. Experiment 1 showed no significant difference between 
congruent and neutral flankers, but only a significant reduction in agency following 
incongruent flankers. Although such null effects should be interpreted with care, 
especially due to potentially low statistical power, they suggest that a perceptual or 
conceptual mismatch may not be sufficient to explain our results. Rather, an 
incongruent action plan should be triggered at some stage, for a reduced sense of 
agency. In fact, subliminal priming was used in previous studies to manipulate action 
selection but preclude such post-hoc, conceptual inferences. This method showed a 
consistent trend for a larger cost of conflict on agency ratings than a facilitation effect 
(Chambon & Haggard, 2012). Our Experiment 3 is also consistent with a prospective 
account: the presence of conflicting motor plans during the trial led to a loss of 
agency, even when the interval between flankers and target was sufficient to resolve 
the conflict. Consistently, supplementary analyses showed that congruency effects 
on the sense of agency could not be fully explained by RT monitoring (see 
Appendix A, also cf. Chambon & Haggard, 2012). The subjective experience of 
conflict may linger, even after the motor conflict has been resolved. Conflict signals 
are especially motivationally significant since they can indicate a need to adjust 
subsequent behaviour (Botvinick & Braver, 2015; Holroyd & Yeung, 2012). As such, 
they may have a greater impact on the sense of agency than fluency experiences. 
Additionally, a positive sense of agency may be a ‘default’, and thus we are 
especially sensitive to disruptions to the normal flow of voluntary action (Chambon, 
Sidarus, et al., 2014).  
Our results clearly contrast with some reports that effort or difficulty can enhance 
sense of agency (Damen et al., 2014; Demanet, De Baene, Arrington, & Brass, 
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2013). Why, then, do effort and conflict sometimes increase sense of agency, and 
sometimes reduce it? The relation between fluency or effort and the sense of agency 
is complex and remains poorly understood (Nahmias, 2005; Pacherie, 2008). Often 
when intentional actions unfold without any obstacles, the sense of fluency can result 
in a strong sense of agency, as “everything went according to plan”. Yet, effort can 
also enhance the sense of agency. When a need for cognitive control can be 
anticipated, some proactive conflict processing (Braver, 2012) may become part of 
the action plan. This may highlight the sense of self, and of being engaged with task 
at hand. In contrast, when disruptions are unexpected, executive control will be 
triggered reactively by conflict signals. We speculate that these two sources of 
cognitive control may have different effects on sense of agency. In particular, 
proactively embedding effort into the action plan may be associated with an increase 
in the sense of agency (I knew it would be tricky, but I managed it), however, the 
unexpected or unwanted need for added effort could instead lead to a reduction in 
our sense of agency (suddenly I had to deal with all these things).  
In addition, the context or the framing of a task could modulate how conflict 
influences agency. In Damen et al.’s study, each action triggered a specific outcome 
(a beep with a given pitch) after a variable delay (0-600 ms). Participants were 
instructed that sometimes they would cause the beep to occur (the outcome), but 
other times it would be caused by the computer. Thus, the task and the agency 
question were framed in terms of attributing the cause of the outcome to the self, or 
to another. Also, subliminal and supraliminal priming were randomised, so 
participants presumably experienced wide variations in degree of influence from the 
primes. In contrast, our studies focused on the instrumental aspect of agency, as 
participants were asked to judge the strength of the relation between various actions 
and outcomes, rather than invoking alternative agents. That is, our study focussed 
on ‘concomitant variation’ between a single agent’s different instrumental actions and 
their outcomes, rather than on attribution of outcomes to agents. Both processes are 
relevant to agency, but conflict between alternative actions might have different 
effects on each of them. Further research is needed to clarify the conditions under 
which conflict can enhance, rather than reduce, the sense of agency. 
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Our results are consistent with previous proposals that the sense of agency 
integrates information from multiple sources (Synofzik et al., 2008), and over time 
(Chambon, Sidarus, et al., 2014; Farrer et al., 2013). In addition to retrospective 
processes related to outcome monitoring, there is also a prospective component 
related to action selection (see Figure 2.5). Action selection monitoring can detect 
conflicting intentions and prospectively signal a loss of agency. After this, outcome 
monitoring can assess action outcome intervals and outcome identity for a mismatch 
with predictions or expectations, and retrospectively signal a loss of agency. If the 
smooth flow between intention – action – outcome remains unperturbed, the sense 
of agency can remain at a default level. Additionally, higher-order beliefs and 
contextual information can also influence the sense of agency (Moore & Fletcher, 
2012; Synofzik et al., 2008). We found that choice, awareness of biases and timing 
of conflict did not interact with the effects of selection fluency. However, they may 
make independent contributions to the sense of agency, depending on context, or 
other cues. 
 
Figure 2.5. Prospective and retrospective contributions to the sense of agency. The sense 
of agency is prospectively informed by monitoring action selection. When this action 
monitoring system detects an intention that conflicts with the to-be-executed intention, it 
sends a signal indicating a loss of agency. Once the action outcome is known, this can be 
compared with a prediction of the outcome, based on the executed action. When there is a 
mismatch between the predicted and actual outcomes, an outcome monitoring system can 
retrospectively signal a loss of agency. If the normal flow from intention, to action, to 
outcome is disrupted, the sense of agency is reduced.  
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2.5.1. Conclusions 
Across the experiments reported here, the sense of agency was prospectively 
informed by monitoring the processes of action selection. When conflicting intentions 
were present, the sense of agency over action outcomes was reduced. The effect of 
conflict on the sense of agency was independent of awareness of the causes of 
conflict, of free vs. instructed action selection, and of the timing of conflicting 
information during action selection. Finally, these effects generalised across tasks, 
from subliminal priming of actions, to the Eriksen flanker task, thus revealing a new 
approach for further investigating prospective contributions to the sense of agency. 
These findings support the view that the sense of agency is especially sensitive to a 
disruption in the normal flow of intentional action, from an intention or goal to its 
corresponding action, to the desired/expected consequences (Chambon, Sidarus, et 
al., 2014; Haggard & Chambon, 2012). Importantly, fluency of action selection was 
independent of the actual statistical contingency between actions and outcomes in 
these experiments. Selection fluency does not guarantee successful agency: one 
can know exactly what to do, and still fail to produce an intended outcome. However, 
selection fluency may serve as a useful heuristic to guide our sense of agency, as it 
often predicts successful outcomes (Haggard & Chambon, 2012). Prospective 
agency processes based on action selection may thus help to bridge the time gap 
between action and outcome. 
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Chapter 3. New Avenues for Investigating the Prospective 
Sense of Agency 
 
 
 
The present study focused on the prospective influence of action selection 
processes to the sense of agency in an ecologically valid, dynamic setting. Across 
three experiments, different manipulations were used to target different stages of 
action selection: visual processing fluency, categorisation ambiguity and response 
conflict. Additionally, we probed the relative contributions of prospective, action 
selection-based cues, and retrospective, outcome-based cues to the sense of 
agency. Manipulations of action selection were combined with discrepant visual 
feedback of action on some trials, thus manipulating proximal outcome monitoring.  
Results show that fluency in action selection influenced the sense of agency across 
tasks. Moreover, discrepant visual feedback led to a large reduction in the sense of 
agency, which tended to predominate over manipulations of action selection. The 
sense of agency appears to be highly sensitive to disruptions of motor control but, 
under successful motor control, disruptions at varying stages of action selection have 
a robust effect on the sense of agency. 
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3.1. Introduction 
As we interact with the world around us, our experience is typically coloured by a 
sense of agency, a feeling that we are in control of our actions and, through them, 
can control events in the outside world (Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009). Much research 
has focused on how actions are linked to their outcomes. This has shown that the 
sense of agency depends on a retrospective comparison between expected or 
desired action outcomes and actual outcomes (e.g. Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 
2002; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). Moreover, the importance of linking intentions and 
actions has been recently highlighted (for a review, see Chambon, Sidarus, et al., 
2014). In fact, modern theoretical frameworks emphasise that the sense of agency 
results from the integration of multiple cues (Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik et al., 
2008), which may become available at different times (Farrer et al., 2013; Haggard & 
Chambon, 2012). Moreover, metacognitive processes are involved in evaluating the 
output of action and outcome monitoring systems (Haggard & Chambon, 2012; 
Metcalfe & Greene, 2007; but see Chambon, Filevich, & Haggard, 2014). 
Recent studies have used subliminal priming of actions to manipulate the fluency of 
action selection, in a simple paradigm in which participants respond according to 
directional arrows and trigger the appearance of coloured circles (Chambon & 
Haggard, 2012; Chambon, Moore, et al., 2014; Chambon et al., 2013; Sidarus et al., 
2013; Wenke et al., 2010). Participants report a stronger sense of agency over 
action outcomes when primes induce fluent, compared to dysfluent, action selection. 
Therefore, a metacognitive signal about the fluency of action selection processes 
contributes to the sense of agency prospectively, and long before the outcome is 
known.  
Interestingly, it has been shown that judgements of agency (JoAs) are influenced by 
the metacognitive monitoring of performance in a game, but are still highly sensitive 
to actual disruptions of control (Metcalfe & Greene, 2007). In these studies, a 
computer game was used in which participants move a mouse cursor (a box) along a 
horizontal bar to catch falling Xs, while avoiding Os. Introducing a discrepancy 
between one’s mouse movements and the visual feedback of the cursor movements 
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(i.e. proximal outcomes) leads to a reduction in both performance and judgements of 
performance (JoPs), but an even greater reduction in JoAs. Additionally, when Xs or 
Os disappear without being touched (i.e. distal outcomes), JoAs are reduced, 
independently of how performance was affected. Nonetheless, the reduction in JoAs 
associated with disruptions of proximal outcomes is larger than the disruption of 
distal outcomes (cf. Metcalfe, Eich, & Miele, 2013). Together, these results suggest 
that the sense of agency is preferentially tuned to monitor proximal cues, tied to 
action and motor control, and indeed reflects the statistical contingency between 
actions and outcomes. 
The present study aimed to further investigate the role of prospective, action 
selection-based, cues in the sense of agency. To this end, different manipulations of 
action selection were employed, and adapted to the computer game described 
above (Metcalfe & Greene, 2007). This allowed us to test the generalisability of the 
effects of action selection across manipulations, but also in a dynamic environment, 
with greater ecological validity than the experimental paradigms typically used to 
study the sense of agency. Additionally, we aimed to compare the relative 
contribution of prospective cues to agency with that of retrospective, outcome-based 
cues by manipulating proximal outcomes. Manipulations of action selection were 
thus combined with manipulating the discrepancy between action and visual 
feedback. 
In this game, an action consists of moving the cursor to the horizontal location of a 
target (i.e. an X). The expected proximal outcome is that the cursor will move to the 
location matching one’s mouse movements. The expected distal outcome is that the 
target will disappear once caught. This means action selection is determined by: first, 
detecting a stimulus; second, categorising it as a target or distractor; and, third, 
deciding whether to move the box towards it (for targets), while also avoiding 
distractor stimuli (i.e. O’s). Therefore, with some changes to the stimuli, we could 
manipulate these three different stages of action selection. 
Many studies have shown that fluency in visual processing or decision making can 
affect a variety of judgements, such as confidence, liking, or familiarity (for a review, 
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see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). Previous studies, which used action priming, 
argued that action selection fluency influences the sense of agency (e.g. Wenke et 
al., 2010). Priming can influence processing fluency, in addition to inducing response 
conflict, but, it remains unclear whether fluency in perceptual processing alone could 
have a similar effect on the sense of agency. To test this, in Experiment 1, we 
manipulated stimulus processing fluency through visual masking. This essentially 
disrupted the very first stage of the stimulus-response-outcome chain, namely, 
identifying and locating target stimuli. If fluency in action selection has a general 
effect on the sense of agency, we would predict that this manipulation would lead to 
a reduced sense of agency.  
In Experiment 2, we manipulated the uncertainty associated with categorising stimuli 
as targets or distractors by varying stimulus ambiguity. When categorising highly 
ambiguous stimuli, uncertainty about the accuracy of the categorisation would be 
higher. It has been suggested that the consequences of uncertain decisions may be 
seen as less blame-worthy than the consequences of more informed decisions 
(Heath & Tversky, 1991). Thus, greater uncertainty during action selection could lead 
to a reduction in the sense of agency. Additionally, a large number of highly 
ambiguous stimuli would render action selection processes more difficult, as many 
items would be hard to categorise. This increased difficulty could also lead to a lower 
sense of agency.  
Finally, in Experiment 3, we interfered with the later, pre-motor aspects of action 
selection, namely, deciding whether to approach or avoid a given stimulus. 
Response conflict was induced by placing incongruent flankers around central 
targets or distractors (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). For example, M could indicate 
targets and C indicate distractors. These items would appear surrounded by 
congruent (e.g. MMM) or incongruent (e.g. CMC) flankers. The simultaneous 
detection of a target and a distractor would suggest two conflicting responses: 
approach and avoid that spatial location. Detecting a distractor flanker could elicit an 
avoidant response, which would need to be overcome if it was flanking a target; 
while an approach response could be erroneously elicited by a target flanker placed 
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around a distractor. A condition in which only congruently flanked items appeared 
was compared to a condition in which most items were congruently flanked, and to a 
condition in which few items were congruently flanked. The degree of response 
conflict was expected to lead to a corresponding reduction in the sense of agency. 
3.2. Experiment 1 
This experiment investigated the effects of visual processing fluency on the sense of 
agency, by adding a visual noise mask on the screen in some trials. 
3.2.1. Materials and Methods 
3.2.1.1. Participants 
Twenty-three Columbia University or Barnard College students volunteered to 
participate for course credit, and gave written informed consent (12 female, mean 
age = 20.05, SD = 2.52, age not recorded for 1 person due to technical error). All 
were right-handed, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and neurologically 
healthy. The procedures described here conform to the guidelines of the APA 
concerning the protection of human subjects, and were approved by the Columbia 
Internal Review Board. 
3.2.1.2. Apparatus 
The experiments were conducted on iMac computers, using a mouse on mouse pad. 
The programme was developed using custom-built scripts running on Python. White 
Xs and Os were presented on a grey background. Each trial started with 10 stimuli of 
each type (targets vs. distractors). In unmasked trials, the background was grey 
(115/255 RGB scale). In masked trials, the noise mask consisted of a Gaussian-
filtered patch of randomly distributed greyscale intensities. This was applied on top of 
the main game screen, except for the half grey horizontal bar and white box (i.e. the 
mouse cursor), which were drawn on top of the mask. This enabled masking of the 
stimuli based on which participants decided what to do, while allowing participants to 
track their movements equally well in both masked and unmasked conditions. On 
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some trials, we also introduced a discrepancy between the participant’s movements 
of the mouse, and the movements of the cursor on the screen, termed “turbulence”. 
In the turbulence condition, the movement of the box depended on the following 
noise function: 
∆!! =  ∆! +  ! sin( 2 ! !/2.4) 
where Δx’ is the movement of the box on the screen, Δx is the distance the 
participant actually moved the mouse, t is time in seconds, and σ is the amplitude of 
the noise wave. 
3.2.1.3. Design and Procedure 
The basic procedure and instructions are described elsewhere (Metcalfe & Greene, 
2007). Briefly, participants played a game in which they observed Xs and Os 
scrolling down a screen, and moved a white box along a grey horizontal track with a 
mouse (see Figure 3.1). Participants were instructed to catch one letter with their 
white box (e.g. Xs), while avoiding the other letter (e.g. Os; counterbalanced 
between participants). Once caught, the items disappeared, and auditory feedback 
indicated whether a target or distractor was hit, with a ping or thud sound, 
respectively. If the items were not caught, they continued scrolling down to the 
bottom of the screen.  
Participants played the game for 30 seconds, and then gave JoAs and JoPs about 
the game they had just played. For the JoAs, participants were asked to judge how 
much control they felt over the game, using a red visual analogue scale (VAS) 
ranging from “No Control” to “Full Control”. For JoPs, participants were asked to rate 
their performance in the game using a blue VAS, ranging from “None Correct” to 
“Completely Correct”. Participants moved a slider with the mouse, and pressed the 
space bar to select their rating. 
To influence action selection, the fluency of visual processing was manipulated by 
either presenting a normal screen (“unmasked” trials), or adding a visual noise mask 
on top of the game (“masked” trials; see Figure 3.1). This masking made it harder to 
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detect the targets and distractors, thus rendering action selection more difficult. 
Additionally, to interfere with proximal outcome monitoring, the movements of the 
mouse cursor (the white box) were manipulated. In some trials, the cursor accurately 
followed the movement of the mouse (“no turbulence”). In other trials, a noise 
function was applied to the movements of the cursor (“turbulence”). These two 
manipulations, visual masking and cursor turbulence, were factorially combined, 
resulting in 4 trial (i.e. game) types. These were quasi-randomised across 6 blocks, 
such that each trial type was played once before the next block. 
Before starting the experiment, participants played a training game, followed by JoAs 
and JoPs. They were given a chance to ask any questions, and either play another 
training game, or start the experiment. At the end of the experiment, participants 
answered a short questionnaire about the experiment and were debriefed.  
 
Figure 3.1. Task outline for Experiment 1. Visual processing fluency was manipulated by 
adding a visual noise mask on some trials. After playing the game for 30 s, participants 
gave judgements of agency (on a red VAS), followed by judgements of performance (blue 
VAS). 
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3.2.1.4. Data Analysis 
Performance in the game was assessed as a d’ score from signal detection theory 
(Green & Swets, 1966), which measured discrimination between targets and 
distractors. The d’ calculation was adjusted for instances of zero false alarms (Mill & 
O’Connor, 2014; Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). JoAs and JoPs were quantified as a 
percentage of the VAS scale. Mean d’, JoAs and JoPs were submitted to repeated 
measures ANOVAs, with the factors masking (unmasked vs. masked) and 
turbulence (no turbulence vs. turbulence). 
Additionally, we assessed whether any effects of visual masking on JoAs could be 
explained by a reduction in JoPs. For this, a hierarchical linear regression model 
(also known as linear mixed-effects models) was used to model single-trial level 
data. JoAs were modelled by the factors masking and turbulence, coded as 
unmasked = 0, masked = 1; no turbulence = 0, turbulence = 1. JoPs were added as 
a covariate, after standardising within participants. This analysis was conducted 
using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2014) in R (R Core Team, 2015). Parameter 
estimates (b) and their associated t-tests (t, p), calculated using the Satterthwaite 
approximation for degrees of freedom (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2015), 
are presented to show the magnitude of the effects, with bootstrapped 95% 
confidence intervals. 
3.2.2. Results 
Analysis of d’ showed that discrimination between targets and distractors was 
significantly lower for masked, relative to unmasked, trials (mean difference = 0.12, 
SD = 0.15, F(1, 22) = 13.67, p = 0.001, ƞ!!  = 0.38; see Figure 3.2.a). Turbulence also 
led to a significant reduction in d’, relative to no turbulence trials (mean diff. = 0.89, 
SD = 0.25, F(1, 22) = 302.66, p < 0.001, ƞ!!  = 0.93). There was no significant 
interaction between the factors (F(1, 22) = 0.91, p = 0.35, ƞ!!  = 0.040). 
Similarly, JoPs were significantly lower for masked, relative to unmasked, trials 
(mean diff. = 4.60%, SD = 4.73, F(1, 22) = 20.66, p < 0.001, ƞ!!  = 0.48; see Figure 
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3.2.b). Turbulence also led to a significant reduction in JoPs, relative to no 
turbulence trials (mean diff. = 32.67%, SD = 17.96, F(1, 22) = 75.83, p < 0.001, ƞ!!  = 0.78). There was a marginally significant interaction between the factors 
(F(1, 22) = 3.53, p = 0.074 , ƞ!!  = 0.14). 
Results for JoAs (see Figure 3.2.c) showed a significant reduction for masked, 
relative to unmasked, trials (mean diff. = 6.13%, SD = 5.39, F(1, 22) = 28.52,  
p < 0.001, ƞ!!  = 0.57). Turbulence also led to a significant reduction in JoAs, relative 
to no turbulence trials (mean diff. = 49.58%, SD = 18.67, F(1, 22) = 161.65, p < 0.001, ƞ!!  = 0.88). Moreover, there was a significant interaction between the factors 
(F(1, 22) = 5.81, p = 0.025 , ƞ!!  = 0.21). Simple effects t-tests showed that, for no 
turbulence trials, masking led to a significant reduction in JoAs (mean diff. = 9.48%, 
SD = 10.65, t(22) = 4.27, p < 0.001, dz = 0.89); whereas this reduction was only 
marginally significant for turbulence trials (mean diff. = 2.65%, SD = 6.19, t(22) = 2.05, 
p = 0.053, dz = 0.43). Turbulence had a significant effect in both masking conditions 
(unmasked: mean diff. = 52.97%, SD = 19.91, t(22) = 12.76, p < 0.001, dz = 2.66; 
masked: mean diff. = 46.14%, SD = 19.87, t(22) = 11.14, p < 0.001, dz = 2.32). 
 
Figure 3.2. Results of Experiment 1. Effects of masking and turbulence on mean d’ (a.), 
JoPs (b.), and JoAs (c.). No Turb = no turbulence, Turb = turbulence. Error bars show the 
standard error of the mean.  
 
Finally, we assessed whether the effect of masking on JoAs could be accounted for 
by changes in JoPs. Previous studies (e.g. Metcalfe, Eich, & Miele, 2013) showed 
that perceived performance is used as cue to agency, predicting a general, positive 
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relation between JoPs and JoAs. Therefore, JoAs were modelled by the 
experimental factors, and JoPs (standardised) were entered as a covariate (see 
Figure 3.3). The results revealed that JoPs were positively related to JoAs (b = 0.12, 
t(22.56) = 6.39, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [0.087, 0.16]), as predicted. Importantly, masking 
remained a significant predictor of JoAs (b = -0.047, t(21.53) = -2.98, p = 0.007, 95% 
CI = [-0.080, -0.015]), as did turbulence (b = -0.34, t(20.27) = -8.08, p < 0.001, 95% 
CI = [-0.41, -0.26]). The interaction between masking and turbulence was no longer 
significant (b = 0.031, t(51.91) = 1.48, p = 0.14, 95% CI = [-0.013, 0.076]). 
 
Figure 3.3. JoAs model for Experiment 1. Parameter estimates, with bootstrapped 95% 
confidence intervals, for modelling JoAs by the factors masking and turbulence, and by JoPs 
(within-participants Z-score). 
3.2.3. Discussion 
In Experiment 1, visual masking was used to disrupt the processing fluency of the 
stimuli that drove participants’ actions. This, in turn, disrupted the fluency of action 
selection, as it made the process of deciding which action to make, i.e. where to 
move the cursor, more difficult. The results showed that visual masking disrupted 
both objective and subjective measures of performance, as expected. Moreover, 
visual masking led to a reduction in JoAs, which could not be explained by perceived 
differences in performance, due to increased task difficulty. That is, the mere 
disruption of processing fluency led to a loss of agency. 
These results are consistent with research showing that fluency can affect a number 
of metacognitive judgements (see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009 for a review). 
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Moreover, previous studies have shown that dysfluent action selection is associated 
with a reduction in the sense of agency (Chambon, Sidarus, et al., 2014). These 
studies used response conflict to manipulate the fluency of action selection. Here, we 
show that disrupting action selection at the early stage of stimulus processing can 
lead to a reduction in the sense of agency. 
In addition to visual processing, we manipulated whether the consequences of one’s 
actions matched one’s intentions, by introducing a discrepancy between the 
movement of the mouse and the movement of the cursor, termed turbulence. When 
the cursor on the screen did not accurately track the mouse’s movements, there was 
a reduction in both objective and subjective measures of performance, as well as a 
large reduction in JoAs. This reduction in JoAs was independent of differences in 
JoPs, and was larger than the effect of turbulence on JoPs. These findings replicate 
previous studies that used a similar manipulation (e.g. Metcalfe, Eich, & Miele, 2013; 
Metcalfe & Greene, 2007).  
Finally, while discrimination performance reflected additive effects of the visual 
masking and mouse turbulence manipulations, the effects of these factors on 
metacognitive judgements of agency were partially underadditive. This 
underadditivity can be seen in the significant interaction between visual masking and 
turbulence effects on average JoAs. Overall, visual masking had a minor effect on 
JoAs compared to the effect of turbulence. Additionally, we found that visual 
processing dysfluency especially disrupted the sense of agency when the cursor 
accurately followed the movements of the mouse, but less so when turbulence was 
introduced. On the other hand, turbulence had a large and robust effect across 
masking conditions. The larger effect of turbulence on performance suggests that it 
may be a more salient cue for agency than visual processing fluency. In fact, 
average JoPs also showed a somewhat underadditive effect of the two 
manipulations, possibly denoting that turbulence was a stronger cue for both 
metacognitive judgements. 
Nonetheless, the interaction between masking and turbulence on JoAs was no 
longer significant after accounting for differences in JoPs, in a multi-level regression 
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model. We may speculate that the apparent underadditive effect is due to the 
difference in the size of the effects of masking and turbulence on JoAs. Future 
studies should attempt to balance the effects of masking and turbulence on 
performance, to clarify whether these underadditive effects on metacognitive 
judgements are linked to differences in the salience of the two manipulations. One 
may speculate that they are not, given that mouse turbulence is a reliable and direct 
indicator of a loss of agency. Participants were less able to implement their intended 
actions, and thus had objectively less control over the game. Visual masking only 
made action selection more difficult, but did not interfere with the ability to interact 
with the game. Alternatively, selection fluency may have a general effect on JoAs, 
consistent with other work on the effects fluency on metacognitive and affective 
judgements (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). 
3.3. Experiment 2 
This experiment aimed to investigate whether the ease, or difficulty, of classifying 
stimuli as targets for action would influence sense of agency, by varying stimulus 
ambiguity. 
3.3.1. Materials and Methods 
3.3.1.1. Participants 
Procedures were as described above. Twenty-four new Columbia University or 
Barnard College students (10 female, mean age = 20.79, SD = 2.93) volunteered to 
participate for course credit, and gave written informed consent. Five participants 
were left-handed, and the remaining were right-handed. 
3.3.1.2. Apparatus 
The basic setup was as in Experiment 1, except for the following. The target and 
distractor items now consisted of six grey circles, of 3 lighter and 3 darker shades 
relative to half grey (roughly 65, 90, 115, 140, 165, and 190 on a 255 RGB scale). 
The horizontal bar was now white, and the box controlled by the participant was 
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black. The number of items at the start of the trial was reduced to 6 targets and 6 
distractors, in order to increase overall performance. The turbulence manipulation 
was adjusted to double the period of the sine wave (by dividing 2π t by 4.8, instead of 
2.4). This slowed down the rate at which the direction of the noise component added 
to the mouse’s movement changed, thus making the mouse more controllable than 
in Experiment 1. 
3.3.1.3. Design and Procedure 
The main design and procedures were as in previous experiments. Instead of letters, 
the items consisted of grey circles. Participants were instructed to catch all the light 
grey circles, i.e. the targets, but to avoid the dark grey circles, i.e. the distractors 
(counterbalanced). Here, action selection was manipulated by varying the ambiguity 
in categorising items as targets or distractors. There were 6 equally spaced shades 
of grey, bisected by the half grey tone (see Figure 3.4.a). Thus, there were 3 levels 
of ambiguity in the grey shades, depending on the distance from half grey. The two 
shades at the extremes of the range were easy to categorise as light or dark, 
whereas the two shades closest to half grey were highly ambiguous. 
Ambiguity was manipulated across trials (i.e. games), by varying the proportions of 
more and less ambiguous shades (see Figure 3.4.b). In the low ambiguity condition, 
most items were drawn from the extremes of the range. Thus, each trial started with 
3 extreme, 2 medium, and 1 very ambiguous shade, both for targets and distractors. 
In the high ambiguity condition, most of the items were drawn from the highly 
ambiguous end of the range. Each trial started with 1 extreme, 2 medium and 3 very 
ambiguous shades of targets and of distractors. As before, turbulence was also 
manipulated across trials. As before, the 4 resulting conditions were quasi-
randomised, across 6 blocks. Participants played the game for 30 s, and then gave 
JoAs, and JoPs. 
During training, participants were shown the 3 shades of grey to class as targets, 
and the 3 shades to class as distractors. There were 2 practice games, both followed 
by JoAs and JoPs. 
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Figure 3.4. Schematic of stimuli in Experiment 2. a. The 6 graded shades of grey used. 
The first three stimuli were classed as light grey, whereas the last three were classed as 
dark grey. b. The two ambiguity conditions, which differed in their proportions of extreme 
and ambiguous grey shades. Stimulus size and colours have been adapted. 
 
3.3.1.4. Data Analysis 
Mean d’, JoPs and JoAs were submitted to repeated measures ANOVAs with the 
factors ambiguity (low vs. high) and turbulence (no turbulence vs. turbulence). 
Simple effects t-tests were used to probe interaction between ambiguity and 
turbulence. 
To characterise participants’ strategies, the response bias (c) measure from signal 
detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966) was used, with a correction for zero false 
alarms (Mill & O’Connor, 2014; Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). Zero reflects an 
unbiased criterion, negative values reflect a liberal criterion, and positive values 
denote a conservative criterion. Essentially, here, a larger positive criterion would be 
associated with a lower number of items caught (targets or distractors), i.e. more 
careful responding. This bias measure was computed for each trial, and then 
averaged for each participant (collapsing across conditions). 
Similarly to the previous experiments, JoAs were modelled by the independent 
variables and by JoPs. Ambiguity was coded as low = 0, high = 1. Additionally, 
average bias (c) was included as a between-participant (mean centred)(i.e. level 2) 
covariate, as was the interaction between ambiguity and average bias. 
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3.3.2. Results 
Discrimination between targets and distractors (d’) was significantly reduced by high 
ambiguity, relative to low ambiguity (mean diff. = 0.45, SD = 0.20, F(1, 23) = 116.00, 
p < 0.001, ƞ!!  = 0.84; see Figure 3.5.a). Turbulence also led to significantly lower d’ 
scores, relative to no turbulence (mean diff. = 0.55, SD = 0.14, F(1, 23) = 362.92, 
p < 0.001, ƞ!!  = 0.94). There was no significant interaction between the factors 
(F(1, 23) = 1.57, p = 0.22, ƞ!!  = 0.064). 
High ambiguity led to a significant reduction in JoPs, relative to low ambiguity (mean 
diff. = 3.04%, SD = 5.04, F(1, 23) = 8.73, p = 0.007, ƞ!!  = 0.28; see Figure 3.5.b). 
Turbulence also led to significantly lower JoPs than no turbulence (mean 
diff. = 12.77%, SD = 8.32, F(1, 23) = 56.62, p < 0.001, ƞ!!  = 0.71). There was no 
significant interaction between the factors (F(1, 23) = 1.51, p = 0.23, ƞ!!  = 0.062). 
 
Figure 3.5. Results of Experiment 2. Effects of ambiguity and turbulence on mean d’ (a.), 
JoPs (b.), and JoAs (c.). No Turb = no turbulence, Turb = turbulence. Error bars show the 
standard error of the mean. 
 
Importantly, in this experiment, the effect of the ambiguity manipulation (varying the 
proportions of more and less ambiguous items) on JoAs could depend on the 
strategy participants employed in playing the game. Some might try to maximise 
their hits by catching many items, while risking a larger number of false alarms. 
Others might be very wary of false alarms, and thus focus on catching the least 
ambiguous items, even though they reduce their number of hits. One hypothesis 
would be that participants making risky choices would be more affected by the 
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ambiguity manipulation, because they would make more uncertain decisions, i.e. 
deciding to catch an item that they were uncertain about, with higher ambiguity. On 
the other hand, more careful participants could be more affected by the manipulation 
because they would be more sensitive to the overall increased uncertainty in the 
decision process, i.e. deciding which items to catch, in the high ambiguity condition. 
These strategies were captured as the average response bias (Green & Swets, 
1966) of each participant, with larger (positive) values indicating more careful 
responding.  
Therefore, in addition to assessing whether the effect of ambiguity on JoAs, could be 
accounted for by changes in JoPs, as in previous experiments, we assessed 
whether it was related to participants’ average bias. For this, we added average bias, 
and its interaction with ambiguity, to the previously used model. As before, results 
showed a positive relation between JoPs and JoAs (b = 0.054, t(22.56) = 7.34,  
p < 0.001, 95% CI = [0.039, 0.068]), and a significant effect of turbulence (b = -0.35, 
t(23.38) = -9.83, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [-0.42, -0.28]; see Figure 3.6.a). Consistent with 
the ANOVA results, the main effect of ambiguity was not significant (b = -0.019, 
t(196.38) = -1.26, p = 0.21, 95% CI = [-0.049, 0.012]). However, the ambiguity by 
turbulence interaction, which was significant in the ANOVA, was no longer significant 
in this model (b = 0.034, t(390.44) = 1.60, p = 0.11, 95% CI = [-0.007, 0.079]). 
Participants’ average bias was not significantly related to JoAs overall (b = 0.17, 
t(22.82) = 1.48, p = 0.15, 95% CI = [-0.055, 0.43]), but, more importantly, there was a 
significant interaction between ambiguity and average bias (b = -0.16, t(194.37) = -2.60, 
p = 0.010, 95% CI = [-0.29, -0.027]). Model predictions, displayed in Figure 3.6.b, 
showed that participants with a larger average bias, that is, with more conservative 
responding, showed a larger ambiguity effect. 
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Figure 3.6. JoAs Model for Experiment 2. a. Parameter estimates, with bootstrapped 95% 
confidence intervals, for modelling JoAs by the independent variables, JoPs (Z-score, within 
participants), and average bias (mean centred, between participants). b. Average JoAs 
across participants (points) and model predictions (regression line, and shaded 95% 
prediction intervals) for the relation between the effect of stimulus ambiguity on JoAs and 
participants’ average response bias. Participants with a larger bias had a more conservative 
response criterion. Predictions were obtained from 10000 simulations from the posterior 
distribution of plausible parameter values under uniform priors (Gelman & Su, 2015). 
 
3.3.3. Discussion 
The present experiment investigated the effect of uncertainty in action selection on 
the sense of agency by manipulating stimulus ambiguity. In Experiment 1, once 
stimuli were identified amidst the noise mask, it was clear whether they were a target 
or a distractor. In contrast, items were easy to detect here, but there was uncertainty 
about the categorisation of highly ambiguous stimuli. Results showed that objective 
and subjective measures of performance were reduced by greater stimulus 
ambiguity, and by the turbulence manipulation. Average JoAs were also reduced by 
turbulence, but were only affected by stimulus ambiguity in the condition without 
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turbulence. That is, when the cursor accurately followed the mouse’s movements, 
greater stimulus ambiguity led to a decrease in JoAs, but there was no difference in 
JoAs when the mouse and cursor movements were discrepant. 
In line with the previous experiment, these findings support the proposal that 
metacognitive signals about action selection can influence the sense of agency 
(Chambon, Sidarus, et al., 2014). They further extend previous research by showing 
that uncertainty about the correct response to a stimulus can lead to a loss of 
agency. Interestingly, stimulus ambiguity reduces confidence judgements (Boldt & 
Yeung, 2015), suggesting there may be overlap in the signals that inform both types 
of metacognitive judgements.  
The discrepancy between intended and observed movements, induced by mouse 
turbulence, again had a larger effect on JoAs than the visual manipulation (in this 
case, ambiguity), and, in fact, abolished stimulus ambiguity effects. A similar 
interaction between masking and turbulence was found in Experiment 1. The 
turbulence manipulation was attenuated in the present experiment, and its effect on 
performance was more similar in size to the effect of ambiguity, relative to the 
difference between the effects of turbulence and masking in Experiment 1. However, 
the increased overall difficulty of this task, even in the “low ambiguity” condition, may 
have led to weaker ambiguity effects on metacognitive judgements, as the difference 
between conditions was less clear. 
Furthermore, this experiment allowed participants to use different strategies in 
playing the game. Some might risk making uncertain decisions, by catching the more 
ambiguous items, even though they could be distractors. Others might avoid making 
such risky decisions, and limit themselves to catching the less ambiguous items. To 
account for these differences in strategies across participants, we included a 
measure of the average response bias of participants when modelling JoAs. On the 
one hand, stimulus ambiguity might particularly affect the sense of agency when one 
makes more uncertain decisions. In this case, participants who made more uncertain 
decisions, i.e. those with a lower response bias, would presumably be more sensitive 
to the ambiguity manipulation. At the same time, these risky participants might have 
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been less concerned with whether they caught a target or distractor. On the other 
hand, stimulus ambiguity might have affected the sense of agency by making the 
task more difficult, since there were fewer easy-to-categorise items in the high 
ambiguity condition. Then, participants who restricted themselves to making more 
certain decisions, i.e. those with a higher response bias, would have been more 
affected by the ambiguity manipulation. 
Modelling results showed that the interaction between ambiguity and turbulence 
found for average JoAs may be partly explained by differences in JoPs. Additionally, 
there was a significant interaction between ambiguity and participants’ average 
response bias, which was independent of JoPs. This showed that stimulus ambiguity 
had a larger effect on JoAs in participants who had a more conservative criterion for 
responding, or a more positive bias, relative to less conservative participants. 
Participants who restricted themselves to catching those stimuli that were 
unambiguously identifiable as targets were most affected by the ambiguity 
manipulation. In the high ambiguity condition there were fewer unambiguous items, 
therefore the task was more difficult. 
This could also reflect an overall effect of action frequency on sense of agency: 
conservative participants who required unambiguous evidence to identify targets for 
action would make relatively fewer actions during the game, especially in the high 
ambiguity condition. They would therefore feel a reduced sense of agency, 
compared to less conservative participants who made more actions. Interestingly, 
the interaction pattern observed in Figure 3.6.b shows little difference in JoAs 
across participants for the high ambiguity condition. Instead, it suggests that it was 
more conservative participants who showed an increase in JoAs in the low ambiguity 
condition. Perhaps these participants felt especially certain of their decisions in this 
condition, whereas liberal participants who made more risky decisions always felt 
highly uncertain about their decisions, regardless of the ambiguity condition. 
These results suggest that participants’ JoAs were especially sensitive to the 
contextual effect of stimulus ambiguity on task difficulty, i.e. whether it was easier or 
harder to identify targets. It remains unclear how uncertainty in a specific decision 
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influences the sense of agency, since the dynamic nature of the game allowed 
participants to avoid making more uncertain decisions. Yet, in everyday life, there 
are many situations in which one cannot avoid making a decision, even when one is 
uncertain. Thus, it could still be hypothesised that, under conditions where avoiding a 
decision is not possible, uncertainty about the action could influence the sense of 
agency. 
3.4. Experiment 3 
This experiment tested the effect of response conflict on the sense of agency, by 
adding task-relevant flankers to target and distractor stimuli. 
3.4.1. Materials and Methods 
3.4.1.1. Participants 
Procedures were as described above. Twenty-three new Columbia University or 
Barnard College students (18 female, mean age = 23.87, SD = 4.87) volunteered to 
participate for course credit, and gave written informed consent. Three participants 
were left-handed, 1 was ambidextrous, and the remaining were right-handed. One 
participant was excluded due to extremely low JoPs and JoAs (> 2 SD below the 
mean, across conditions), and very low performance in the condition with no 
disruptions (full congruency and no turbulence: d’ was 2 SDs below the mean). 
3.4.1.2. Apparatus 
The main apparatus was as in Experiment 2, except for the targets and distractors. 
Groups of 3 letters, consisting of Ms and Cs, were presented in white on a black 
background. Groups with a target letter in the central position were defined as target 
groups, and groups with a distractor letter in the central position were defined as 
distractor groups. Each trial started with 6 target groups and 6 distractor groups.  
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3.4.1.3. Design and Procedure 
The design and procedure were as in previous experiments, except for the following 
changes. In the present experiment, Ms and Cs were presented as targets and 
distractors (counterbalanced). To manipulate action selection, flanker letters were 
added to the target and distractor items, in order to induce response conflict when 
flankers were incongruent with the middle letter (e.g. CMC). Items always consisted 
of 3-letter groups, but participants were instructed to focus on the middle letter. Only 
the central letter counted as a target or distractor, and participants had to touch the 
central letter with the mouse cursor (white box) in order to catch it. Touching only the 
outer letters did not count as a catch. Therefore, the flanker letters should be 
ignored. As before, participants played the game for 30 s, and then gave JoAs, and 
JoPs. Instructions were adapted for the present manipulation. 
Flanker congruency was manipulated across three conditions (see Figure 3.7). In 
the full congruency condition, all items were surrounded by congruent flankers (i.e. 
always MMM and CCC). In the high congruency condition, two-thirds of the items 
were congruent, but the other third was incongruent (i.e. CMC, MCM). Finally, in the 
low congruency condition, only one-third of the items was congruent, and the other 
two-thirds were incongruent. Additionally, turbulence was manipulated across trials, 
as in Experiment 2. This 3 x 2 factorial design resulted in 6 conditions, which were 
quasi-randomised across 6 blocks, as before. 
During training, participants first started by playing a game with full flanker 
congruency, and practiced JoAs and JoPs. Once confident with this condition, they 
were introduced to the incongruently flanked items, and played another practice 
game with high flanker congruency, followed by JoAs and JoPs. They were given the 
chance to practice further, if required. 
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Figure 3.7. Schematic of stimuli in Experiment 3. Stimulus size has been adapted, and 
colours have been inverted. 
 
3.4.1.4. Data Analysis 
Mean d’, JoPs and JoAs were submitted to repeated measures ANOVAs with the 
factors flanker congruency (full vs. high vs. low) and turbulence (no turbulence vs. 
turbulence). Planned comparisons were used to probe the main effect of 
congruency. Additionally, JoAs were modelled by the experimental factors and by 
JoPs, as in Experiment 1, except for the coding of congruency. The three-level factor 
congruency resulted in two contrasts, with full congruency as a baseline condition 
(i.e. full vs. high, and full vs. low). 
3.4.2. Results 
Discrimination between targets and distractors (d’) was significantly affected by 
flanker congruency (F(2, 42) = 105.41, p < 0.001, ƞ!!  = 0.83; see Figure 3.8.a.). High 
congruency led to a significant reduction in performance, relative to full congruency 
(full - high: mean = 0.30, SD = 0.14), and low congruency led to a further significant 
reduction relative to high (high – low: mean = 0.23, SD = 0.19; all comparisons  
p < 0.001). Turbulence led to a significant reduction in performance, relative to no 
turbulence (mean diff. = 0.72, SD = 0.21, F(1, 22) = 253.70 p < 0.001, ƞ!!  = 0.92). 
There was no significant interaction between the factors (F(2, 42) = 0.23, p = 0.80, ƞ!!  = 0.011). 
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Analyses of JoPs showed a significant effect of flanker congruency (F(2, 42) = 31.36,  
p = 0.001, ƞ!!  = 0.60; see Figure 3.8.b.). Relative to full congruency, high 
congruency led to a significant reduction in JoPs (full - high: mean = 5.87%, 
SD = 5.16, p < 0.001), and there was a further reduction in JoPs for low congruency, 
relative to high (high – low: mean = 2.27%, SD = 4.99, p = 0.042). Turbulence led to 
a significant reduction in JoPs, relative to no turbulence (mean diff. = 16.61%, 
SD = 11.14, F(1, 22) = 48.49, p < 0.001, ƞ!!  = 0.70). The interaction between the 
factors was not significant (F(2, 42) = 0.86, p = 0.39, ƞ!!  = 0.039, Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected). 
 
Figure 3.8. Results of Experiment 3. Effects of flanker congruency and turbulence on 
mean d’ (a.), JoPs (b.), and JoAs (c.). No Turb = no turbulence, Turb = turbulence. Error 
bars show the standard error of the mean. 
 
Flanker congruency also influenced JoAs significantly (F(2, 42) = 19.91, p < 0.001, ƞ!!  = 0.49; see Figure 3.8.c.). JoAs were significantly lower in the high and low 
congruency conditions, relative to full congruency (full - high: mean = 5.39%, 
SD = 4.80; full - low: mean = 6.66%, SD = 4.69; ps < 0.001). JoAs did not differ 
between high and low congruency conditions (high - low: mean = 1.27%, SD = 6.12; 
p = 0.33). Turbulence led to a reduction in JoAs, relative to no turbulence (mean 
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diff. = 31.48%, SD = 21.00, F(1, 22) = 49.19, p < 0.001, ƞ!!  = 0.70). The interaction 
between the factors was not significant (F(2, 42) = 0.71, p = 0.47, ƞ!!  = 0.033, 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). 
Modelling JoAs with JoPs as a covariate (see Figure 3.9) again showed a significant 
positive relation between JoPs and JoAs (b = 0.10, t(21.15) = 7.90, p < 0.001, 95% 
CI = [0.079, 0.13]), and turbulence remained a significant predictor of JoAs 
(b = -0.22, t(20.71) = -4.98, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [-0.31, -0.13]). The contrast between 
full and high congruency was not a significant predictor of JoAs (b = -0.026, 
t(60.60) = -1.65, p = 0.10, 95% CI = [-0.059, 0.0036]), and neither was the full vs. low 
congruency contrast (b = -0.0085, t(57.39) = -0.55, p = 0.58, 95% CI = [-0.040, 0.023]). 
This shows that the effects of flanker congruency on JoAs could be largely explained 
by changes in JoPs. There were no significant interactions between the congruency 
contrasts and turbulence (full vs. high x turbulence: b = 0.015, t(53.87) = 0.69, p = 0.49, 
95% CI = [-0.031, 0.059]; full vs. low x turbulence: b = -0.017, t(111.32) = -0.83, 
p = 0.41, 95% CI = [-0.059, 0.027]).  
 
 
Figure 3.9. JoAs Model for Experiment 3. Parameter estimates, with bootstrapped 95% 
confidence intervals, for modelling JoAs by the independent variables and by JoPs (Z-score, 
within participants). 
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3.4.3. Discussion 
In Experiment 3, action selection fluency was manipulated by varying the congruency 
between flankers and targets or distractors. Incongruent flankers were used to 
induce response conflict, as one might be mistakenly drawn towards a distractor or 
away from a target. Results showed that, indeed, flanker congruency affected both 
objective and subjective measures of performance, as well as metacognitive 
judgements of agency. Parametrically reducing the proportion of congruent flankers 
led to a gradual reduction in performance. JoPs also showed a gradual reduction in 
performance, but with a larger reduction when comparing full and high congruency, 
relative to comparing high and low congruency. This confirms that the presence of 
incongruent flankers led to an impairment in performance. Moreover, it suggests that, 
the presence of incongruent flankers was more salient than their proportion at a 
metacognitive level. 
In fact, the results showed that average JoAs were only sensitive to the presence or 
absence of incongruent flankers. Relative to full congruency, both high and low 
congruency conditions led to a significant reduction in JoAs, but there was no 
difference between high and low congruency. The mere presence of incongruent 
flankers was sufficient to disrupt the sense of agency, independently of their 
proportion and, thus, independently of the precise degree of task difficulty. 
Interestingly, previous studies using a similar game have shown that, while JoAs are 
sensitive to the presence of discrepancy between the mouse’s movements and 
visual feedback, they are not particularly sensitive to the degree of that discrepancy 
(Metcalfe, Eich, & Castel, 2010; Metcalfe, Van Snellenberg, DeRosse, Balsam, & 
Malhotra, 2012; Zalla, Miele, Leboyer, & Metcalfe, 2015). 
These results are consistent with the view that a positive sense of agency may be a 
“default” state, and it is when the normal flow from intention to action to outcome is 
disrupted that the sense of agency is reduced (Chambon, Sidarus, et al., 2014). 
Relative to the default state (in this case, the full congruency/no turbulence 
condition), any disruption is quite salient, whereas the degree of disruption may be 
less important. When any part of the stimulus-action-outcome processing chain is 
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disrupted, the sense of agency may be reduced. However, details about the 
disruption that informs metacognitive judgements of agency can be somewhat 
unspecific, not only about the locus of the disruption, but also about the degree of the 
disruption. Indeed, fluency/conflict signals are known to often be vague and 
unspecific in content, and can affect other metacognitive judgements (Winkielman et 
al., 2015). 
As predicted, turbulence once again led to a large reduction in JoAs, which was 
greater than the effect of introducing incongruent flankers. Unlike Experiments 1 and 
2, in which manipulations of action selection interacted with turbulence, there was no 
significant congruency by turbulence interaction for JoAs. As can be seen in Figure 
3.8, there was a clear additive effect of the two manipulations on performance, and 
to some extent on JoPs, but the pattern was less clear for JoAs. Nevertheless, 
turbulence seemed to be a more important cue to agency. 
Finally, modelling of JoAs revealed that they were only significantly predicted by 
JoPs and the turbulence factor. This suggests that changes in JoPs accounted for a 
large part of the congruency effects on JoAs. While this might seem to imply that 
flanker congruency, and thus that response conflict does not have an effect on the 
sense of agency independently of performance monitoring, this conclusion would be 
premature. Previous studies have shown that inducing response conflict with 
subliminal priming (Chambon, Sidarus, et al., 2014) leads to a reduction in the sense 
of agency independently of monitoring the external consequences of the action (e.g. 
the appearance of a coloured circle). Those effects were also independent of 
monitoring of performance in terms of RTs (Chambon & Haggard, 2012), which 
might be used as a proxy to selection fluency, since response conflict leads to slower 
RTs than fluent selection. Finally, the studies presented in Chapter 2 also used 
flankers to induce response conflict, and showed a reduction in the sense of agency, 
independent of RT and outcome monitoring. 
Whereas the aforementioned studies mostly measured the sense of agency after 
each fluent or dysfluent action, the present experiment involved a dynamic 
interaction with varying proportions of congruent/incongruent flankers, and thus 
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assessed a more global experience of fluency vs. conflict, after the participant made 
several different actions in the game. The present experiment shows, as “proof of 
concept”, that an accumulated experience of conflict can influence the metacognition 
of agency. This would also be consistent with studies which obtained agency ratings 
at the end of a block, and showed that experiences of fluency or conflict became 
associated with specific action outcomes (Wenke et al., 2010; and see Chapter 2, 
Experiment 1). 
Nonetheless, further research is needed to explore a possible dissociation between 
the effects of conflict on JoAs and JoPs. For example, the use of 3 congruency levels 
here could have led to an overall reduction in the congruency effect on JoAs, relative 
to an experiment comparing only full and high congruency conditions. The frequent 
exposure to incongruent flankers, due to the inclusion of both high and low 
congruency conditions, could have weakened the required stimulus-response 
association (i.e. catch Ms, avoid Os). This would, in turn, have weakened the conflict 
triggered by incongruent flankers, and thus reduced their impact on JoAs. We may 
therefore speculate that reinforcing the standard stimulus-response mapping by 
increasing the prevalence of congruent flankers could yield a greater effect of 
response conflict on the sense of agency. 
3.5. General Discussion 
The present study investigated the contribution of action selection processes to the 
sense of agency. Over three experiments, different manipulations were used: 
stimulus processing fluency, stimulus ambiguity, and response conflict. Applying 
these manipulations in a computer game provided greater ecological validity, 
compared to previous studies (Chambon, Sidarus, et al., 2014). Consistently, the 
results showed that these various disruptions, affecting different stages of action 
selection, led to reductions in JoAs. These novel manipulations, applied in a dynamic 
environment, reveal the robustness and generalisability of the effects of action 
selection fluency on agency. 
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In addition, we probed how prospective cues, based on action selection, were 
integrated with retrospective cues to agency, based on proximal outcomes. For this, 
a discrepancy between participants’ movements and visual feedback was introduced 
on some trials. This led to a loss of agency, in accordance with previous studies 
(Farrer, Bouchereau, Jeannerod, & Franck, 2008; Metcalfe et al., 2010, 2013; 
Metcalfe & Greene, 2007). Across all experiments, the contingency between action 
and (proximal) outcome, captured by the turbulence factor, remained the 
predominant cue to agency. Discrepant visual feedback resulted in a large cost to 
agency, which sometimes overshadowed the effects of action selection. When 
everything else was going well, and the cursor accurately followed the mouse’s 
movements, action selection made a larger contribution to JoAs, at least when 
manipulating the fluency of visual processing and stimulus ambiguity. When 
outcomes were not as predicted, the cues provided by visual processing were less 
important. 
In the present studies, discrepant visual feedback also resulted in a greater cost to 
performance and JoPs, compared to manipulations of action selection. Therefore, 
the similarly larger effect of discrepant visual feedback on JoAs could have been due 
to the fact that it caused a more salient disruption of motor control. However, in a 
similar game, proximal action outcomes (visual feedback of action) were also found 
to be a predominant cue to agency, relative to distal outcomes, such as whether the 
items on the screen (i.e. Xs and Os) disappeared, or not, once touched (Metcalfe et 
al., 2013). 
These findings contrast, however, with a previous study that showed action selection 
fluency had a larger effect on the sense of agency when outcomes (coloured circles) 
violated expectations (Sidarus et al., 2013). Nevertheless, as those (distal) outcomes 
were mostly predictable (67% contingency), the occasional violation of expectations 
was not a reliable indicator of loss of agency. Under such circumstances, relying on 
internal cues to agency would compensate for the expected uncertainty (Yu & 
Dayan, 2005) of the external environment. On the other hand, here, discrepancy 
between the mouse and cursor movements (proximal outcomes) did reliably indicate 
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a loss of agency, as participants had objectively less control over the game. While 
the manipulations of action selection made the game more or less difficult to play, 
they did not affect participants’ ability to interact with the game. Together, these 
findings suggest that sense of agency is more sensitive to proximal action outcomes 
(disruptions of motor control), than to distal outcomes, or action selection fluency. 
Finally, as manipulations of action selection can also affect task performance, we 
tested whether effects on JoAs could be partially accounted for by changes in JoPs. 
As seen in previous studies (e.g. Metcalfe et al., 2013; Metcalfe & Greene, 2007), 
JoPs were positively related to JoAs. Supplementary analyses supported the 
assumption of a linear relation between JoPs and JoAs (see Appendix B), 
underlying the use of linear regression models. Importantly, the effects of discrepant 
visual feedback on JoAs could not be accounted for by changes in JoPs. Regarding 
manipulations of action selection, in Experiment 1, visual processing fluency had an 
effect on JoAs that was independent of changes in JoPs. In Experiment 2, we 
additionally considered the behavioural strategies of participants in playing the 
game, and found that the effect of stimulus ambiguity on more cautious, conservative 
participants was not fully accounted for by JoPs. However, in Experiment 3, the 
effects of response conflict on JoAs appeared to be largely explained by JoPs. 
Notably, the weaker effects of the action selection manipulations on JoAs in 
Experiments 2 and 3 may have allowed for a greater influence of JoPs 
Further research is needed to clarify the interaction between prospective and 
retrospective cues to agency, and the role of perceived performance. Nevertheless, 
the present experiments present new methods for manipulating action selection that 
can influence the sense of agency. As action selection processes precede the 
outcome, they can inform the sense of agency prospectively. That is, before we even 
act, the process of constructing a feeling of agency has already begun. This 
prospective sense of agency is thought to serve as an advance predictor of 
successful action, and to bridge the interval between action and outcome (Chambon, 
Sidarus, et al., 2014). The results in this chapter confirm the role of this cue in the 
sense of agency, while consistently showing that the actual statistical relation 
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between action and (proximal) outcome remains the most important cue. A greater 
understanding of the prospective aspects of the sense of agency could reveal new 
therapeutic targets for disorders of agency, such as schizophrenia. Thus, the present 
study offers new avenues for investigating the prospective sense of agency. 
 
  
 
111 
 
  
 112 
 
 
  
 
113 
 
Chapter 4. How Action Selection Influences the Sense of 
Agency: an ERP study 
 
 
 
We investigated the neural mechanisms of prospective contributions to the sense of 
agency by means of event-related potentials (ERPs). Subliminal priming was used to 
manipulate the fluency of selecting a left or right hand action in response to a 
supraliminal target. Actions were followed by one of several coloured circles, after a 
variable delay. Participants rated their degree of control over these visual outcomes. 
Incompatible priming impaired action selection, and reduced sense of agency over 
action outcomes, relative to compatible priming. ERP components at the time of the 
action covaried with judgements of agency over the subsequent outcome. Feedback-
related negativity evoked by the outcome was also associated with reduced agency 
ratings. These ERP components may reflect brain processes underlying prospective 
and retrospective components of sense of agency respectively. The action-related 
signals which prospectively influence the sense of agency are related to confidence 
in having selected the appropriate action. 
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4.1. Introduction 
Previous work shows that the sense of agency (SoA) is prospectively informed by a 
metacognitive signal about the fluency of action selection. The neural correlates of 
this prospective component of SoA have been studied with fMRI (Chambon et al., 
2013), using subliminal priming to manipulate action selection. As this experiment 
was the starting point for the present work, we describe it in some detail. Participants 
responded to a left or right pointing arrow with a corresponding left or right hand 
action. After a variable delay, a coloured circle would appear. At the end of the trial, 
participants were asked to judge how much control they felt over that coloured circle. 
Importantly, and unbeknownst to the subject, a prime arrow was subliminally 
presented before the visible target arrow (Vorberg et al., 2003). If the prime arrow 
was compatible with the target, i.e. pointed in the same direction, action selection 
was facilitated, leading to shorter RTs. When the prime was incompatible with the 
target, i.e. pointed in the opposite direction, action selection was impaired, as 
evidenced by slower reaction times (RTs) and more errors. These incompatible 
priming trials were associated with lower agency ratings, relative to compatible 
priming. FMRI results showed that activity in the angular gyrus (AG) was related to 
agency ratings in incompatible priming trials, with greater AG activity being 
associated with a loss of agency. Notably, this activation pattern was modelled 
during the action selection period, between prime onset and action, thus before the 
outcome was known, and long before agency ratings were given. 
The poor temporal resolution of fMRI does not permit a more detailed investigation of 
the temporal dynamics of prospective signals to SoA. In contrast to fMRI, the higher 
temporal resolution of EEG may help differentiate prospective processes linked to 
action monitoring, from later retrospective processes linked to outcome monitoring. 
Here we used event-related potentials (ERP) to investigate the contribution of three 
distinct stages of processing to SoA, locked to the target, the action, and the 
outcome. We next briefly consider the role of each, based on previous literature. 
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4.1.1. Action Monitoring 
ERP studies of action priming have shown that incompatible prime-target 
combinations are associated with an N2 component, 200-350 ms after target onset, 
which is absent or greatly reduced for compatible priming (Hughes, Velmans, & De 
Fockert, 2009; Jiang, van Gaal, Bailey, Chen, & Zhang, 2013; Verleger & Jaskowski, 
2008; Wang, Xiang, & Li, 2013). A similar component has previously been identified 
using the Eriksen flanker task, when distractors are incompatible with a central target 
(e.g. HHSHH; Kopp et al., 1996). The N2 component is thought to reflect pre-
response conflict detection and resolution (Donkers & van Boxtel, 2004; Yeung, 
Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). N2 amplitude is linked to both the degree of conflict in a 
given task, and of cognitive control recruited to deal with the conflict (Larson et al., 
2014). We therefore predicted that the N2 to the target stimulus might reflect action 
selection dysfluency, and thus be associated with prospective SoA. 
A recent transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) study showed that disruption of 
inferior parietal lobe (aiming to target the AG) both before and at the time of the 
action, abolished action priming effects on SoA (Chambon, Moore, et al., 2014). 
Post-decisional action monitoring allows the integration of initial conflict signals with 
how well the conflict was actually handled. Crucially, action monitoring occurs in 
advance, and independently, of outcome monitoring. Therefore, it can provide a 
prospective signal to SoA, according to our definition. In action-locked ERPs, the 
correct related negativity (CRN) is a fronto-central component immediately following 
action (0-100 ms) that is thought to index post-decisional conflict monitoring, and a 
continued need for cognitive control (Grützmann, Riesel, Klawohn, Kathmann, & 
Endrass, 2014; see Larson et al., 2014 for a review). We therefore hypothesised that 
the Action CRN could be associated with prospective SoA. 
4.1.2. Outcome monitoring 
Previous ERP studies on SoA have shown that voluntary actions lead to an 
attenuation of outcome processing, relative to comparable externally-triggered 
events (Gentsch & Schütz-Bosbach, 2011; Kühn et al., 2011; Timm, SanMiguel, 
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Saupe, & Schröger, 2013). Sensory attenuation of outcomes has been proposed as 
a marker of agency also in behavioural studies (Blakemore et al., 1998; Shergill, 
Samson, Bays, Frith, & Wolpert, 2005). However, sensory attenuation depends on 
outcomes being highly predictable, close in time to the action (see Hughes et al., 
2012 for a review), and high in salience (Reznik, Henkin, Levy, & Mukamel, 2015). 
Therefore, under conditions of uncertainty about the outcome, such as during the 
learning of new action-outcome associations, sensory attenuation may be less 
relevant to outcome monitoring. 
The feedback-related negativity (FRN) is a fronto-central component seen around 
250-300 ms after outcome feedback. It has been associated with reinforcement 
learning (Holroyd & Coles, 2002), and the learning of action-outcome associations 
more generally (Oliveira, McDonald, & Goodman, 2007). The FRN is typically 
associated with unexpected outcomes or negative feedback, such as errors or 
losses (San Martín, 2012). The FRN might therefore be a marker of retrospective 
SoA, since it reflects violations of learned action-outcome associations. 
4.1.3. Present study 
The present study aimed to investigate these aforementioned possible neural 
correlates of SoA.  Each trial involved subliminal action primes, supraliminal target 
stimuli, manual responses to those targets, a delayed visual outcome, and an explicit 
judgement of agency (Chambon et al., 2013). We measured candidate ERPs to 
different events in this sequence, to investigate potential neural correlates of 
prospective and retrospective components contributing to SoA. Finally, we included 
both free choice and instructed trials, to investigate whether the endogenous vs. 
exogenous origins of action contribute similarly to SoA. 
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4.2. Materials and Methods 
4.2.1. Participants 
Thirty-five participants were recruited via a UCL online database, to obtain a desired 
sample size of 24, based on an a priori power calculation (given Cohen’s dz = 0.65 
for within-subjects comparison of compatibility effect on agency ratings (Chambon et 
al., 2013), power = 0.8, alpha = 0.05). All were right-handed, with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, did not suffer from colour blindness, and had no history of 
psychiatric or neurological disorders. Participants received payment of £7.50/hour. 
Written informed consent was obtained from all participants. The study had ethical 
approval from the UCL Research Ethics Committee. Seven participants were 
excluded due to high artefact rejection rates (above 30% of the data). Three 
participants were excluded as they were uncooperative, or did not adequately follow 
instructions (e.g. repeatedly falling asleep during study; reported pre-deciding their 
response prior to each trial; reported in debriefing that they based their agency 
ratings on colour preference rather than on the relation to their own action). One 
further participant was excluded because they may have consciously perceived the 
primes (post-test d’ = 0.65, over 2 SD’s above the group mean d’ = 0.02, SD = 0.21). 
Twenty-four participants remained (12 females, mean age = 24.38, SD = 4.90). 
4.2.2. Apparatus and Materials 
The experiment was programmed using Psychophysics Toolbox v3 (Brainard, 1997; 
Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997). Stimuli were presented on a mid-grey background, 
on a 17’’ CRT monitor (75 Hz refresh rate) positioned at approximately 60 cm 
distance from participants. Prime and mask stimuli consisted of left- or right-pointing 
arrows, presented in dark grey. Primes subtended visual angles of 0.8° x 1.86°, and 
masks 1.09° x 3.47°. Prime and mask could appear randomly 1.38° above or below 
fixation to enhance the masking effect (Vorberg et al., 2003). Each action was 
followed by a visual stimulus in one of 8 colours (see later) subtending 3.8°.  
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4.2.3. Design and Procedure 
4.2.3.1. Agency task 
In the main task, participants had to respond to a target arrow with left or right hand 
action, which would trigger the appearance of a visual outcome – a coloured circle 
(see Figure 4.1 below for an outline of the paradigm). At the end of a trial, they were 
asked to rate how much control they felt they had over the visual outcome they had 
just seen. 
In forced choice trials, a directional arrow (pointing randomly to the left or right) 
instructed participants to perform the corresponding left or right hand action. In free 
choice trials, a bi-directional arrow indicated that participants could choose 
themselves whether to make a left or right hand action. Participants were instructed 
to try and make their choices as spontaneously as possible, and avoid deciding in 
advance of a trial, but at the same time, to try to choose each hand about 50% of the 
time. To ensure similar number of trials across actions, feedback was given at the 
end of each block on the percentage of left and right hand choices. Forced and free 
choice trials were randomised, and equiprobable. 
Primes and actions could either be compatible or incompatible. In forced choice 
trials, prime direction could be the same as the target direction, and thus would also 
be compatible with the action, or primes might point in the opposite direction as the 
target arrow, and be incompatible with the action. Prime-action compatibility was 
determined online for free choice trials. When participants chose the action 
suggested by the prime, i.e. a left action following a left prime, trials were classed as 
compatible. Trials were classed as incompatible when participants chose the 
opposite action to the prime (i.e. a right action). 
Crucially, the outcome colours were not directly related to the primes alone, or to the 
actions alone. Rather, the outcome colour was based on the combination of prime 
and target, or prime and action, so that compatible and incompatible trials were 
associated with different colours. Further, different colours were used for free and 
forced choices. Hence, within a block, 4 colours were associated with each choice  
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Figure 4.1. Experimental paradigm. Left or right subliminal prime arrows were briefly flashed 
before a target arrow, containing a metacontrast mask. Participants responded to the target 
by either following the instruction of directional arrows, or choosing which action to perform 
in response to the bi-directional (free choice) arrow. Primes and actions could be compatible 
(left prime – left action) or incompatible (left prime – right action). Actions triggered the onset 
of a visual outcome, after a variable delay. At the end of the trial, participants gave agency 
ratings. 
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condition. Of these, two colours were associated with each action, one for each level 
of prime-action compatibility (cf. Wenke et al., 2010). Moreover, to ensure that the 
frequency of each coloured outcome was equal despite differences in error rates for 
compatible and incompatible priming, error trials were replaced at the end of a block. 
Finally, to exclude any idiosyncratic preference effects, the colours were latin square 
rotated across 8 blocks of trials, so that each colour appeared once in each choice x 
action x compatibility condition. An extra block of trials with a random assignment of 
colours to conditions was completed at the end of the 8 blocks. This block was 
included to detect any anomalous use of the rating scale, but was not otherwise 
analysed. 
The interval between action and outcome was randomly either 400 or 600 ms. The 
minimum interval of 400 ms between action and outcome helped to reduce the 
influence of action-related components on the outcome-locked ERP (Hughes & 
Waszak, 2011). Action-outcome interval was jittered because variation in temporal 
contiguity was predicted to lead to varying sense of agency, and thus to reduce 
stereotyped agency judgements (Haggard et al., 2002; Wenke et al., 2010). Interval 
duration was orthogonal to the factors of interest in the present study (choice, action 
and prime-action compatibility).  
A trial started with a central fixation cross presented for 700 ms. Primes were shown 
for 13.3 ms and, after a 40 ms delay, the target/mask stimulus was displayed for 250 
ms. Previous studies have shown that these parameters allow for robust priming 
effects, without conscious perception of primes (Vorberg et al., 2003). Participants 
were instructed to respond as quickly as possible to the target arrow by pressing a 
corresponding left or right arrow key, or to choose which action to make when bi-
directional targets were shown. If they pressed the wrong key (in forced choice 
trials), or were too slow (> 1.2 s), a black cross appeared, indicating an error. 
Otherwise, after a variable delay a coloured circle would appear, for 1 s. Participants 
were instructed to pay attention to the relation between their action and the coloured 
circle that followed. After a variable delay between 1 and 2 s, the rating scale was 
presented until participants made a response. Participants were asked to judge how 
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much control they felt over the coloured circle, on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 
to 9 (1 = very little control, 9 = very strong control). To prevent EEG artefacts, they 
were instructed not to blink until after the coloured circle disappeared. Inter-trial 
intervals varied randomly between 1 and 1.5 seconds. 
The study started with a training block of 48 trials. If participants felt confident about 
the task and agency ratings, they proceeded to main experiment. The main 
experiment consisted of 8 blocks of 64 trials. Participants could take small breaks 
between the blocks. After the main experiment, participants were debriefed on the 
presence of primes and completed a prime awareness test. 
4.2.3.2. Prime Awareness Test 
To assess whether primes remained subliminal for all participants, after the main 
experiment participants were debriefed about the presence of primes and completed 
a prime awareness test. This task resembled the main experiment, except without 
any colours following the action, or agency ratings. Participants were instructed to 
press the left- or right-arrow key according to the direction of the prime arrow, 
ignoring the supraliminal target arrow. To avoid possible response biases induced by 
directional targets (Vermeiren & Cleeremans, 2012), only the bi-directional arrow 
target was used. Additionally, a delay was introduced after mask presentation in 
which participants could not respond (Wenke et al., 2010). This served to prevent 
conscious reports from being biased by unconscious motor activations triggered by 
primes (Vorberg et al., 2003). This delay varied randomly between 600 and 800ms, 
with an auditory tone (600Hz, 150ms duration) signalling that participants could 
respond. This test consisted of 3 blocks of 60 trials. 
4.2.4. EEG Recording and Analysis 
EEG was acquired with a 64 channel BioSemi Active-Two system (Biosemi Inc, 
Amsterdam, Netherlands) and sampled at 512 Hz. The CMS (common mode sense) 
and DRL (driven right leg) electrodes were used as reference and ground electrodes. 
Additional electrodes were placed on the left and right mastoid. Vertical and 
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horizontal EOGs were recorded from electrodes placed above and below the right 
eye and on the outer canthi of the left and right eyes. 
EEG data analysis was performed with Fieldtrip (Oostenveld, Fries, Maris, & 
Schoffelen, 2011) and custom-built Matlab scripts (MATLAB 8.1, The MathWorks 
Inc., Natick, MA, 2013). All channels were 0.1-30Hz band-pass filtered, and re-
referenced to average mastoids. An automatic artefact rejection procedure was 
employed. To identify epochs with eye-blink artefacts, EOG channels were bandpass 
filtered from 1-15Hz (Butterworth filter, 4th order) and any epochs with activity 
exceeding +/- 60µV were rejected. Additionally, any epochs where EEG activity 
exceeded +/- 60µV were excluded. Due to recording difficulties with some subjects, 
and given that these electrodes were not of interest, the following channels were 
excluded from analysis: T7, T8, TP7, TP8, P9 and P10. In four participants, 1 
channel had to be interpolated due to abnormal noise (P7, AF3, F5 and P2 for each 
participant respectively). Error trials, in which participants pressed the wrong key 
after a forced choice target (M = 3.26% SD = 2.66), or exceeded the response 
window (> 1.2 s; M = 1.54% SD = 1.33) were excluded. 
Target-locked ERPs. Target-locked epochs were selected from 200 ms pre-
stimulus to 600 ms after. Baseline correction was applied with a 100 ms interval prior 
to prime onset (-155 to -55 ms). Separate ERPs were calculated for each choice and 
priming condition (average N trials = 110, min = 64). Based on previous studies 
(Larson et al., 2014) and observation of grand ERPs and scalp topography, the 
Target N2 component was analysed as the average amplitude at Cz, between 250 
and 325 ms. 
Action-locked ERPs. Action-locked epochs were selected from 600 ms before the 
action to 400 ms after, with a 100 ms baseline before action (average N = 107, min = 
57). Based on previous studies on the Error and Correct Related Negativity 
(ERN/CRN; e.g. Boldt & Yeung, 2015; Scheffers & Coles, 2000), CRN was 
measured as the average amplitude at FCz from 0 to 100 ms after the action.  
Chapter 4. An ERP Study with Subliminal Priming 
123 
Outcome-Locked ERPs. Outcome-locked epochs were selected from 200ms before 
stimulus to 600ms after, with a 100ms pre-stimulus baseline (average N trials = 110, 
min = 57). Feedback Related Negativity (FRN) was measured as the average 
amplitude from 250 to 300 ms at FCz, based on observation of the data and previous 
research (Yeung, Holroyd, & Cohen, 2005). 
These ERP components were analysed with hierarchical linear regression models 
(also known as linear mixed-effects models). This approach, unlike classical ANOVA 
models, performs well with unbalanced data (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; 
Bagiella, Sloan, & Heitjan, 2000; Tibon & Levy, 2015). Additionally, it allowed us to 
investigate the relation between agency ratings and ERP components, by modelling 
single-trial level data with continuous predictors. Analyses were conducted using the 
lme4 package (Bates et al., 2014) in R (R Core Team, 2015). Parameter estimates 
(b) and their associated t-tests (t, p), calculated using the Satterthwaite 
approximation for degrees of freedom (Kuznetsova et al., 2015), are presented to 
show the magnitude of the effects, with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. Plots 
of model predictions were obtained from 10000 simulations from the posterior 
distribution of plausible parameter values under uniform priors (Gelman & Su, 2015). 
For display purposes only, but not for statistical analysis, agency ratings were 
median split to demonstrate the relation between neural processes indexed by ERP 
components and SoA. For each subject, and for each choice and priming condition, 
median agency rating values were obtained, and trials were classed as low or high 
agency ratings with respect to the median. 
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Agency Task 
Mean RTs were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), 
with the factors choice (free vs. forced) and priming condition (compatible vs. 
incompatible). This revealed a significant main effect of choice (F(1,23) = 5.92, 
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p = 0.023, ƞ!!  = 0.21), such that free choice trials led to slower RTs than forced 
choice (free: M = 432.11, SD = 147.69; forced: M = 420.65, SD = 124.11). There was 
also a significant main effect of prime-action compatibility (F(1, 23) = 74.36, p < 0.001, ƞ!!  = 0.76), as predicted, with slower RTs for prime incompatible actions than prime 
compatible actions (compatible: M = 414.95, SD = 34.12; incompatible: M = 440.52, 
SD = 31.82; see Figure 4.2.a). The interaction was not significant (F(1, 23) = 1.98, 
p = 0.17, ƞ!!  = 0.079). 
In free choice trials, prime compatible choices were made on 59% (SD = 0.06) of 
trials, revealing a choice bias. A one-sample t-test revealed this was significantly 
different from chance level of 50% (t(23) = 7.12, p < 0.001, dz = 2.97; see Figure 
4.2.b). For forced choice trials, error rates for prime compatible and incompatible 
actions were submitted to a paired-samples t-test. This showed that participants 
made significantly more errors when primes were incompatible with the target, 
compared to compatible (M = 9.10%, SD = 6.26 and M = 4.28%, SD = 4.71, 
respectively; t(23) = -5.55, p < 0.001, dz = -2.31; see Figure 4.2.c). 
Agency ratings were submitted to a 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA, with 
factors of choice (free vs. forced), prime-action compatibility (compatible vs. 
incompatible) and action-outcome interval (400 vs. 600 ms). Results showed a 
significant main effect of choice (F(1,23) = 4.45, p = 0.046, ƞ!!  = 0.16), with higher 
ratings in free, compared to forced, choice trials (free: M = 5.26, SD = 0.44; forced: 
M = 5.01, SD = 0.40, see Figure 4.2.d). A significant main effect of prime-action 
compatibility was also found (F(1,23) = 10.42, p = 0.004, ƞ!!  = 0.31), with compatible 
priming leading to higher agency ratings than incompatible priming (M = 5.30, 
SD = 0.41 and M = 5.05, SD = 0.46 respectively). The interaction between choice 
and priming was not significant (F(1,23) = 2.96, p = 0.099, ƞ!!  = 0.11). Finally, there 
was no effect of action-outcome interval, nor any interaction with the other factors 
(Fs < 1). Action-outcome interval did influence agency ratings in previous studies 
(Chambon, Sidarus, et al., 2014), but those studies used more intervals and a wider 
range than the present study. Importantly, action-outcome interval was not a key 
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factor of interest here, and did not interact with the other factors. Therefore, it will not 
be discussed further. 
a. 
 
b. 
 
c. 
 
d. 
 
Figure 4.2. Behavioural results. a. Mean reaction times across choice and priming 
conditons. b. Percentage of prime-compatible and prime-incompatible actions on free 
choice trials, showing the choice bias induced by primes. c. Mean error rates across 
priming conditions in forced choice trials. d. Mean agency ratings across choice and 
priming conditions. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. ** - p < 0.001. 
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4.3.2. Prime Awareness Test 
Prime discrimination performance was assessed by calculating a d’ score, according 
to signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966). A one-sample t-test showed that 
average d’ did not differ significantly from zero (M = -0.004, SD = 0.16; two-tailed: 
t(23) = -0.13, p = 0.89, dz = -0.054). This suggests that primes remained below the 
threshold of conscious awareness. 
4.3.3. ERPs 
ERP analyses focused on three neural processes that might inform SoA, at three 
different time points in the trial. Processes related to action monitoring were 
assessed at pre- and post-response stages, by analysing the target-locked N2 
(Target N2) and the action-locked CRN (Action CRN) components, respectively. 
Finally, the outcome-locked FRN (Outcome FRN) was assessed as an index of 
outcome processing. 
4.3.3.1. Action Monitoring 
Pre-Response - Target N2. 
Using hierarchical linear regression, N2 amplitude was predicted from choice and 
priming condition (coded as 1/-1 for free/forced choice and as 1/-1 for 
compatible/incompatible priming), and choice by priming interaction, as fixed effects. 
Participants were modelled as random intercepts and random slope effects. RTs and 
their interactions with other factors were entered as fixed covariates, after first log-
transforming the RT data, to render the distribution more normal, and standardizing it 
within participants. 
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Figure 4.3. Target-locked ERPs across choice and priming conditions. Incompatible priming 
led to an enhanced N2 component, relative to compatible priming (window highlighted in 
grey). This component had a central scalp distribution (incompatible – compatible 
subtraction). The black vertical line before the target shows the onset of the prime, and the 
horizontal bar indicates average RT, +/- 1 SD.  
 
The model predicting the Target N2 revealed a significant main effect of priming 
condition (b = 0.34, t(34) = 2.42, p = 0.021, 95% CI = [0.080, 0.60]), a significant 
negative relation with RTs (b = -1.98, t(8325) = -17.04, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [-2.18,  
-.1.77]), and a significant interaction between priming and RTs (b = -0.25, 
t(8449) = -2.13, p = 0.033, 95%CI = [-0.47, -0.0010]). No significant effect of choice, 
nor any other interactions were found (see Table C1, in Appendix C, for full results). 
These results showed that greater N2 amplitudes (more negative potentials) 
occurred for incompatible priming trials, relative to compatible priming (see Figure 
4.3 below for ERP and topographic plots). Additionally, greater N2 amplitudes were 
associated with slower RTs. To probe the interaction between priming condition and 
RTs, point estimates and standard errors were obtained from model predictions at 
+/- 1 SDs of the RTs, and one sample t-tests were performed, using a conservative 
N-1 degrees of freedom (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). The priming x RTs interaction 
(Figure 4.4) showed that the compatibility effect on Target N2 amplitude (greater N2 
for incompatible) was largest for fast RTs (-1 SD RT: b = 1.17, t(23) = 3.17, p = 0.004), 
still robust at average RTs (mean RT: b = 0.67,t(23) = 2.41, p = 0.024), but no longer 
statistically significant for slow RTs (+1 SD RT: b = 0.18, t(23) = 0.49, p = 0.63). These 
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results are broadly consistent with an association between the Target N2 and conflict 
monitoring and resolution processes 
 
Figure 4.4. Target N2 model predictions for the priming by RTs interaction (with 95% 
prediction intervals shaded around regression lines). For fast RTs, incompatible priming led 
to larger Target N2 than compatible priming, but this effect reduces for slow RTs. 
 
Post-Response - Action CRN. 
The same analysis model was also applied to the mean Action CRN amplitude. The 
Action CRN model revealed a significant effect of priming (b = -0.27, t(24) = -2.12, 
p = 0.044, 95% CI = [-0.51, -0.020]), a significant relation with RTs (b = -0.54, 
t(8485) = -5.55, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [-0.72, -0.35]), and a significant priming by RTs 
interaction (b = .37, t(8667) = 3.85, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [0.19, 0.55]). No effects of 
choice, nor any other interactions were found (see Table C2). 
Larger CRN amplitude (more negative potentials) was associated with compatible, 
relative to incompatible, priming. Additionally, larger CRN was associated with slower 
RTs. Model predictions and point estimates were again used to assess the priming 
by RTs interaction (see Figure 4.5). First, the relation between Action CRN and RTs 
was assessed separately for each priming condition. For compatible priming, CRN 
amplitude was not significantly different between fast (-1 SD) and slow (+1 SD) RT 
trials (b = -0.33, t(23) = -1.27, p = 0.22). However, for incompatible priming, there was 
a significant negative relation between RTs and CRN amplitude, such that slower 
RTs were associated with larger CRN than faster RTs (+1 vs -1 SD RT: b = -1.82, 
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t(23) =-6.30, p < 0.001). This revealed that the interaction between priming and RTs 
was driven by a modulation of CRN amplitude across RTs in incompatible priming 
trials, but not in compatible trials. Second, CRN amplitude was compared across 
priming conditions. This showed that the compatibility effect – smaller CRN for 
incompatible versus compatible trials – was largest for fast RTs (-1 SD RT: b = -1.29, 
t(23) = -3.97, p = 0.001) and reduced for average RTs (mean RT: b = -0.54, 
t(23)  = -2.12, p = 0.045). For slow RTs (+1 SD), the compatibility effect was no longer 
significant (b = 0.20, t(23) = 0.64, p = 0.53), but reversed at very slow RTs (+2 SD RT: 
b = 0.95, t(23) = 2.07, p = 0.050). Together, these results are consistent with an 
association between Action CRN and post-response conflict monitoring. They further 
point to the possibility that the CRN could be suppressed in incompatible priming 
trials in which conflict is well resolved, resulting in fast or average RTs. 
 
Figure 4.5. Action CRN model predictions for the priming by RTs interaction (with 95% 
prediction intervals shaded around regression lines). For incompatible priming, Action CRN 
varied across RTs, with an enhancement of the Action CRNs for very slow RTs, but a 
suppression for fast RTs. 
 
To test a possible trade-off between pre- and post-response conflict monitoring, 
indexed by the Target N2 and Action CRN respectively, mean Target N2 amplitude 
(standardised within-subjects) was added as a fixed covariate to the previous Action 
CRN model. Indeed, results showed a significant negative relation between Target 
N2 and Action CRN (b = -0.94, t(8775) = -10.02, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [-1.13, -0.75], see 
Table C3). Larger Target N2 (more negative potential) was associated with a smaller 
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Action CRN (more positive potential). Notably, the Target N2 seemed to explain 
some of the variance previously accounted for by the main effect of priming, as 
priming now became only a marginal predictor of Action CRN (b = -0.24, t(24) = 1.91, 
p = 0.069, 95% CI = [-0.48, 0.011]), whereas RTs became a stronger predictor 
(b = -0.71, t(8495) = -7.27, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [-0.91, -0.51]). The priming by RTs 
interaction remained significant (b = 0.35, t(8663) = -3.62, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [0.16, 
0.56]). These results support a distinction between pre- and post-response conflict 
monitoring, as the latter may integrate initial conflict signals with actual conflict 
resolution. 
4.3.3.2. Outcome Monitoring 
To test the hypothesis that manipulating action selection fluency may affect SoA by 
altering outcome processing, we modelled Outcome FRN by choice and priming 
condition, and their interaction, as both fixed and participant random effects. Results 
showed no significant effects of choice (b = -0.015, t(22.92) = -0.088, p = 0.82, 95%  
CI = [-0.34, 0.34]), priming (b = -0.094, t(42.3) = -0.74, p = 0.93, 95% CI = [-0.35, 
0.16]), or choice x priming interaction (b = 0.13, t(29.53) = 1.00, p = 0.33, 95% 
CI = [-0.13, 0.41]; see Table C4). Therefore, we found no evidence that Outcome 
FRN was affected by our manipulations of action selection. 
Additionally, we tested a possible relation between Action CRN and Outcome FRN, 
by adding Action CRN to the previous Outcome FRN model. The new model 
revealed no significant effect of Action CRN (b = -0.087, t(8778) = -0.76, p = 0.45, 95% 
CI = [-0.31, 0.12]; see Table C5). Since null effects cannot be clearly interpreted 
within frequentist statistics, Bayesian hypothesis testing (Wagenmakers, 2007) was 
used to further probe this relation. By comparing the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) between a model with a predictor (alternative hypothesis) and a model without 
that predictor (null hypothesis), a Bayes factor can be approximated in order to 
weigh the evidence for or against the null hypothesis, i.e. that the predictor is not 
related to the dependent variable. Comparing the BIC for the previous, null model 
with the new, alternative model yielded a Bayes factor of 70.52, indicating strong 
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evidence for the null hypothesis of no association between Action CRN and Outcome 
FRN.  
Sensory Attenuation. 
Although our task was not particularly designed to investigate sensory attenuation, 
we additionally tested whether our manipulations could have affected SoA by altering 
early sensory attenuation of outcomes. For this, we analysed the N1 component in 
the outcome-locked ERP (Gentsch, Kathmann, et al., 2012; Gentsch & Schütz-
Bosbach, 2011). Average N1 amplitudes between 75-125 ms at Cz (Vogel & Luck, 
2000) were modelled by the factors choice and priming, plus their interaction, as 
fixed and participant random effects. Results showed a significant negative relation 
between Outcome N1 and choice (b = -0.29, t(25.30) = -2.38, p = 0.025, 95% 
CI = [-0.54, -0.033], see Figure 4.6 below), with larger (more negative) N1 
amplitudes for free choice, relative to forced choice, trials. There was no effects of 
priming (b = 0.061, t(269) = 0.65, p = 0.52, 95% CI = [-0.14, 0.25]), nor choice x 
priming interaction (b = -0.0042, t(25.10) = -0.040, p = 0.97, 95% CI = [-0.22, 0.20]; 
Table C6). Therefore, we found no evidence of sensory attenuation but, in contrast, 
found a sensory enhancement of N1 in free choice trials.  
 
 
      75-125 ms 
  Free Choice Forced Choice 
 Compatible  Compatible 
 Incompatible  Incompatible 
 
Figure 4.6. Outcome-locked ERPs across choice and priming conditions. The N1 
component (window highlighted in grey) was larger in free choice, relative to forced choice, 
trials, but was not related to priming, or agency ratings. This component had a central scalp 
distribution (forced – free, 75-125 ms). 
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As the effect of choice on agency ratings was not very robust (no longer significant 
after artefact rejection), it seems unlikely that this sensory enhancement is related to 
how action selection influences SoA. In fact, observation of Figure 4.8.b suggested 
that Outcome N1 was not related to agency ratings. Nonetheless, this was tested 
more directly by comparing BICs between a model predicting agency ratings by 
experimental factors (as above) only, with a model that additionally included 
Outcome N1 (standardised within-subjects). The resulting Bayes factor of 62.46 
indicated strong evidence for the null hypothesis, that the Outcome N1 was not 
related to agency ratings. 
4.3.3.3. Predicting Agency Ratings 
Finally, we modelled agency ratings to investigate the neural correlates of the 
subjective experience of agency. As above, the experimental factors of choice and 
priming were entered as fixed and participant random effects. Target N2, Action CRN 
and Outcome FRN, as well as RTs, were entered as fixed covariates (standardised 
within-subjects). Importantly, including the RTs as a predictor in the model ensures 
that other effects, such as priming effects, are estimated after taking into account the 
possible contribution of RTs. 
Considering the experimental factors, results were consistent with the previous 
analysis: there was a significant effect of priming (b = 0.10, t(23) = 2.45, p = 0.022, 
95% CI = [0.021, 0.19]), a marginal effect of choice (b = 0.15, t(23) = 2.06, p = 0.051, 
95% CI = [-.0085, 0.30]), and no significant choice x priming interaction (b = 0.023, 
t(23) = 0.56, p = 0.58, 95% CI = [-0.059, 0.097]). The reduced effect of choice on 
agency ratings seen here, relative to the ANOVA analysis above, is due to the EEG 
artefact rejection procedures. Only trials with ERP data in all 3 time windows could 
be used for the ERP analysis, whereas all correct trials were used for behavioural 
data analysis. 
The model further showed a significant negative relation between agency ratings and 
RTs (b = -0.15, t(8726) = -5.94, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [-0.20, -0.093]), such that slower 
RTs were associated with lower agency ratings. This shows that RT monitoring may 
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partly contribute to SoA. Notwithstanding that, results show that the effect of priming 
on SoA could not be fully explained by differences in RTs across priming conditions. 
 
Figure 4.7. Parameter estimates for the model predicting agency ratings , with 95% 
bootstrapped confidence intervals. 
 
Turning to the putative neural correlates of agency, it had been hypothesised that 
Target N2, as a pre-response index of conflict monitoring, might be related to agency 
ratings. Larger Target N2 amplitudes (more negative potentials) would imply stronger 
response conflict and hence be associated with lower agency ratings. However, the 
model revealed no significant effect of Target N2 (b = -0.023, t(8754) = -0.92, p = 0.36, 
95% CI = [-0.071, 0.029]). Comparing the previous model, which included the Target 
N2 as a predictor, to a model without the Target N2 predictor (null hypothesis), 
resulted in a Bayes factor of 61.46, indicating strong evidence for the null hypothesis 
of no relation between Target N2 and agency ratings. The degree of conflict 
experienced, or of cognitive control recruited, during initial action selection was not 
directly related to SoA. 
Alternatively, as an index of post-response action monitoring, it was hypothesised 
that Action CRN could be related to SoA. Indeed, Action CRN was found to have a 
significant positive relation to agency ratings (b = 0.079, t(8760) = 3.22, p = 0.001, 95% 
CI = [0.029, 0.13], see Figure 4.8.a for ERP and topographic plots). Larger Action 
CRN amplitudes (more negative potentials) were associated with lower agency 
ratings. This would be consistent with the role of Action CRN in post-response 
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conflict monitoring, with unresolved conflict leading to greater Action CRN, and thus 
a reduction in SoA. 
Finally, looking at neural correlate of outcome processing, we found a significant 
positive relation between Outcome FRN and agency ratings (b = 0.13, t(8760) = 5.52,  
p < 0.001, 95% CI = [0.085, 0.18], see Figure 4.8.b). Larger Outcome FRN 
amplitudes (more negative potentials) were associated with lower agency ratings. 
The Outcome FRN may indicate a violation of outcome expectations, or more 
negative responses to the outcomes, thus leading to a reduction in SoA. 
a. Action-Locked ERPs 
 
 
b. Outcome-Locked ERPs 
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Figure 4.8. Relation between subjective agency ratings and ERPs locked to the action and 
outcome onset. For display purposes, agency ratings were median split, and separate 
ERPs computed for high and low ratings. In panel a. the action-locked ERPs show that low 
agency ratings were associated with a larger CRN than high ratings, with a fronto-central 
scalp distribution (low - high agency, 0-100 ms). Panel b. shows the outcome-locked ERPs, 
revealing that low agency ratings were associated with a larger FRN than high ratings, with 
a fronto-central scalp distribution (low - high agency, 250-300 ms). 
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4.4. Discussion 
The present study aimed to clarify the neural correlates of SoA, and specifically the 
neural basis of prospective cues to SoA based on action selection. Behaviourally, we 
found that incompatible action priming led to slower RTs than compatible priming, in 
both free and forced choice trials. Free choices were biased towards prime-
congruent choices, while incompatible priming led to more errors than compatible 
priming in forced choice trials. These results are consistent with previous subliminal 
priming studies including free choice trials (Kiesel et al., 2006; O’Connor & Neill, 
2011; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004). More importantly, the disruption to action 
selection induced by incompatible priming led to a reduction in agency ratings over 
action outcomes, relative to compatible priming (Chambon & Haggard, 2012; 
Chambon, Moore, et al., 2014; Chambon et al., 2013; Sidarus et al., 2013; Wenke et 
al., 2010). Additionally, free choice trials led to a stronger SoA than forced choice 
trials, but priming had a similar effect on SoA for both choice conditions (cf. Wenke et 
al., 2010). At a neural level, we identified ERP components associated with SoA at 
the time of the action, and also at the time of the outcome. Based on previous work, 
these components could be identified with action monitoring and outcome 
monitoring, respectively (see Figure 4.9). 
4.4.1. Action Monitoring 
Previous studies into the neural correlates of prospective cues to SoA (Chambon, 
Moore, et al., 2014; Chambon et al., 2013) had not been able to disentangle the role 
of pre- and post-decisional action monitoring stages to SoA. The high temporal 
resolution of EEG allowed us to investigate this question. Broadly, components that 
occur early, and are related to target processing, reflect pre-decisional monitoring, 
while components that occur later, namely at the time of the action, reflect post-
decisional monitoring processes. 
Here, we found evidence of pre-response conflict monitoring, with a larger Target N2 
associated with incompatible priming trials. Previous studies have shown the N2 
component is sensitive to incompatibility between prime and target (Hughes et al., 
Chapter 4. An ERP Study with Subliminal Priming 
136 
2009; Jiang et al., 2013; Verleger & Jaskowski, 2008; Wang et al., 2013), or to 
incompatibility between a distractor and target (e.g. Kopp et al., 1996; see Larson et 
al., 2014 for a review). Moreover, we found that larger Target N2 amplitude was 
related to slower RTs, as in previous studies (Beste, Saft, Andrich, Gold, & 
Falkenstein, 2008; Yeung et al., 2004; Yeung & Nieuwenhuis, 2009). 
 
Figure 4.9. Schematic outline of the experimental paradigm with the putative cognitive 
processes involved at different stages of voluntary action. These processes are thought to 
be respectively indexed by the neural markers measured here. The two measures that were 
associated with the subjective sense of agency are highlighted. These reflect two 
independent cues to SoA: a prospective cue (blue outline), and a retrospective cue (purple 
outline). 
 
We also found an interaction between RTs and the effect of priming on Target N2 
amplitude. The compatibility effect on Target N2 (more negative amplitude for 
incompatible trials) was greater for fast responses than for slow responses. A 
previous study, that split RTs into deciles, found that the delaying effects of 
incompatible, relative to compatible, priming were stronger for faster RTs (Atas & 
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Cleeremans, 2015). Those authors proposed that trials with slower RTs may already 
reflect enhanced cognitive control, resulting in reduced response interference from 
incompatible primes. In contrast, faster responses would not benefit from the same 
level of cognitive control, and so would be more sensitive to the effect of the prime. 
Our finding of larger Target N2 associated with slower RTs for both compatible and 
incompatible trials strongly supports this view, and suggests that Target N2 reflects 
the recruitment of cognitive control. Intriguingly, the Target N2 was comparable in 
incompatible priming trials for both free and forced choices. To our knowledge this 
has not been previously investigated, but seems consistent with the observed choice 
bias introduced by the primes. This suggests a specific cost, or effort, is involved in 
‘freely’ choosing a prime-incompatible action. Finally, we did not find any relationship 
between Target N2 amplitude and agency ratings, suggesting that the effects of 
action priming on agency were not directly related to the action selection stage. 
We found a clear neural correlate of the SoA at the post-decisional monitoring stage. 
Larger Action CRN was associated with lower agency ratings. This finding is 
consistent with previous studies that showed a similar relation between Action CRN 
and metacognitive judgements of confidence (Boldt & Yeung, 2015; Scheffers & 
Coles, 2000). These studies showed that larger Action CRN was associated with 
reduced confidence in having made a correct response. Additionally, perceptual 
discrimination tasks that are objectively more difficult have also been associated with 
larger Action CRN compared to those involving easy discrimination (Endrass, 
Klawohn, Gruetzmann, Ischebeck, & Kathmann, 2012; Pailing & Segalowitz, 2004). 
These results are consistent with a view of the Action CRN as related to post-
response conflict monitoring (Grützmann, Riesel, et al., 2014; Larson et al., 2014; 
Yeung et al., 2004), and/or uncertainty about the correct response (Pailing & 
Segalowitz, 2004; Scheffers & Coles, 2000). They further suggest that prospective 
signals to the SoA and confidence judgements draw on information from post-
decisional processes that integrate early and late action selection signals, rather 
than only from pre-decisional processes. 
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The effects of action priming on the Action CRN require further consideration. 
Overall, we found that compatible priming was associated with a larger Action CRN 
than incompatible priming. At first glance, this would seem to go against a conflict 
monitoring account, since that account would predict that incompatible priming trials 
would be associated with higher conflict, and hence larger Action CRN, than 
compatible priming. Yet, the literature does not support this prediction: to our 
knowledge, no previous studies using subliminal priming have looked at the 
compatibility effects on Action CRN. A few studies using the flanker task have 
analysed conflict effects on action-locked ERPs for correct trials, but have found 
inconsistent results. While one study found an overall larger Action CRN for 
compatible, relative to incompatible, flanker trials (Grützmann, Riesel, et al., 2014), 
others have shown non-significant effects in the same  direction (Cohen & Donner, 
2013; Scheffers & Coles, 2000), while yet another study has reported the opposite 
effect (larger Action CRN for incompatible; Bartholow et al., 2005). In line with a 
conflict monitoring account, our results also showed that a larger Action CRN was 
associated with slower RTs. Importantly, there was a significant interaction between 
priming and RTs, qualifying the two main effects. The relationship between Action 
CRN and RTs was specifically present for incompatible priming trials, whereas 
Action CRN was stable across fast and slow RTs for compatible priming trials. 
When priming is incompatible, a fast RT might reflect a trial in which the prime was 
less processed, leading to a reduced, or absent, response conflict. However, this 
would predict no difference in Action CRN between compatible and incompatible 
trials. In fact, the current results show that incompatible priming was associated with 
smaller Action CRN than compatible priming for fast and average RTs. Alternatively, 
incompatible priming trials with fast RTs could reflect trials with faster and/or more 
efficient recruitment of cognitive control processes to overcome response conflict. 
Then, the observation of a smaller Action CRN for incompatible priming in trials with 
fast RTs could be interpreted as a suppression of Action CRN due to efficient 
cognitive control deployment before the action. This suppression would not be 
necessary in compatible priming trials. While our findings cannot disambiguate 
between these hypotheses, they do point to a complementarity, or trade-off, between 
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pre- and post-response conflict monitoring (cf. Grützmann et al., 2014; Larson et al., 
2014). 
Both the pre-response N2 and post-response negativities (Action CRN/ERN) have 
been linked to the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (van Veen & Carter, 2002; Yeung 
et al., 2004), suggesting they reflect two successive recruitment events of a single 
conflict monitoring circuit. If conflict is adequately detected and resolved before the 
response, there may be no need for further conflict-related processing after the 
response. However, if conflict is not fully processed before the response, post-
response conflict signals could be important to help prevent future errors. To test this 
complementarity in our data, we added Target N2 amplitude as a covariate to our 
model predicting Action CRN amplitude. Results indeed showed that larger Target 
N2 was associated with smaller Action CRN, consistent with a previous study 
(Grützmann, Riesel, et al., 2014) that showed this relation both at the within- and the 
between-subject level. Together, these results support the view that post-response 
action monitoring can integrate initial conflict signals with actual conflict resolution. 
The Action CRN may reflect a persisting need for cognitive control recruitment at the 
time of the action (Grützmann et al., 2014). Yet, successful cognitive control at an 
early, pre-decisional stage would reduce or obviate the need for later, post-decisional 
cognitive control. 
Prospective SoA may therefore be linked to a post-decisional integration of signals 
both early and late in the action-generation process (see Figure 4.9). A putative role 
of the prospective component of SoA may be as an experiential marker, or an 
epistemic feeling (Proust, 2008), of the unfolding voluntary action. If action selection 
is dysfluent, there may be a need to adjust behaviour. If an error is made, corrective 
action may help to avoid unintended outcomes. Even when the correct action is 
made, a signal that “something went wrong” (Pacherie, 2008), might weaken the link 
between the action and ensuing outcome, leading to a reduced SoA over the 
outcome. When processing action-outcome contingencies, it may be adaptive to 
learn following fluent, high-confidence actions, but not learn following dysfluent, low-
confidence, actions. 
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Alternatively, conflicts can serve as aversive signals (Botvinick, 2007). Conflict 
induces negative evaluations of subsequent neutral stimuli (Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013), 
and triggers behavioural adjustments in subsequent trials (Dreisbach & Fischer, 
2011, 2012). In fact, post-response negativities (CRN/ERN) have been linked to 
negative affect (Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2004; Simon-Thomas & Knight, 2005), 
and to the motivational significance of errors (Aarts, De Houwer, & Pourtois, 2013; 
Grützmann, Endrass, Klawohn, & Kathmann, 2014; Hajcak & Foti, 2008). From this 
perspective, our finding, of reduced SoA over outcomes following response conflict, 
could be interpreted as the negative valence of conflict “leaking” into outcome 
evaluation. 
4.4.2. Outcome monitoring 
After outcome onset, we found that larger (more negative) Outcome FRN amplitudes 
were associated with lower agency ratings. Previous studies comparing Outcome 
FRN between gains and losses, have shown greater FRN sensitivity associated with 
outcomes contingent on action vs. non-contingent (Yeung et al., 2005); and with 
greater perceived responsibility over outcomes (Li et al., 2010; Li, Han, Lei, Holroyd, 
& Li, 2011). Our results are also consistent with a recent report that stronger 
negative potentials in a similar time window were associated with outcomes that 
were externally- vs self-attributed (Bednark & Franz, 2014). More generally, the 
terminology for this component has been disputed. On one view, this component 
would be best described as a positive-going potential for positive outcomes, termed 
feedback-correct related positivity (fCRP; Holroyd, Pakzad-Vaezi, & Krigolson, 2008; 
Oliveira, McDonald, & Goodman, 2007; see San Martín, 2012 for a review). 
Irrespective of naming conventions, our results, and those discussed above, agree 
that less negative (or more positive) potentials for correct or rewarding outcomes are 
a putative correlate of greater SoA. 
Previous EEG studies on agency have manipulated outcome expectation or 
predictability, for example, by priming the outcome (Gentsch, Kathmann, et al., 2012; 
Gentsch & Schütz-Bosbach, 2011), or by violating learned action-outcome 
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contingencies (Kühn et al., 2011). These studies have found sensory attenuation to 
self-triggered and predicted/expected outcomes in early (N1) processing; as well as 
smaller P3a for self-attributed, relative to externally-attributed, outcomes (Kühn et al., 
2011). Additionally, using subliminal action priming with fully predictable outcomes, a 
study has found a sensory attenuation of outcomes that followed compatibly primed, 
relative to incompatibly primed, actions (Stenner, Bauer, Sidarus, et al., 2014). 
In contrast, we manipulated action selection while equating outcome predictability, 
and frequency, across conditions (choice x priming). Here, outcomes were always 
relatively uncertain, as there were many possible outcomes (8), and action-outcome 
contingencies changed across blocks. Within a block, participants could learn that 
left and right hand actions were each associated with 4 colours, 2 for free and 2 for 
forced choice trials. The compatibility relation between prime and target 
disambiguated the remaining 2 colours, but this information was not available since 
the primes were subliminal. Sensory attenuation depends on the ability to adequately 
predict a sensory event (see Hughes et al., 2012 for a review), therefore such 
measures were not particularly suited to our design. 
Our analyses did not show any evidence of sensory attenuation associated with the 
priming manipulation. We did find that free choices were associated with higher N1 
amplitude, relative to forced choices. The N1 component is well known to be 
enhanced by attention (Vogel & Luck, 2000), suggesting that freely choosing what to 
do may enhance attention to action consequences. Consistently, a recent study 
found larger N1 for the auditory outcomes of free choices, relative to a coercive 
condition (Caspar et al., 2016). Importantly, in the present study, the effect of choice 
on agency ratings was not very robust, and became only marginally significant after 
EEG artefact rejection. In constrast, the effect of priming was highly robust. 
Moreover, we found no association between Outcome N1 amplitude and agency 
ratings, as can be observed in Figure 4.8.b of the main article. 
Despite considerable outcome uncertainty, participants could still learn action-
outcome associations throughout a block. This may be reflected in the present 
Outcome FRN findings. The expectancy-deviation account of the FRN (Oliveira et 
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al., 2007) proposes that the FRN is associated with ACC-mediated monitoring and 
learning of action-outcome associations. Mismatches between expected and 
observed outcomes would result in greater ACC activation, and larger FRN, 
signalling a need for cognitive control and an updating of internal models of action-
outcome contingencies. Similarly, the reinforcement learning account (Holroyd & 
Coles, 2002; Holroyd et al., 2008) suggests that the FRN reflects dopaminergic 
prediction-error signals. Negative prediction-errors, or worse than expected 
outcomes, would lead to more negative FRN potentials. Therefore, our findings could 
be due to a larger Outcome FRN being evoked in trials with outcome prediction 
errors, which were in turn related to lower agency ratings. Our results further showed 
no effects of priming or choice on Outcome FRN. This suggests that priming did not 
affect agency by directly altering outcome processing, namely by disrupting outcome 
predictions. 
The FRN has been widely linked to negative outcomes (San Martín, 2012), such as 
monetary losses (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002), or no reward relative to reward (e.g. 
Holroyd, Krigolson, Baker, Lee, & Gibson, 2009). Therefore, the present Outcome 
FRN findings could also reflect varying affective evaluations of the outcome. As 
mentioned before, response conflict can be considered aversive, and influence 
affective responses to ensuing events (Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013). Disruptions in 
action selection, induced by incompatible priming, could have led to more negative 
affective responses to action outcomes, leading to larger Outcome FRN and lower 
SoA. 
Importantly, the relation between Outcome FRN and SoA was independent of a 
possible link between Action CRN and conflict-induced negative affect. In modelling 
of agency ratings, we found no relation between these two ERPs, suggesting that the 
Outcome FRN did not directly reflect an affective response linked to the preceding 
action. Furthermore, Action CRN and Outcome FRN were significant predictors of 
agency ratings, suggesting that they explained different portions of the variance. 
Outcome monitoring, as indexed by the Outcome FRN, may be partly influenced by 
action monitoring signals, but it also integrates information about the observed 
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outcome, and whether it matches internal models of action-outcome contingencies. 
Our study supports the proposal that prospective, action selection-based, and 
retrospective, outcome-based, cues can make independent contributions to the SoA 
(Sidarus et al., 2013), at least when outcomes are not highly predictable (Stenner, 
Bauer, Sidarus, et al., 2014; Stenner, Bauer, Heinze, Haggard, & Dolan, 2014). 
4.4.3. Common performance monitoring framework 
Converging evidence shows that response-related negativities, i.e. Action CRN/ERN, 
and the Outcome FRN have common neural mechanisms, linked to the ACC 
(Botvinick, 2007; Frank, Woroch, & Curran, 2005; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Larson et 
al., 2014; San Martín, 2012). The ACC is thought to be involved in goal-directed 
action, driving action-outcome learning and adaptive behaviour (Botvinick, 2007; 
Holroyd & Yeung, 2012). Monitoring actions and outcomes for response conflict, 
errors, and negative or unexpected outcomes, the ACC can signal a need for 
cognitive control. Structures such as the dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex can in turn 
adjust current behavioural strategies or internal models of action-outcome 
associations. 
Notwithstanding this commonality, action and outcome monitoring use different 
information, available at different times. Action monitoring relies on internal, 
prospective signals about action selection and execution, whereas outcome 
monitoring depends on external, retrospective feedback processing in sensory 
areas. Here we saw that the SoA was independently related to both Action CRN and 
Outcome FRN, consistent with the idea that they integrate different information. 
Interestingly, a study has reported a disruption in ERN but intact FRN in patients with 
schizophrenia (Horan, Foti, Hajcak, Wynn, & Green, 2012), thus dissociating these 
two monitoring processes, and potentially their role in SoA. Other studies have 
similarly suggested that schizophrenia patients have impaired monitoring of internal, 
action-related signals, and are instead over-reliant on external, outcome monitoring 
(Metcalfe, Van Snellenberg, et al., 2012; Voss et al., 2010). Furthermore, the ERN is 
sensitive to whether errors are internally or externally generated, e.g. a response 
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button malfunction (Gentsch, Ullsperger, & Ullsperger, 2009; Padrao, Gonzalez-
Franco, Sanchez-Vives, Slater, & Rodriguez-Fornells, 2016; Steinhauser & Kiesel, 
2011). Internally-generated errors led to a large ERN, whereas externally-generated 
errors were associated with later ERP components, arguably FRN-like (Gentsch et 
al., 2009). 
Interestingly, with the exception of studies on error monitoring, the ACC and ACC-
mediated performance monitoring have rarely been linked to SoA. The agency 
literature has typically employed considerably different tasks from the one used here, 
focusing especially on the attributional aspect of agency, i.e. “who did it” (Chambon, 
Filevich, et al., 2014). For example, participants may be asked to judge whether 
outcomes were caused by oneself or another agent. This research has linked 
sensorimotor control and outcome monitoring to the parietal cortex, though other 
frontal and premotor areas have been implicated (David et al., 2008; Farrer, Frey, et 
al., 2008; Fink et al., 1999; Miele et al., 2011). 
In contrast, our study focused on the instrumental aspect of agency, involving 
monitoring and using more abstract action-outcome associations. As the ACC is 
involved in goal-directed actions and performance monitoring more generally, it is 
especially relevant to this aspect of SoA, rather than to agency attribution. The SoA 
is complex and multifaceted, involving the integration of multiple signals, from 
internal sensorimotor signals, to external feedback, to higher-level beliefs and 
inferences (Gallagher, 2012; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Voss, 2013). We speculate that 
regions previously associated with SoA, may integrate signals from the ACC with 
other inputs relevant to determining agency. The AG is a likely candidate for this 
integration as it has been linked to a subjective loss of agency associated with 
dysfluent action selection (Chambon et al., 2013), as well as with unexpected 
outcomes (Farrer et al., 2003; Farrer, Frey, et al., 2008; Farrer & Frith, 2002; Nahab 
et al., 2011). The AG may subserve an online monitoring system that tracks the 
whole intentional action chain, from intentions, to actions, to outcomes, and signals a 
loss of agency. 
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4.4.4. Conclusions 
We found that an unconscious influence on action selection processes, from 
subliminal priming, can affect the conscious experience of agency over action 
outcomes. ERP results showed that action monitoring signals influence SoA 
prospectively, since the neural correlates of SoA emerge at the time of the action, 
long before the outcome is known. The association seen here between Action CRN 
and agency ratings mirrors associations found between Action CRN/ERN and 
confidence ratings (Boldt & Yeung, 2015; Scheffers & Coles, 2000). This suggests 
that the signals related to action selection which influence SoA could be better 
described as relating to confidence in selecting or having selected the appropriate 
response, and not only to selection fluency as has been previously described 
(Chambon, Sidarus, et al., 2014; Wenke et al., 2010). Our results therefore link 
prospective sense of agency to the processes of action monitoring and cognitive 
control. These results invite speculations, about possible functions of SoA within 
human cognition generally. In particular, the SoA may provide an important 
experiential marker, both for alerting to the need for corrective action, and for guiding 
learning. 
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Chapter 5. Integrating Prospective and Retrospective 
Cues to the Sense of Agency: A Multi-Study 
Investigation 
  
 
 
Sense of agency (SoA) involves a complex integration of various cues. These 
include prospective, related to the fluency of action selection, and retrospective, 
linked to outcome monitoring. It remains unclear whether these cues may have 
independent effects on SoA, and, in particular, how their relative contributions may 
change during instrumental learning. In the present study, we investigated these 
issues by conducting a multi-study analysis, combining the experiments described 
here in Chapters 2 & 4, with other known studies on prospective cues to the SoA 
(with a total of seven experiments). 
Our main question was how the effects of selection fluency on SoA might change as 
information about action-outcome contingencies is gathered. Results show that 
selection fluency can have a general, and consistent influence on the SoA, 
independent of outcome monitoring. Selection fluency is used as a heuristic cue, to 
prospectively inform our SoA. In addition, our results show that the influence of 
selection fluency on SoA may change during the learning of action-outcome 
contingencies. We speculate that dysfluent selection may impair the linkage between 
action and outcome. 
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5.1. Introduction 
The sense of agency (SoA) is highly sensitive to disruptions in the chain of events of 
voluntary action (Chambon, Sidarus, et al., 2014; Gallagher, 2012): SoA emerges 
from establishing a link between our intentions, actions, and external outcomes. 
Importantly, the SoA involves the integration of multiple signals, which may become 
available at different stages of voluntary action (Chambon, Sidarus, et al., 2014; 
Farrer et al., 2013; Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik et al., 2013). Monitoring the 
fluency of action selection processes can provide an initial, prospective cue to SoA. 
Forward model predictions about the outcome can then be compared with the 
observed outcome, to retrospectively link action and outcome. These predictions 
may concern both the interval between action and outcome, and outcome identity. 
Additionally, higher-level beliefs and contextual information can also influence the 
SoA. 
Some have proposed that this integration follows the principles of optimal cue 
integration (Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik et al., 2013): cues are weighted based 
on their reliability, thus more reliable cues have a stronger influence than less 
reliable cues. Additionally, the weighting of cues may be altered by prior knowledge, 
or contextual cues. This approach has previously proved useful to understanding cue 
integration in SoA (Moore & Haggard, 2008; Wolpe et al., 2013). Yet, how the 
weighting of different cues may change dynamically with experience, for example, 
throughout the process of learning new action-outcome contingencies, remains 
poorly understood. 
It has also been suggested that selection fluency may become a useful cue to SoA 
because it is predictive of successful action (Chambon, Sidarus, et al., 2014; 
Haggard & Chambon, 2012). Yet, it remains unclear how the process of learning 
about action-outcome relations may influence the role of prospective cues to SoA. 
One the one hand, the relation between selection fluency and particular outcomes 
might need to be acquired in specific contexts, in order to inform SoA. On the other 
hand, lifelong experience might establish a link between selection fluency and 
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successful action, and thus selection fluency could be generally used as a heuristic 
cue to SoA. 
Alternatively, the fluency of action selection might itself influence the learning of 
action-outcome contingencies. Learning to associate dysfluent actions to their 
outcomes could be impaired, relative to learning about the outcomes of fluent 
actions. In line with this perspective, sensorimotor predictions of action 
consequences can be disrupted by incongruent subliminal priming of actions 
(Stenner, Bauer, Sidarus, et al., 2014; Stenner, Bauer, Heinze, et al., 2014). 
In the present study, we investigated the relation between prospective and 
retrospective cues to SoA, based on action selection and outcome monitoring, 
respectively. More specifically, we assessed how the contribution of selection fluency 
to SoA may change during instrumental learning, as information about action-
outcome contingencies is gathered. For this, we conducted a multi-study analysis, 
combining the experiments described here in Chapters 2 & 4, with currently known 
studies on prospective cues to the SoA. 
In these studies, three cues to SoA were varied (see Figure 5.1.A). Selection fluency 
was manipulated by varying the congruency between primes, or flankers, and the 
executed action. The action was followed by a variable action-outcome interval 
(AOI). The action outcome (one of several coloured circles) depended on the action 
and congruency conditions. Therefore, in each trial, these three cues could be 
combined to inform agency ratings (our measure of SoA). Since action-outcome 
relations had to be learned anew in each block of trials, tracking changes in agency 
ratings across trials indexed the contribution of monitoring outcome identity. 
Importantly, the relative contribution of these 3 cues to SoA could be modulated by 
contextual information, such as instructions. If participants are instructed to focus on 
a particular cue to SoA, e.g. outcome identity, the contribution of that cue to SoA 
would likely increase overall. Additionally, this could also alter the contribution of the 
other cues to SoA. Within the experiments analysed here, there were two groups of 
studies that differed in the instructions given to participants about the agency ratings 
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procedure. The studies in Group 1 (in Chapters 2 & 4) instructed participants to focus 
on the relation between actions and outcomes, that is, to focus on outcome identity. 
Studies in Group 2 additionally instructed participants to consider AOI (see Table 5.1 
in Methods). 
In general, assuming participants are attending to action-outcome relations, as 
instructed, we predict that agency ratings would increase across trials. If that is the 
case, we can consider possible interactions between selection fluency and outcome 
identity. Given the literature discussed above, our main question was whether we 
must learn to use selection fluency as a cue to SoA in specific contexts, or whether it 
may be a heuristic learned from everyday experience. We suggest 4 different 
accounts on the relation between selection fluency and outcome identity, which could 
be consistent with three possible results for how the effect of selection fluency on 
agency ratings may change across trials (see Figure 5.1.B). 
1. Learning to be prospective. As we learn specific action-outcome relations in 
each block, we become able to use selection fluency as a proxy for causing a 
specific outcome. This predicts that the effects of selection fluency on SoA 
would increase across trials (pattern a). 
2. Optimally prospective. We rely on the heuristic of selection fluency as a cue to 
SoA to prospectively guide our SoA at the start of a block, when outcomes are 
not a reliable cue. Once enough knowledge is gathered about action-outcome 
contingencies, outcomes will be a more reliable cue to SoA. Therefore, the 
effects of selection fluency on SoA should decrease across trials (pattern b). 
3. Generally prospective. Selection fluency is a heuristic that is generally used to 
prospectively inform SoA, independent of outcome monitoring. In this case, 
the effects of selection fluency on SoA would remain constant across trials 
(option c). 
4. Prospective effects on learning. Selection fluency impacts on the learning of 
action-outcome associations. As fluent actions are well linked to their 
outcomes, agency ratings increase steeply, whereas dysfluent actions are 
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more slowly associated with their outcomes. This account predicts that the 
effects of selection fluency on SoA would increase across trials (pattern a). 
Notably, accounts 1 and 4 predict the same pattern of results (a), but for very 
different reasons. Whilst these may be prove difficult to dissociate, it is worth noting 
that account 4 would be compatible with using selection fluency as a heuristic cue to 
agency in different contexts. In contrast, account 1 would not be compatible with this 
heuristic, since it implies that selection fluency is exclusively learned in a context-
specific manner. 
 
  
Figure 5.1. Rationale for the study. A. Prospective and retrospective cues to the SoA, with 
their presumed corresponding variables investigated here (in italics). B. Schematic of 
hypothetical results for the interaction between selection fluency and trial number, assuming 
that repeated exposure to actions and outcomes will influence SoA. As knowledge about 
action-outcome contingencies is gathered (across trials), the effect of selection fluency on 
SoA might: a) increase; b) decrease; or c) remain constant.  
 
Finally, it is worth considering the role of AOI. This was manipulated in the 
experiments considered, in order to increase variability in SoA, and prevent ceiling 
effects on ratings (Haggard et al., 2002; Wenke et al., 2010). No significant 
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interactions have been found between selection fluency and AOI so far. However, 
the relation between AOI and outcome identity is less clear. Longer delays are 
typically associated with a weaker SoA (Farrer et al., 2013), possibly due to short 
AOIs being strongly associated with the typical windows of motor control. Therefore, 
short intervals may generally lead to stronger SoA than long intervals, regardless of 
knowledge about outcome identity. Yet, AOI may also compete with outcome identity 
in driving SoA. A focus on outcome identity, as instructed in Group 1, may reduce the 
contribution of AOI to SoA. In contrast, if contextual cues highlight using AOI as a 
cue, as in Group 2, outcome identity may become less relevant to SoA. This would 
predict a reduced influence of outcome identity on SoA, and thus a smaller change in 
agency ratings across trials. 
5.2. Methods 
5.2.1. Experimental Design 
The behavioural tasks are described in detail in each respective publication; the 
common design features are depicted in Figure 5.2. A list of the studies included is 
provided in Table 5.1. This table further lists the grouping of experiments, and 
relevant differences between the studies. In addition to the differences listed, 
experiments in Group 1 used a 9-point Likert scale, whereas studies in Group 2 used 
an 8-point scale. 
5.2.2. Study Selection for Multi-Study Analysis 
Of all the known studies that have manipulated action selection and obtained a 
measure of agency, three were excluded from our analysis. One study only obtained 
agency judgements at the end of each block (Wenke et al., 2010). Another study 
only had two outcomes, therefore did not require much action-outcome learning 
(Damen et al., 2014). A final study could not provide detailed trial-wise data due to 
technical error during data collection (Chambon & Haggard, 2012). Furthermore, we 
only included the relevant data from the available studies: For Exp. 2, we only used 
the data for the half of participants who gave agency ratings at the end of each trial, 
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as the other half gave block-wise ratings. Also, we excluded trials from the neutral 
condition. For Exp. 6, we only used data from healthy participants, as the others 
were patients. For Exp. 7, we only used the data from the sham TMS (i.e. control) 
condition, since the other conditions involved active TMS stimulation. 
 
Figure 5.2. Task outline for the subliminal priming studies (adapted from Chambon et al., 
2013). This outline is similar to experiments from Group 1 (see Chapters 2 & 4). Critically, all 
studies involve a target which calls for a left- or right-hand action. This is followed by a 
coloured circle (the outcome), after a variable delay. Participants give agency ratings over 
the outcome, at the end of each trial. In studies with supraliminal flanker, targets consist of 
one of two letters, which appear surrounded by congruent (e.g. SSSSS), or incongruent (e.g. 
HHSHH) flankers. 
5.2.3. Data Analysis 
Our main goal was to model the trial-wise data obtained across the seven 
experiments in a three-level multilevel linear regression model (e.g. Gelman & Hill, 
2006), and explore the relative contributions of selection fluency, AOI and outcome 
identity to SoA. Given the difference in instructions, we further considered the effect 
of Group. More details are provided below. 
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Table 5.1. Factorial design and differences between studies. 
Publication Group Experiment Number Manipulation 
Action-Outcome 
Interval (ms) 
Number of 
Outcomes1 
Number  
of Trials 
Number  
of Blocks  
Chapter 4 1 1 
Subliminal 
Priming 
400, 600 8 64 8 
Chapter 2, 
Experiment 1 
1 2 
Supraliminal 
Flankers 
100, 300, 500 4 72 4 
Chapter 2, 
Experiment 2  
1 3 
Supraliminal 
Flankers 
200, 400 8 64 8 
Chapter 2, 
Experiment 3 
1 4 
Supraliminal 
Flankers 
100, 500 4 64 12 
Chambon et al., 2013 2 5 
Subliminal 
Priming 
100, 300, 500 4 48 4 
Chambon et al. 
(Unpublished) 
2 6 
Subliminal 
Priming 
100, 400, 700 8 56 8 
Chambon, Moore, et 
al., 2014 
2 7 
Subliminal 
Priming 
100, 400, 700 4 36 2 
                                            
 
1 This refers to the number of outcomes (coloured circles) per block. In Experiment 4, there were 12 coloured circles overall, but 
only 4 in each block. 
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To detect potential differences between experiments, and groups, we plotted the 
data for each experiment separately (see below). We also estimated the effects in 
separate multilevel models for each experiment, including all trials from each 
experiment, confirming the results presented here (see Appendix D). 
5.3. Results 
Considering how agency ratings changed across the trials, the data presented in 
Figure 5.3 suggest an important distinction between the patterns of data obtained in 
the two groups of experiments. In Group 1 (Exp.: 1-4), agency ratings increased over 
trials, and the effect of congruency (higher agency ratings for congruent trials) 
increased as participants progressed through the trials, within a block. These 
patterns seemed largely absent in the data obtained from experiments in Group 2 
(Exp.: 5-7): Agency ratings and the congruency effect remained broadly stable 
throughout the block.  
 
Figure 5.3. Mean agency rating across participants as a function of trial number, for each 
experiment (± 1 SEM as shaded area). Top row = experiments from Group 1, bottom row 
= Group 2. Green = congruent, red = incongruent. 
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We also considered the effect of AOI on agency ratings. The data presented in 
Figure 5.4 suggest another important difference in the patterns of data between the 
groups of experiments: Longer AOIs led to lower agency ratings in Group 2, but this 
pattern seemed to be absent in Group 1. 
 
Figure 5.4. Mean agency rating as function of AOI for each experiment (± 1 SEM). Top 
row = experiments from Group 1, bottom row = Group 2). Green = congruent, red = 
incongruent. 
 
To formally quantify these patterns in the data, we used a three-level multilevel 
regression model, with trials nested as repeated measures within individuals, and 
individuals nested within experiments. Before modelling the data, we limited the 
block length of each experiment to 36 trials per block in order to prevent any effects 
of trial number due to differences in block length across the experiments included in 
the multi-study model (see Table 5.1). 
5.3.1. Multilevel Model of Agency Ratings 
We modelled these data with a three-level multilevel linear regression model (e.g. 
Gelman & Hill, 2006), where the effects of trial (linear and quadratic), congruency, 
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AOI, congruency by trial (linear) interaction, and congruency by AOI varied within 
individuals and experiments. We also modelled these effects at the average level, in 
addition to their interactions with a group indicator variable. The full average effects 
specification of this model, along with estimated effects is shown in Table 5.2. Our 
main goals of inference were the differences in the data patterns observed in Figure 
5.3 and Figure 5.4; these effects are highlighted in bold in Table 5.2.  
The use of multilevel modelling was motivated by acknowledging the hierarchical 
structure of the data, with repeated measures on individuals, and individuals within 
experiments, and the need to include continuous predictors at all levels of analysis. 
Additionally, the data were not balanced across individuals or experiments, because 
the sequence of congruent and incongruent trials within a block was randomized, 
further motivating the use of multilevel modelling. The model was fitted using the 
lme4 package in the R statistical programming environment (Bates et al., 2014; R 
Core Team, 2015). 
We used the following coding scheme for the predictor variables in the regression 
model: Group was dummy coded as 0 (Group 1) and 1 (Group 2), therefore all 
effects in Table 5.2 without Group interaction denote average effects for experiments 
in Group 1. Trial was entered as a linear and quadratic predictor (computed using 
orthogonal polynomials, range of linear trial predictor = [-0.28, 0.28]); Congruency 
was coded as -0.5 (incongruent) and 0.5 (congruent); AOI denotes the effect of 
100ms increase in action-outcome interval, and was centred at 400ms and used as a 
linear predictor—when using AOI as a factorial predictor, the model did not 
converge, and the data presented in Figure 5.4 suggest that a linear effect in these 
ranges of AOI was a good approximation. 
Regarding the main effect of congruency, the model (see Table 5.2) showed a 
strong and robust effect of congruency on SoA for Group 1 (main effect of 
Congruency), with no noticeable difference in this effect for Group 2 (Congruency by 
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Group interaction). AOI did not exert a detectable effect in Group 1 (main effect of 
AOI), but strongly decreased agency ratings in Group 2 (AOI by Group, general 
linear hypothesis test2 of AOI effect for Group 2: b = -0.27, t(7) = -7.91, p < .001; see 
Figure 5.4). Importantly, there was no significant interaction between AOI and 
congruency for Group 1 (Congruency by AOI), nor for Group 2 (Congruency by AOI 
by Group). 
 
Table 5.2. Multilevel model of agency ratings. Effects of primary interest are highlighted in 
bold. 
    95% CI 
Average Effect Estimate (SE) t p Lower Upper 
Intercept 5.22 (0.25) 20.80 < 0.001 4.73 5.72 
Trial 4.21 (0.57) 7.32 0.001 3.08 5.34 
Trial (quadratic) -1.18 (0.31) -3.82 0.014 -1.79 -0.58 
Congruency 0.28 (0.05) 5.25 0.008 0.18 0.39 
AOI 0.01 (0.03) 0.43 0.665 -0.04 0.06 
Group -0.75 (0.39) -1.90 0.110 -1.52 0.02 
Trial x Congruency 0.65 (0.19) 3.42 0.001 0.28 1.02 
Congruency x Group 0.03 (0.10) 0.34 0.746 -0.16 0.23 
AOI x Group -0.28 (0.04) -6.60 < 0.001 -0.37 -0.20 
Congruency x AOI 0.02 (0.02) 1.05 0.293 -0.01 0.05 
Trial x Group -3.76 (0.91) -4.14 0.008 -5.55 -1.98 
Trial (quad.) x Group 0.90 (0.50) 1.79 0.125 -0.08 1.88 
Trial x Congruency x 
Group 
-0.92 (0.39) -2.36 0.019 -1.69 -0.16 
Congruency x AOI x 
Group 
0.02 (0.03) 0.67 0.500 -0.04 0.08 
Note. p-values were computed using the Satterthwaite approximation (Kuznetsova et al., 
2015). Confidence intervals were obtained using the Wald method (Bates et al., 2014).  
‘x’ denotes interaction terms. 
                                            
 
2 Obtained using the model’s estimated parameters and variance-covariance matrix. 
All tests were computed with a conservative 7 degrees of freedom (number of 
experiments). 
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Regarding the effect of outcome identity, agency ratings increased with trial number 
in Group 1 (main effect of Trial), but not in Group 2 (Trial by Group, general linear 
hypothesis test of Trial effect for Group 2: b = 0.45, t(7) = 0.63, p = .55). The effect of 
congruency increased with trial number in Group 1 (Trial by Congruency), but this 
interaction was not noticeable in Group 2 (Trial by Congruency by Group, general 
linear hypothesis test of Trial by Congruency for Group 2: b = -0.28, t(7) = -0.81, 
p = .45). These effects are illustrated in Figure 5.5. 
 
Figure 5.5. Multilevel model of agency ratings. Predicted average agency ratings for each 
Group as a function of trial number (with 95% prediction intervals as shades around 
regression lines; dots are means from raw data across experiments within each Group). 
Green = congruent, red = incongruent. Predictions were obtained from 100000 simulations 
from the posterior distribution of plausible parameter values under uniform priors (Gelman 
& Su, 2015). Note the progressively increasing effect of congruency on agency in studies 
of Group 1, but not of Group 2. 
 
5.4. Discussion 
The present study investigated the relative contribution of prospective and 
retrospective cues to agency. Overall, a multi-study analysis of seven experiments 
showed a robust effect of the prospective – selection fluency – cue to SoA. These 
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effects were consistent across different instructions regarding the agency ratings 
procedure, suggesting a general role of this prospective cue to agency. The different 
instructions did, however, modulate the contribution of the two retrospective cues – 
outcome identity and AOI. On the one hand, Group 1 experiments gave instructions 
to focus on learning action-outcome contingencies. These showed an increase in 
agency ratings across trials, as knowledge about the outcomes was gathered. Yet, 
no effect of AOI was found, suggesting that outcome identity drove agency ratings 
for Group 1. On the other hand, Group 2 experiments instructed participants to 
additionally attend to AOI. These did not show a consistent change in ratings across 
trials, but did show effects of AOI on ratings. Thus, for Group 2, AOI drove agency 
ratings, instead of outcome identity. These results suggest a trade-off or competition 
between the two retrospective cues. As it is our main interest, we will first consider 
the relation between prospective and retrospective cues. 
5.4.1. Prospective vs. Retrospective Cues 
For Group 1 studies, which focused on outcome identity, interactions with the 
prospective cue emerged. In addition to agency ratings increasing over time, we 
found a concurrent increase in selection fluency effects. There was a shallower 
increase over time in agency ratings for dysfluent actions (incongruent 
priming/flankers), relative to fluent actions (congruent priming/flankers). For Group 2 
studies, which focused on AOI, there were no interactions between retrospective and 
prospective cues to agency. As there was no change in agency ratings across trials, 
selection fluency effects remained stable throughout. Dysfluent actions (incongruent 
priming) led to lower agency ratings than fluent actions (congruent priming) across 
trials. We will now evaluate the 4 possible mechanisms outlined in the introduction 
with regards to our results. 
5.4.1.1. Learning to be Prospective: Fluency Effects Are Not Context-Specific  
The interaction between selection fluency and outcome identity observed for Group 1 
studies are in line with the prediction of the “learning to be prospective” account. This 
view proposes that we learn to use selection fluency as a cue to agency in a context-
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specific manner: We learn that fluent actions are associated with specific outcomes, 
and come to rely on selection fluency as a prospective proxy for the action outcome. 
From this perspective, there should be no fluency effects at the start of a block, 
because there is no a priori knowledge about how fluency informs SoA (hypothesis 
a), in Figure 5.1). This was indeed the pattern observed in Group 1 studies (see 
Figure 5.5). 
However, this account cannot explain the general effects of selection fluency found 
in Group 2 (see Figure 5.5). In those studies, similar fluency effects were present 
from the start of a block, and independently of outcome identity. Therefore, the 
relation between selection fluency and SoA had to be learnt in advance. Note that 
this does not preclude the possibility that the association between selection fluency 
and action outcomes could still be strengthened in particular contexts, and further 
enhance the contribution of prospective cues to SoA. For example, in complex tasks, 
e.g. sports, as expertise increases, greater fluency in action selection will typically be 
associated with greater accuracy in outcome prediction (Gray et al., 2007). Thus, the 
experience of fluency might gradually become an even more reliable advance 
predictor of action outcomes, and agency. 
5.4.1.2. Optimally Prospective: No Reduction in Fluency Effects 
The present results seem to rule out the “optimally prospective” account. Assuming 
prior knowledge about the relation between selection fluency and SoA, this account 
suggests that we rely most on selection fluency as a cue to agency when other cues 
are unreliable/unavailable. An optimal cue integration account (Moore & Fletcher, 
2012; Synofzik et al., 2013) would have predicted that the prior reliability of the 
selection fluency cue could have served to compensate for the low reliability of 
outcome identity at the start of a block, and perhaps that its contribution to SoA might 
reduce with outcome learning, given that agency ratings should have been tracking 
the outcomes (hypothesis b), in Figure 5.1). In contrast, results showed either a 
constant or an increasing contribution of selection fluency to SoA across trials. These 
findings question the use of an optimal integration across all cues to SoA (Sidarus et 
al., 2013), although it may apply when integrating some cues. Current proposals do 
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not easily account for changes in reliability over time, such as those found for 
outcome identity during instrumental learning. Moreover, it remains unclear how 
these processes can handle the integration of cues that become available at different 
times within a trial, e.g. prospective vs. retrospective. 
5.4.1.3. Generally Prospective: Selection Fluency as a General Heuristic 
These findings clearly support the “general heuristic” account described above: 
Selection fluency can serve as a heuristic cue to agency, which can be employed in 
novel circumstances, independently of one’s knowledge about action-outcome 
contingencies (hypothesis c), in Figure 5.1). In Group 2 studies, we did not find a 
general increase in agency ratings, as predicted by hypothesis c), but, importantly, 
selection fluency effects were similar across trials.  
These findings suggest that the relevance of selection fluency to agency is likely 
learned through everyday experience, rather than being specifically linked to any 
given environment. Regardless of a specific link between fluency/difficulty and 
particular outcomes, fluent action selection is more likely associated with desired or 
predicted outcomes than dysfluent selection. These findings are also consistent with 
the view that response conflict is an aversive signal (Botvinick, 2007), with negative 
affective consequences that can affect subsequent events (Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013). 
Relatedly, many studies have shown general influences of fluency/difficulty, e.g. in 
stimulus processing, on a variety of judgements, such as liking or familiarity (Alter & 
Oppenheimer, 2009).  
5.4.1.4. Prospective Effects on Action-Outcome Learning  
The increased effects of selection fluency on agency across trials seen in Group 1 
would also be consistent with the “prospective effects on learning” account. From 
this perspective, outcomes that follow dysfluent actions would be less easily 
associated with their corresponding action, relative to outcomes that follow fluent 
actions. Assuming agency ratings would be tracking action-outcome knowledge, 
ratings would increase more slowly for outcomes that followed dysfluent actions, thus 
the difference in ratings relative to outcomes that followed fluent actions would 
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increase. This could potentially result from action representations being disrupted by 
response conflict, and, in turn, be less effectively associated with outcomes. It may 
be adaptive to learn less about the consequences of dysfluent actions, than of fluent 
actions. For example, a novice playing darts who hits the bull’s-eye at the first throw 
should recognise that this successful hit may have been partly due to luck. Her lack 
of practice with the game means her action selection was likely not very fluent or 
precise, and she is unlikely to easily replicate such an ideal hit. 
In fact, sensorimotor predictions can be influenced by selection fluency (Stenner, 
Bauer, Heinze, et al., 2014), and thus alter action-outcome linkage. Otherwise, the 
negative affect induced by conflict could also impair the associative process. 
Interestingly, this view would suggest that selection fluency effects previously found 
with block-wise agency ratings (e.g. Wenke et al., 2010) could result from better or 
worse associative links between particular outcomes and their corresponding actions 
Finally, under the instructions to focus on outcome identity, agency ratings may have 
been very low at the start of a block, since participants did not have any outcome 
information yet. It is possible that this floor effect could have masked the general, 
and typically stable, influence of selection fluency on agency, which then gradually 
emerged as outcome knowledge was gathered, and ratings started to vary. Further 
research is needed to test these hypotheses, namely by directly testing knowledge 
about action-outcome associations. 
5.4.2. Competition Between Retrospective Cues 
Returning to the relation between the two retrospective cues, outcome identity and 
AOI, the apparent competition, or trade-off, between the two cues could perhaps be 
partially attributed to differences in the salience of the AOI cue. Variability may have 
been less salient in most experiments that were part of Group 1, as three out of four 
used only 2 intervals, whereas experiments in Group 2 always used 3 intervals (see 
Table 5.1). However, similarly to those experiments, and others (Chambon & 
Haggard, 2012; Sidarus et al., 2013), 3 AOIs were used in Experiment 2 (Group 1), 
but no significant effect of AOI was found (see Table D2, in Appendix D). Therefore, 
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the difference in instructions between the groups of studies likely played a greater 
role in the relative weighting of the retrospective cues. 
When participants were instructed to use AOI as a cue, and given the prior 
association between short intervals and stronger SoA, this may have seemed a more 
reliable cue to SoA, relative to outcome identity. The availability and relevance 
(reinforced by the instructions) of this cue to agency could have, in turn, reduced the 
learning of action-outcome associations. It is worth noting that the learning of action-
outcome associations in these studies could be difficult, even when only 4 colours 
appeared in each block (as in Exps. 5 & 7). In the subliminal priming paradigm, 
participants could learn that 2 colours were associated with each hand, but could not 
further disambiguate those 2 colours. Outcome colours depended both on the action 
performed, and on prime-action congruency, and this latter information was not 
available since primes were subliminal. On the other hand, in studies with 
supraliminal flankers, congruency information was explicitly available, which could 
have facilitated action-outcome learning. Whereas all studies in Group 2 used 
subliminal priming, and 3 of 4 studies in Group 1 used supraliminal flankers (see 
Table 5.1), one might wonder whether differences in learning effects across groups 
of studies could explain the different role of outcome identity to SoA. However, in 
Experiment 1 (Group 1) an increase in agency ratings over time was found (see 
Table D1) despite using subliminal priming, and having eight outcome colours per 
block (due to another factor in the experiment). This further supports a role for 
instructions. 
Nonetheless, while this trade-off may emerge due to instructions, other contextual 
cues could also have an impact. A study which used similar instructions to those in 
Group 2 reported both an effect of AOI and of outcome identity on agency ratings 
(Sidarus et al., 2013), with no significant interaction. Moreover, an interaction 
between outcome identity and selection fluency was found. However, this study 
involved a lower action-outcome contingency (67%), than the studies considered 
here (100%). As outcome predictions were sometimes violated, a stronger intrinsic 
motivation to attend to outcome identity may have been engaged. This motivation 
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may have been partially absent in the studies of Group 2 investigated here, as 
outcome identity was fully contingent on action. Alternatively, if outcome identity is 
highly reliable, given prior training, this may be a predominant cue to SoA (Evans, 
Gale, Schurger, & Blanke, 2015). Therefore, interactions among retrospective, or 
between retrospective and prospective cues to agency, can be contextually 
modulated not only by instructions, but also by the requirements of the task at hand. 
5.4.3. Conclusions 
The present investigation has shown that action selection fluency can serve as a 
heuristic cue to prospectively inform our SoA. The experience of agency may already 
begin even before the action. This prospective SoA may serve as a general advance 
predictor of successful action, and to bridge the interval between action and 
outcome. Importantly, the SoA requires a complex integration of multiple cues, from 
multiple sources, available at different times. Prospective and retrospective cues can 
have an independent effect on SoA. Nonetheless, depending on contextual cues, 
such as instructions, or task requirements, the relative contribution of these two cues 
to SoA may also be dynamically changed during instrumental learning. We speculate 
that dysfluent action selection may weaken the link between action and subsequent 
outcome. 
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Chapter 6. Beyond Self-serving Bias: Diffusion of 
Responsibility Reduces Sense of Agency and Outcome 
Monitoring. 
 
 
 
Diffusion of responsibility has been proposed to underlie decreased helping and 
increased aggression in group behaviour. However, direct effects of the presence of 
other people on how we experience the consequences of our actions have not been 
shown so far. In this EEG-study, we investigated whether diffusion of responsibility 
reflects a purely post-hoc self-serving bias, or has online effects on how we process 
outcomes of our own actions, and how we experience sense of agency with respect 
to them. Using a task in which objective responsibility for an outcome was 
unambiguous, we show that the alleged presence of another agent reduced 
participants’ subjective sense of agency over the outcomes of their own actions. 
Furthermore, amplitude of the feedback-related negativity evoked by outcome stimuli 
was decreased, suggesting reduced monitoring of action outcomes. The presence of 
other agents may lead to diffused responsibility by modulating how the brain relates 
actions to outcomes. 
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6.1. Introduction 
Social psychology has long recognised that the presence of other people can have 
substantial effects on individual behaviour. One example is the so-called “bystander 
effect”: in emergency situations requiring the help of a bystander, the likelihood of 
someone offering that help decreases with the number of people witnessing the 
emergency (Darley & Latane, 1968). People are also less likely to react to social 
norm violations, such as spraying graffiti, when bystanders are present (Chekroun & 
Brauer, 2002). A similar effect, termed “social loafing”, can be observed in working 
environments. When a group of people has to work towards a collective goal, each 
individual on average puts in less effort than they would when working alone (Karau 
& Williams, 1993). Experimental studies also show that groups tend to make riskier 
choices than individuals (Bradley, 1995; Wallach, Kogan, & Bem, 1964) and behave 
more aggressively (Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 1975; Meier & Hinsz, 2004). 
All these situations have in common that individual behaviour is altered by the 
presence of other people. In such experiments, participants report that they feel less 
responsible for the outcome of group decisions, especially those with negative 
consequences (Forsyth, Zyzniewski, & Giammanco, 2002; Mynatt & Sherman, 
1975). 
These findings have led to the concept of diffusion of responsibility: the idea that the 
presence of others changes the behaviour of the individualy making them feel less 
responsible for the consequences of their actions (Bandura, 1991).Diffusion of 
responsibility has even been proposed to serve moral disengagement when 
committing inhumane actions (Bandura, 1999). However, it is not clear to date 
whether diffusion of responsibility actually has a causal effect on behaviour and 
experienced responsibility, or merely constitutes a post-hoc bias in self-reports, 
serving the preservation of self-esteem and impression management. In order to 
play a causal role in group behaviour, diffusion of responsibility would need to have 
online influences on how people experience a given situation. The mechanisms by 
which this influence could occur remain unclear. 
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A central aspect of human experience is the sense of agency, i.e. the feeling that we 
can control external events through our actions. This experience depends on 
establishing a relation between our actions and their consequences. When the 
outcomes of our actions do not match our predictions or expectations, we feel a loss 
of agency (Blakemore et al., 2002). The sense of agency plays a crucial role in social 
interactions, where authorship of events can be ambiguous (Frith, 2014). Moreover, 
sense of agency is tightly linked to the experience and allocation of responsibility: we 
should only feel responsible for events that we had at least some control over. 
The subjective experience of agency can be measured by asking people how much 
control they felt over a certain outcome of their actions. However, similarly to 
diffusion of responsibility studies, such self-reports can be subject to biases and 
post-hoc considerations. A more objective, and implicit, measure of action-outcome 
processing can be obtained using event-related potentials (ERPs). The feedback-
related negativity (FRN) is an ERP-component observed when participants receive 
negative feedback (for a review, see San Martín, 2012). Importantly, this component 
is sensitive to the perceived controllability of action outcomes: when participants 
believe that an outcome is uncontrollable, the FRN to negative outcomes is greatly 
reduced (Li et al., 2011; Yeung et al., 2005). As the FRN is sensitive to the 
motivational significance of outcomes (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd & 
Yeung, 2012), a likely explanation for this finding is that uncontrollable outcomes are 
less important to the agent, as they provide little information on how to improve 
future behaviour. 
One way in which the presence of others may reduce sense of agency is through 
increased authorship ambiguity and an objective decrease in control: a communal 
grade for a group project provides little information about the quality of individual 
contributions. Accordingly, Li et al. (2010) showed that in a dice-tossing task, FRN 
amplitude was reduced when instead of tossing all three dice, participants tossed 
only one, and the others were tossed by other players. Playing with others also 
reduced participants’ self-reported contribution to the outcome. 
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However, diffusion of responsibility occurs beyond an objective distribution of control 
among agents. For example in the helping scenarios described for the bystander 
effect, each individual’s control over their action outcomes is not reduced, nor is 
ambiguity of attribution increased. If several people witness an emergency and one 
person decides to act, their actions have the same consequences as if they were 
alone. Thus, to explain why the presence of others changes people’s behaviour, 
diffusion of responsibility would have to influence an individual’s experience of the 
situation, beyond objective effects on action-outcome contingencies. To date, it 
remains unclear whether people actually experience the link between their own 
actions and outcomes as being weakened by the presence of other potential agents. 
We propose that if diffusion of responsibility causally affects group behaviour, it does 
so by reducing people’s sense of agency over action outcomes in the presence of 
others. This reduction in sense of agency may be mediated by the complexity of 
social decision making compared to individual decision making. In social situations, 
we need to take into account the possible actions of others, and the outcomes those 
actions could produce, in addition to our own actions and outcomes. Difficulty, or 
dysfluency, in decision making has been shown to lead to a reduction in sense of 
agency over action outcomes (for a review, see Chambon, Sidarus, et al., 2014). 
Therefore, the increased difficulty of decision making in social contexts could 
potentially contribute to reduced sense of agency. Importantly, it should do so in a 
situation where attribution of outcomes to one’s own actions is unambiguous, and 
action-outcome contingencies are identical for social and non-social settings. 
To this end, we designed the task to create two experimental conditions that only 
differed in terms of social context. This required the following criteria to be met: 1. 
Action consequences had to be controllable, i.e. there had to be a consistent 
contingency between actions and outcomes; 2. While controllable, outcomes should 
not be perfectly predictable, to ensure that outcome feedback was relevant to the 
participant on each trial; 3. Attribution of outcomes to the participant’s own actions 
had to be unambiguous in both the social and non-social context. 
Chapter 6. A Study on Diffusion of Responsibility 
171 
To meet these requirements, we used a task in which a marble rolls down a bar, and 
an action is required to stop it from crashing (Schel, Brass, Haggard, Ridderinkhof, & 
Crone, 2014). In our version of this task, participants either played alone, or (in their 
belief) together with another player. Importantly, the stopped marble provided 
participants with immediate feedback of their action, thus eliminating ambiguity as to 
who caused a given outcome. Stopping the marble incurred some cost for the 
participant, but this cost was avoided if the other player acted to stop the marble. 
However, if the marble crashed the cost was much greater. ERPs were recorded in 
response to the feedback of points lost, and participants rated how much control they 
felt over that outcome. 
As diffusion of responsibility is mostly used to explain behaviour in situations where 
acting is somehow costly or effortful, or results in negative consequences, we 
designed the task to exclusively produce negative outcomes. If diffusion of 
responsibility is merely a post-hoc justification, this loss frame would provide ideal 
conditions for a self-serving bias to “attribute away” responsibility to other agents. In 
that case, participants should report especially low sense of control in social trials 
with worse outcomes.  
We predicted that the presence of an alternative agent would result in a diffusion of 
responsibility effect. This might result in changes in behaviour, as participants might 
wait for the other player to stop the marble, and a reduction in the sense of agency. 
Furthermore, if diffusion of responsibility reduces the subjective experience of control 
over action outcomes, the FRN component to the outcome should be reduced. 
6.2. Materials and Methods 
6.2.1. Participants 
We tested 32 healthy volunteers (16 male, 16 female; age 18-32).The data of one 
participant was lost due to technical failure. The data of 6 other participants was 
excluded from data analysis based on the following a priori criteria: fewer than 20 
trials per condition after artefact rejection of ERP epochs (3 participants); 
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spontaneously expressing suspicion about the co-player participation in the task in 
the post-experimental questionnaire (3 participants). Thus, data of 25 participants 
(12 male, 13 female) was included in the analyses. 
6.2.2. Apparatus and Materials 
Participants were tested in pairs. Stimuli were presented on two identical computer 
screens for the two participants. Participants gave responses using standard 
computer mice. After the task, participants filled out a post-experimental 
questionnaire probing for suspicion concerning the participation of the co-player in 
the task, as well as the Locus of Control Scale by Rotter (1966), and the subscales 
“Diffuse Responsibility” and “Exercised Responsibility” of the Ascription of 
Responsibility Questionnaire (Hakstian, Suedfeld, Ballard, & Rank, 1986). 
EEG was recorded from 26 channels using g.tec g.USB amplifiers with active ring 
electrodes and non-abrasive conductive gel. Horizontal and vertical eye movements 
were recorded simultaneously. EEG signals were referenced online against the left 
earlobe and were recorded with a 0.1 Hz highpass filter. 
6.2.3. Design and Procedure 
Participants were invited to the laboratory in mixed-gender pairs of two. They 
received instructions together, filled out consent forms for participation in the study 
and were then seated in adjoining laboratories for the testing. During the instructions, 
participants were assigned one avatar, which would represent them during the task. 
They were also shown their co-player’s avatar, which would be used when they 
played together. Both participants performed the task simultaneously, but separately. 
After the task was finished, participants filled out post-experimental questionnaires 
and personality questionnaires (see materials above). Participants were then fully 
debriefed and paid for their participation. Payment consisted of £7.50 per hour, plus 
any earnings from the task. 
The marble task was designed to create a situation in which acting was costly, but 
withholding action was potentially more costly still. In each trial, participants had to 
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stop a rolling marble from falling off a tilted bar, and crashing (see Figure 6.1). 
Participants were instructed that, at the beginning of each block, they would receive 
1500 points worth 150 pence, and in each trial they could lose up to 100 of these 
points. The task consisted of 4 blocks of 30 trials each. Trials were randomly 
assigned to either the “Alone” or the “Together” condition, with 15 trials per condition 
and block.  
 
Figure 6.1. Marble Task. This figure shows the outline of a low-risk successful trial (A), a 
high-risk successful trial (B), and an unsuccessful trial (C). Note that C is the worst 
outcome, B the best, and A the intermediate. Social context was indicated at the start of a 
trial, by either presenting the participant’s own avatar alone, or together with the other 
player’s avatar. The marble colour served as a reminder of social context, and was either 
blue in the alone condition (shown here), or green in the together condition. In the together 
condition, besides the trials displayed here, there were trials in which the “other” player 
stopped the marble, and the participant did not lose any points. ERPs were time-locked to 
outcome presentations of successful trials (A and B, marked in bold) in which the 
participant stopped the marble. 
 
In the beginning of an “Alone”-trial, participants saw their own avatar alone, 
indicating they would be playing by themselves, while their co-player supposedly 
played simultaneously on his/her computer. Next, they saw a blue marble lying on 
top of a tilted bar, which after 500ms started rolling down towards the lower end of 
the bar. At any point, participants could press the left mouse button to stop the 
marble. If they did so, the marble stopped in its current position, providing immediate 
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feedback of their successful action. If participants did not react in time, the marble 
rolled off the bar and crashed. The final position of the marble, whether stopped or 
crashed, was shown for 500ms, followed by the presentation of a fixation cross for 
1500 – 2500ms. In either case, participants received information about how many 
points they lost, i.e. the action outcome for 2000ms. ERPs were time-locked to 
outcome presentation. Afterwards, a fixation cross was presented for 500ms and 
then participants saw a visual analogue scale with the question “How much control 
did you feel over the outcome?” and the end points of the scale labelled “No control” 
and “Complete control”. Participants used the mouse to indicate how much control 
they felt they had over the number of points lost during that trial. 
Participants were instructed that the later they stopped the marble, the fewer points 
they would lose. In order to make it difficult to always stop the marble at the very end 
of the bar, the speed with which the marble rolled down the bar varied from trial to 
trial. Also, at some point along the bar, the marble would speed up, and this point 
varied from trial to trial. This added a risk component to the task, since if the 
participant waited too long, the marble might suddenly speed up and they might not 
be able to stop it in time to prevent a crash. There was also uncertainty about the 
outcome, as the exact number of points lost could not be fully predicted from the 
marble stopping position. In fact, the bar was divided into 4 different payoff sections 
of equal length (60-46 points at the top; 45-26 and 25-16 points in the middle; 15-1 
points at the end). If the marble crashed, 70-99 points would be lost. Within each 
section, the number of points lost was varied randomly from trial to trial. 
At the beginning of “Together” trials, participants saw their own avatar next to the 
avatar of their co-player, and the marble in these trials was coloured green. 
Participants were instructed that, in these trials, both players would be playing 
together and either could use their mouse button to stop the marble. If neither player 
acted, the marble would crash and both players would lose the same number of 
points. If the co-player stopped the marble, the participant would not lose any points. 
If the participant stopped the marble, they would lose a number of points according 
to the position where they stopped it, and their co-player would not lose any points. 
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In fact, participants were playing alone in all trials, and the co-player’s behaviour was 
simulated by the computer. The co-player’s behaviour was programmed such that 
participants had to stop the marble in the majority of “Together” trials, to ensure a 
sufficient number of artefact-free trials was available for ERP analyses. If participants 
had stopped the marble more often than their co-player, and if participants did not 
act sooner, the co-player could stop the marble along the lower half of the bar. In that 
case, the marble would stop on its own, and participants received feedback of losing 
zero points. To avoid ambiguity about who caused the outcome, simultaneous 
actions of both participant and co-player were attributed to the participant. Thus, if 
the participant acted within 50ms of a simulated co-player action, this would count as 
participant’s action, and feedback would indicate a loss according to the stop 
position. 
6.3. ERP Preprocessing 
EEG-signals were processed using the Matlab-based open-source toolbox eeglab 
(Delorme & Makeig, 2004) with the ERPlab plugin (Lopez-Calderon & Luck, 2014). 
The continuous EEG signal was notch-filtered and re-referenced to the averaged 
signal of the left and right mastoids. The signal was then cut into 3000ms epochs 
time-locked to the presentation of the outcome. Independent component analysis 
was used to remove eye movement artefacts. A 0.5 Hz highpass filter and a 20 Hz 
lowpass filter were applied. Epochs with signal artefacts were removed using an 
80µV threshold. EEG signals were then averaged into event-related potentials 
separately for the two experimental conditions, using a 100ms pre-stimulus baseline. 
This resulted in an average of 40.78 (SD = 4.78) trials for the Alone condition (min = 
34), and an average of 34.24 (SD = 8.41) trials for the Together condition (min = 21). 
The FRN component was analysed as the mean amplitude between 250-330 ms, at 
electrode FCz, based on previous studies (Li et al., 2011; Yeung et al., 2005) and 
observation of grand ERPs and scalp topography. 
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6.4. Data analysis 
Behavioural data in successful stopping trials (stopping position, outcomes, and 
agency ratings) and mean FRN amplitude were analysed using hierarchical linear 
regression models (i.e. linear mixed-effects models). This approach is advisable with 
unbalanced data, and allowed us to model single trial data (Baayen et al., 2008; 
Bagiella et al., 2000; Tibon & Levy, 2015). Models included the condition as a 
predictor, coded as Alone = 0, Together = 1. Where relevant, Stopping Position and 
Outcome were also included as covariates, after standardising the values within 
participants. All fixed effects were also modelled as participant random effects 
(random intercepts and slopes). Analyses were conducted using the lme4 package 
(Bates et al., 2014) in R (R Core Team, 2015). Parameter estimates (b) and their 
associated t-tests (t, p), calculated using the Satterthwaite approximation for degrees 
of freedom (Kuznetsova et al., 2015), are presented to show the magnitude of the 
effects, with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (Efron & Tibshirani, 1994). 
Moreover, we analysed behavioural data (proportion of trials, agency ratings, and 
mean outcomes) from trials in which the marble crashed. ERP data for these trials 
was not analysed, however, due to low trial numbers. Finally, for together trials only, 
we compared the proportion of trials in which the co-player acted, relative to the 
marble crashing. 
6.5. Results 
6.5.1. Behaviour 
The main focus of our analyses was trials in which the participant successfully 
stopped the marble. These trials were the same across the two social context 
conditions, but differed only in that participants acted while knowing that their co-
player could have acted instead of them, in the together condition. To assess how 
participants’ behaviour varied across social contexts, we modelled the position at 
which the marble was stopped. Participants stopped the marble significantly later in 
the together condition, relative to playing alone (b = 3.08, t(554.04) = 5.49, p < 0.001, 
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95% CI = [2.01, 4.15]). This suggests that participants waited longer to act in the 
together condition to allow time for their co-player to act instead of them. 
Outcome (number of points lost) was predicted from the social context factor, stop 
position covariate, and their interaction. Outcomes were related to the marble stop 
position (b = 6.20, t(28.89) = 22.01, p< 0.001, 95% CI = [5.59, 6.74]), with later stops 
resulting in smaller losses, as expected based on the task design. The social context 
did not influence outcomes (b = 0.089, t(28.86) = 0.27, p = 0.79, 95% CI = [-0.63, 
0.70]), nor did the social context by stop position interaction (b = -0.42, t(61.51) = -1.39, 
p = 0.17, 95% CI = [-1.01, 0.23]). This shows that outcomes were similar across 
social contexts, for trials in which the participant successfully stopped the marble. 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Behavioural results. a Parameter estimates for the model predicting agency 
ratings, with 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals. Condition refers to the effect of social 
context (Alone = 0 vs. Together = 1), such that a negative parameter estimate denotes a 
loss of agency in the Together condition. b Model predictions (lines) and mean agency 
ratings (dots) for the two social contexts as a function of outcome (number of points lost, 
Z-score). This displays the main effect of social context, with higher agency ratings in the 
alone condition. It additionally shows that agency ratings were lower for higher losses, and 
this relationship was similar across social contexts (no significant social context (condition) 
x outcome interaction, as seen in panel a). 
 
Finally, agency ratings were modelled using social context, stop position, and 
outcome, plus their interactions. Results showed a significant reduction in agency 
ratings when playing together, relative to playing alone (b = -4.63, t(21.59) = -3.35, 
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p = 0.003, 95% CI = [-7.40, -2.05]; see Figure 6.2.a). Agency ratings were also 
predicted by the outcome (b = 4.34, t(23.78) = 4.76, p< 0.001, 95% CI = [2.41, 6.38]), 
with smaller losses being associated with higher ratings. Finally, agency ratings were 
significantly influenced by the marble stopping position (b = 2.54, t(21.17) = 2.82, 
p = 0.010, 95% CI = [0.71, 4.39]), with later stops being linked to higher ratings. 
There were no significant interactions (see Figure 6.2.b, and Table 6.1 for full 
results). 
 
Table 6.1. Agency ratings model: parameter estimates, with bootstrapped 95% confidence 
intervals. * Based on Satterthwaite degrees of freedom estimation. 
 
      95% C.I. 
 Estimate S.E. t df* p* Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 68.65 3.07 22.36 24.01 < .001 61.98 74.65 
Condition -4.63 1.38 -3.35 21.59 0.003 -7.40 -2.05 
Outcome 4.34 0.91 4.76 23.78 < .001 2.41 6.38 
Stop Position 2.54 0.90 2.82 21.17 0.010 0.71 4.39 
Condition x Outcome 0.84 1.18 0.71 22.04 0.487 -1.33 2.99 
Condition x Stop Pos -0.56 1.34 -0.42 23.96 0.678 -3.19 1.89 
Outcome x Stop Pos -0.21 0.56 -0.38 29.23 0.705 -1.24 0.86 
Condition x Outcome 
x Stop Pos 
0.64 0.83 0.77 25.15 0.450 -1.05 2.38 
 
To check whether participants might have always reported less control in the 
together condition, agency ratings were analysed specifically in trials in which the 
marble crashed. Agency ratings were modelled by the social context, the outcome, 
and their interaction. When the marble crashed, results showed that only the 
outcome – how many points were lost – influenced agency ratings (b = 2.78, 
t(23.69) = 2.65, p = 0.014, 95% CI = [0.73, 4.55]), with higher ratings associated with 
smaller losses. Social context no longer predicted agency ratings (b = 0.54, 
t(33) = 0.35, p = 0.73, 95% CI = [-2.41, 3.42]), and there was no significant social 
context by outcome interaction (b = -0.37,  t(21.49) = -0.22, p = 0.83, 95% CI = [-3.79, 
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2.76]). We further checked that according to the task design, outcomes did not differ, 
on average, across social contexts (alone: mean = -84.92, SD = 2.88; together: 
mean = -85.34, SD = 3.41; paired samples t-test: t(24) = 0.43, p = 0.67). Therefore, 
the relation between agency ratings and social context described above was 
specifically related to those trials in which the participant successfully acted. 
To fully characterise participants’ behaviour in the task, we also analysed number of 
trials in which the marble crashed, and in which the “Other” agent acted instead (in 
the together condition). The marble crashed significantly more often in the alone 
condition (mean = 19.47%, SD =7.99), than when playing together (mean = 14.47%, 
SD = 6.08; paired samples t-test: t(24) = 3.32, p = 0.003). In the together condition, 
the co-player acted significantly more often (mean = 19.33%, SD = 7.71) than the 
marble crashed (paired samples t-test: t(24) = 4.60, p<0.001). These results, together 
with the earlier finding of later stops in the together condition, show that participants 
adapted their behaviour in order to minimise their losses in the together condition, 
when the “co-player” could act instead of the participant. To assess whether this 
strategy really was beneficial, we averaged the outcomes across all trials (successful 
stops, marble crashes, and “co-player” actions) for each participant. Results 
confirmed that, overall, participants lost significantly less points in the together 
condition (mean = -20.86, SD = 3.78), relative to playing alone (mean = -27.71, 
SD = 4.43; paired samples t-test: t(24) = -6.31, p < 0.001). Since the comparisons 
above showed no significant differences in outcomes across social contexts for 
successful stops, nor for marble crashes, this overall reduction in losses was clearly 
driven by the “co-player” action trials, in which the participant did not lose any points. 
6.5.2. ERPs 
Mean amplitudes for the FRN component were analysed with the same model as 
agency ratings. Results revealed that FRN amplitude was significantly reduced (i.e. 
more positive) when playing together, relative to the alone condition (b = 1.23, 
t(161.77) = 2.31, p = 0.022, 95% CI = [0.15, 2.29]; see Figure 6.3). FRN amplitude was 
not significantly influenced by the outcome (b = 0.21, t(43.11) = 0.42, p = 0.68, 95% 
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CI = [-0.74, 1.07]), nor by stop position (b = -0.62, t(26.15) = -1.16, p = 0.26, 95% 
CI = [-1.63, 0.52]). There were no significant interactions (see Table 6.2). 
 
Figure 6.3. Outcome-locked ERPs. Grand average time courses are shown for the 
two experimental conditions. The time window for the FRN (250-330ms) analysed is 
highlighted in grey. The topographic plot shows the scalp distribution of the difference 
between the social context conditions averaged across the FRN time window. 
 
Table 6.2. FRN model: parameter estimates , with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. 
* Based on Satterthwaite degrees of freedom estimation. 
 
      95% C.I. 
 Estimate S.E. t df* p* Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 1.98 0.88 2.26 23.87 0.033 0.25 3.59 
Condition 1.23 0.53 2.31 161.77 0.022 0.15 2.29 
Outcome 0.21 0.50 0.42 43.11 0.68 -0.74 1.07 
Stop Position -0.62 0.53 -1.16 26.15 0.26 -1.63 0.52 
Condition x Outcome 1.01 0.78 1.29 33.24 0.21 -0.49 2.65 
Condition x Stop Pos 0.10 0.74 0.13 34.69 0.90 -1.36 1.63 
Outcome x Stop Pos -0.12 0.28 -0.45 42.52 0.66 -0.71 0.47 
Condition x Outcome 
x Stop Pos 
0.73 0.64 1.15 17.76 0.27 -0.59 1.99 
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6.6. Discussion 
To investigate the cognitive and neural consequences of the diffusion of 
responsibility phenomenon, we developed a task in which a costly action was 
required to prevent an even greater cost. Participants either played alone, or 
together with another agent who could act instead of them, sparing the participant 
any losses. The presence of a potential alternative agent led participants to act later, 
reduced their subjective sense of agency, and attenuated the neural processing of 
the consequences of their action, as reflected in reduced FRN amplitude.  
6.6.1. Behaviour 
In trials in which the other player could act as well, participants acted later and rated 
their feeling of control over the action outcomes as lower. Importantly, the presence 
of the other player was manipulated on a trial-by-trial basis. Thus, our results show 
that behavioural decisions and sense of agency over action outcomes are 
continuously and flexibly updated in regard to the current social context. 
When participants acted, they objectively had the same amount of control over the 
number of points they lost in “Alone” and “Together” trials. As soon as participants 
pressed the button, the marble stopped, indicating that they had successfully acted. 
Outcomes were always contingent on where the marble was stopped, even though 
they remained partially unpredictable. In contrast, when the alleged co-player acted, 
which was actually the computer, the marble stopped without a concurrent action 
from the participant. Thus, the loss in control reflected in the self-report was purely a 
subjective one, with objective action-outcome contingencies remaining constant. 
Our results also showed that agency ratings were lower following greater losses. 
This is consistent with previous studies which also found reductions in the sense of 
agency for negative, relative to positive, outcomes, while using implicit measures of 
agency linked to the temporal perception of actions and outcomes (Takahata et al., 
2012; Yoshie & Haggard, 2013). This presumably reflects the well-known self-
serving bias of attributing negative outcomes to external factors, and positive 
outcomes to one’s own actions (Bandura, 1999). Importantly, this effect was not 
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related to, nor facilitated by, the presence of an alternative agent. That is, 
participants did not strategically attribute “away” their responsibility over negative 
outcomes to the other player. Interestingly, even when the marble crashed, which led 
to the worst outcomes, agency ratings were not influenced by social context but only 
by the actual outcome. Diffusion of responsibility therefore seems to occur beyond a 
self-serving bias of (mis)attributing negative outcomes to others. 
Finally, higher agency ratings were associated with stopping the marble later, 
independently of the outcome. This effect could be due to a better match between 
the action performed and the theoretically optimal action in later stops. Alternatively, 
trials with early stops may be associated with more counterfactual thinking and 
regret over possibly smaller losses with later stops, linked to the self-serving bias 
mentioned above. Finally, outcomes of risky but successful choices could be 
perceived as more rewarding than those of less risky choices. 
6.6.2. FRN 
ERP results showed an effect of social context on the neural processing of action 
outcomes. In otherwise identical trials, FRN amplitude in response to outcomes of 
successful actions was reduced by the presence of a co-player. 
The FRN has been shown to be sensitive to the distribution of control among multiple 
players (Li et al., 2010), as well as to whether participants were instructed outcomes 
were random or controllable (Li et al., 2011; Yeung et al., 2005). We show a similar 
effect of social context on FRN amplitude, but now using a task in which instructions 
about action-outcome contingencies were identical between conditions, and full 
control over the outcome remained with the participant. Thus, the mere presence of 
another player was sufficient to evoke changes in the neural processing of action 
outcomes akin to those observed when control over an outcome is abolished or truly 
shared between multiple co-players. As such, our findings at the neural level offer an 
objective measure consistent with the perceived loss of control participants reported 
subjectively. 
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The FRN has been widely implicated in outcome monitoring (San Martín, 2012), and 
is thought to be sensitive to the motivational significance of outcomes (Holroyd & 
Yeung, 2012). As outcomes were perceived as less controllable and possibly less 
self-relevant in “Together” trials, the motivation to learn from such outcomes could be 
weakened, leading to a reduction in outcome monitoring. 
6.6.3. Implications for concepts of diffusion of responsibility 
Both our findings of altered subjective sense of agency ratings and reduced FRN 
amplitude suggest that the co-player’s presence made participants feel less in 
control over the outcomes of their actions. This significantly extends current models 
of diffusion of responsibility (Bandura, 1999), by demonstrating an online effect of 
social context on the processing of action outcomes. This is in line with Bandura’s 
proposition that negative consequences of one’s own behaviour are less relevant to 
the self in a group than in an individual context (Bandura, 1999). We suggest that the 
diffusion of responsibility effect may at least partially be due to people actually 
experiencing the consequences of their actions as less controllable and thus less 
meaningful in social contexts, relative to when acting alone. 
The mechanisms by which the presence of others leads to a reduced coupling of 
outcomes to the actions that caused them remain unclear. Different aspects of the 
social situation could potentially affect people’s sense of agency in the absence of an 
objective reduction of control. Cueing the ‘together’ condition possibly triggered 
counterfactual thinking about what would have happened if the participant had 
chosen not to act. The presence of another player presumably made alternative 
scenarios, i.e. in which not acting could have led to better (no-loss) outcomes, more 
accessible and possibly also reduced participants’ motivation to act. 
Such counterfactual thinking might take place once the outcome is known, reflecting 
a retrospective influence on outcome monitoring, and sense of agency. However, it 
might also influence the decision making in advance of the action. Having to consider 
the potential behaviour of an alternative agent would increase the complexity of 
decision making, by adding extra informational load. Previous research has shown 
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that difficulty of action selection can reduce sense of agency (Chambon, Sidarus, et 
al., 2014). Importantly, such processes are thought to influence the sense of agency 
prospectively, as they take place long before the outcome is known. From this 
perspective, the increased complexity in decision making in social situations could 
partly explain how the presence of another agent might affect behaviour, reduce 
outcome monitoring and reduce the sense of agency. 
Interestingly, Bandura (1991) distinguished diffusion of responsibility, linked to the 
presence of other agents, from situations in which one’s responsibility is displaced 
onto perceived authority figures guiding one’s actions. Consistent with our findings, a 
recent study showed that coercion reduces sense of agency and attenuates the 
sensory processing of action outcomes (whether neutral or negative), relative to free 
choice (Caspar et al., 2016). Aside from social contexts, Bandura (1991) further 
proposed that one’s sense of responsibility might be reduced by disregarding or 
distorting action consequences, i.e. inattention or a misrepresentation of outcomes. 
While his model distinguishes these three components, the findings discussed here 
suggest that changes in the processing of action outcomes may, in fact, underlie the 
effects of social context on the sense of agency and responsibility. Previous models 
of sense of agency emphasise that it involves the integration of multiple cues, 
ranging from sensorimotor, to affective, to contextual information (Synofzik et al., 
2013). These results suggest that social context constitutes another influence on 
sense of agency, which may partly act through altering outcome monitoring, but 
might also have independent effects. For example, a situation like coercion involves 
a restriction of one’s choice in addition to a social component, and freedom of choice 
is known to influence sense of agency independently of social context (Barlas & 
Obhi, 2013). 
Our results also suggest possible mechanisms whereby diffusion of responsibility 
may causally affect people’s behaviour. We deliberately designed our task to 
eliminate ambiguity in agency attribution, that is, about who caused a given outcome. 
However, in real-life social situations, attribution of outcomes is likely to be more 
ambiguous than in comparable non-social situations. If the neural processing and 
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monitoring of action consequences is then reduced by the presence of other 
potential agents, this may increase the likelihood of attribution errors. Thus, reduced 
outcome processing due to diffusion of responsibility may lead to ambiguity in 
attribution. Correctly attributing consequences to their causes, however, is a critical 
prerequisite for learning action-outcome associations and likely also for forming a 
sense of moral responsibility. In this sense, the social dilution of agency might 
potentially have both immediate and longer-term effects on agency learning. 
6.6.4. Limitations and outlook 
Research on diffusion of responsibility has mostly focused on the possibility that 
social contexts reduce individuals’ sense of responsibility for negative 
consequences. It remains to be shown whether the effects found in the current study 
generalize to neutral and positive action outcomes. Though caution is required in 
interpreting any null result, the absence of an interaction between outcome and 
social context in the present study suggests that this may be the case. Moreover, our 
task involved negative consequences to the self; therefore, effects could differ when 
the consequences of our actions are experienced by other people. Interestingly, in 
Caspar et al.’s (2016) study, coercion led to a reduction in the processing of action 
outcomes which were positive for oneself, but at the same time could be harmful to 
others. 
In this study we primarily focused on the processing of outcomes following 
participants’ actions. However, perceived responsibility, and sense of agency can 
differ for action relative to inaction (Baron & Ritov, 2004; Kordes-de Vaal, 1996). At a 
behavioural level, we found no evidence for diffusion of responsibility for negative 
outcomes following inaction. It remains to be shown whether there are systematic 
differences in social context effects on sense of agency related to action and 
inaction, and how these effects translate into behaviour. While it seems likely that 
people may feel less inclined to act in a situation that they perceive as less 
controllable, the interactions between sense of agency, action and inaction are yet to 
be investigated. 
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Finally, our conclusions regarding sense of agency are based on an explicit rating of 
control. While our findings are corroborated by the ERP results, future studies could 
additionally use implicit measures of agency to further elucidate the effects of social 
context on pre-reflective aspects of sense of agency.  
6.6.5. Conclusions 
We show that diffusion of responsibility is not merely a post-hoc phenomenon 
reflecting a self-serving bias, but an online influence on how people process the 
consequences of their actions. The presence of other agents, even in the absence of 
attributional ambiguity, can lead to a reduction in outcome monitoring and a 
reduction in individual sense of agency. These effects could be mediated by 
counterfactual thinking or increased complexity of decision making processes in 
social situations. 
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Chapter 7. General Discussion 
 
 
 
The present thesis investigated how action selection processes contribute to the 
sense of agency (SoA). Metacognitive monitoring of action selection processes can 
inform the SoA of any difficulties, or disruptions, experienced during action selection. 
These signals are prospective, as they emerge at the time of the action, and long 
before the outcome is known. This was demonstrated here in the EEG study 
described in Chapter 4, and previously in fMRI (Chambon et al., 2013), TMS 
(Chambon, Moore, et al., 2014), and MEG (Stenner, Bauer, Heinze, et al., 2014). 
This final section will summarise the novel insights offered by our research into the 
mechanisms underlying the prospective contributions to SoA. We have shown that 
the effects of action selection on SoA are robust, and generalise across a number of 
tasks, even to dynamic contexts. Moreover, our research highlights the integrative 
nature of SoA. We will briefly consider how SoA combines a variety of cues, whether 
prospective, retrospective, or contextual. Finally, we consider the potential 
implications of a prospective SoA, namely to our societal notions of responsibility. 
We also suggest that the complexity of decision making required in social contexts 
may mediate the well-known diffusion of responsibility effect. 
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7.1. Prospective Sense of Agency 
7.1.1. Effects of Disrupted Action Selection 
The studies presented throughout the thesis show that SoA is sensitive to 
disruptions in action selection. Various manipulations were used, targeting different 
stages of action selection: 1. Dysfluency in visual processing (Chapter 3, Exp. 1); 2. 
Ambiguity in stimulus categorisation (Chapter 3, Exp. 2); 3. Response conflict, using 
the Eriksen flanker task (Chapter 2, Chapter 3, Exp. 3), or subliminal priming 
(Chapter 4). 
Some studies involved a simple chain of events: a target, an action, and an outcome 
(Chapters 2 & 4). Participants gave judgements of agency over action outcomes. 
These judgements were mostly collected at the end of each trial, but can also be 
made at the end of a block (half of the participants in Exp. 1 of Chapter 2; cf. Wenke 
et al., 2010). Other studies used a dynamic computer game (Chapter 3), in which 
many potential targets, actions, and outcomes were present. Participants gave 
judgements of agency over the game, after playing for 30 s. Therefore, disruptions to 
action selection can have online effects on SoA. Additionally, fluency/conflict 
experiences can also accumulate over time, and even become associated with 
particular outcomes. 
Our experiments also support a particular role of dysfluency in action selection, 
rather than a more global fluency effect, e.g. in stimulus processing. Even though 
neutral flankers were perceptually dissimilar from the target letter, this did not lead to 
a significant reduction in agency ratings relative to congruent flankers in Experiment 
1 of Chapter 2. Moreover, flankers that appeared 100ms after the target still affected 
action selection and the SoA (Experiment 3, Chapter 2), which would be inconsistent 
with an account in terms of “conceptual congruency” between an initial intention, e.g. 
triggered by a subliminal prime, and the executed action (cf. Chambon & Haggard, 
2012). Chapter 3 did reveal that SoA is sensitive to disruptions of fluency in other 
aspects of cognitive processing besides response conflict, such as dysfluent 
stimulus processing. Yet, we suggest that the effects seen here are specifically 
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related to action selection and agency, since the manipulations of fluency regarded 
processes that subserved action selection processes. 
The literature on fluency effect has shown a myriad effects on various judgements 
(Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). Further research is needed to clarify whether similar or 
distinct mechanisms are involved across different metacognitive domains, such as 
confidence judgements, judgements of learning, or the SoA. One distinguishing 
feature of SoA is that it involves integrating information about both one’s action and 
about the outcome(s) of that action, in order to establish their relation (see also 
section 7.5.2). This was evidenced in Chapter 4, as agency ratings were correlated 
to both neural correlates of action and of outcome monitoring. For example, 
confidence judgements about the accuracy of a response would presumably only be 
concerned with information about the action. Therefore, while there may be overlap 
in some metacognitive processes that may inform different judgements, differences 
may also arise due to the different sources of information that are relevant for each 
particular judgement. Notably, the fluency literature has shown that when people are 
aware that the source of fluency experiences is unrelated to the task at hand, they 
are able to discount it (cf. Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). Chapter 2 showed that even 
when the source of dysfluency in action selection was made evident – by using 
supraliminal flankers – fluency effects on SoA remained. This might arguably reflect 
that such dysfluency was considered particularly relevant for the SoA. Yet, it remains 
to be shown whether truly task-unrelated fluency/dysfluency experiences could still 
influence SoA. 
Earlier studies suggested that fluency in action selection might enhance SoA (Wenke 
et al., 2010). However, the results observed could be due to fluency enhancing SoA, 
or dysfluency leading to a reduction in SoA. Our work suggests that it is more likely 
that dysfluency, or conflict, in action selection leads to a reduction in SoA. In Chapter 
2, Experiment 1 showed that although both facilitation and conflict effects were found 
for action selection, only conflict affected SoA significantly (see Figure 2.2, p. 58). 
Experiment 3 also showed that conflict led to a reduction in SoA, even when motor 
performance was not affected (see Figure 2.4, p. 70; cf. Chambon & Haggard, 
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2012). In Chapter 4, we found that SoA was associated with an ERP component, the 
correct-related negativity (CRN), which is thought to reflect conflict monitoring 
(Larson et al., 2014). 
While fluent processing can be associated with a positive affect (Reber, Winkielman, 
& Schwarz, 1998), conflict signals are especially motivationally significant because 
they may indicate a need to adjust subsequent behaviour (Botvinick & Braver, 2015; 
Holroyd & Yeung, 2012). Moreover, a strong SoA may be a default state, requiring 
evidence to the contrary (Sidarus et al., 2013). Therefore, conflict, or dysfluency, 
signals can have a greater impact on SoA, than signals indicating fluent selection. 
Similarly, outcome monitoring is associated with “error” signals, indicating a 
mismatch between intended/predicted and actual action outcomes (Blakemore et al., 
2002). The angular gyrus (AG), in the inferior parietal lobe (IPL), has been implicated 
in the online monitoring of disruptions both to action selection (Chambon et al., 2013) 
and to outcome monitoring (Farrer, Frey, et al., 2008), with greater activity linked to a 
subjective loss of agency. The SoA is especially tuned to detecting disruptions in the 
smooth flow of voluntary action, from intention, to action, to outcome. 
7.1.2. SoA and Post-decisional Action Monitoring 
Our results further suggest that prospective cues to SoA are related to post-
decisional metacognitive signals. In the EEG study reported in Chapter 4, we found 
that agency ratings were related to the action-locked CRN component (see Figure 
4.8.a, p. 134). This has been previously linked to conflict and error monitoring 
(Larson et al., 2014). As this component arises at the time of action execution, it 
reflects post-decisional processes. Such processes are linked to evidence 
accumulation about the correct, or adequate, response, which can continue after an 
initial decision, but may precede or be concurrent with the action itself (Yeung & 
Summerfield, 2014). We also found that pre-decisional monitoring was sensitive to 
response conflict, as indexed by the target-locked N2 potential (see Figure 4.3, p. 
127). However, N2 was not linked to agency ratings. Consistently, a role for post-
decisional processing had been previous shown in a TMS study. Disrupting IPL 
immediately after the action abolished selection fluency effects to SoA, similarly to 
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when applied during action selection (Chambon, Moore, et al., 2014). Post-decisional 
processes can integrate both early and late stages of action selection, thus providing 
a more complete signal to SoA. 
Interestingly, post-decisional processes related to action selection have also been 
implicated in models of confidence judgements (Fleming et al., 2014; for a review, 
see Yeung & Summerfield, 2014). Namely, the CRN component has been 
associated with confidence judgements (Boldt & Yeung, 2015; Scheffers & Coles, 
2000). Moreover, studies on confidence often employ manipulations of processing 
fluency, categorisation ambiguity, or uncertainty, similarly to the manipulations we 
used in Chapter 3, which we found affect agency judgements. This suggests that 
confidence and agency judgements may rely on common metacognitive signals. 
We may speculate that, in the context of agency, confidence that the action is 
appropriate (“I just know what to do”) may be related to confidence that the action 
outcome will be as intended. Alternatively, low-confidence actions may be 
associated with uncertainty about action consequences. Sometimes, we may not 
know what outcomes to expect, and thus a sense of confidence in our actions (“I did 
the best I could”) may be more important to SoA than the consequences. 
Similar metacognitive signals may be associated with other aspects of processing 
quality, namely processing dysfluency, uncertainty, response conflict. Such signals 
may be vague, and unspecific regarding their source, and thus have global influence 
other processes (Winkielman et al., 2015). Therefore, selection fluency may be used 
as an umbrella term, which encompasses various disruptions to action selection, 
such as conflict, uncertainty, or difficulty. 
Fluency should not be confused with speed of processing. This may often be related 
to fluency, or may be used as a proxy for difficulty. For example, both evidence and 
decision time have been shown to influence confidence judgements (Kiani et al., 
2014). Indeed, we found that RTs were negatively related to agency ratings in 
Chapter 4, but selection fluency (i.e. congruency) still had a significant, independent 
effect on agency (see Figure 4.7, p. 133; see also Appendix A for similar results 
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from Chapter 2). Moreover, RTs can also be dissociated from the effects of conflict 
on SoA. In Chapter 2, Experiment 3 showed that when flankers preceded the target 
by 500 ms, congruency effects on motor performance were abolished, yet 
incongruent flankers still led to lower SoA than congruent flankers (see Figure 2.4, 
p. 70). Even when RTs are faster for incongruent, relative to congruent, subliminal 
priming, SoA is still reduced by incongruent priming (Chambon & Haggard, 2012). 
Therefore, RT monitoring may serve as an additional, independent cue to agency 
and confidence judgements. 
Finally, in Chapter 4, we suggested that SoA is linked to a post-decisional signal that 
indicates unresolved conflict at the time of action, rather than to initial signals linked 
to conflict detection or cognitive control recruitment. This may appear inconsistent 
with the suggestion in Chapter 2 that SoA is especially sensitive to detecting the 
presence of conflicting intentions, even when conflict is eventually resolved. 
However, we note that in Chapter 4 we found a general relation between CRN and 
agency ratings, using a trial-wise analysis. On the other hand, the study in Chapter 2 
involved comparing average agency ratings across congruency conditions. Whilst 
incongruent trials will more likely trigger conflict, conflict signals can also vary 
independently of congruency. Additionally, N2 amplitude was also linked to cognitive 
control recruitment, rather than just conflict detection, as congruency effects were 
reduced for slow RTs (see Figure 4.4, p. 128). Therefore, trials with a large N2 
amplitude may reflect instances in which successful cognitive control prevented or 
limited response conflict. In those cases, SoA might be preserved, rather than 
reduced. 
7.2. Integrating Prospective and Other Cues to Sense of Agency 
In line with previous proposals (Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik et al., 2013), our 
work shows that the SoA involves integration of a variety of cues. These cues may 
be of different types, e.g. sensorimotor, or conceptual, and may become available at 
different times, e.g. at the time of the action, or of the outcome. Critically, the 
weighting of these cues, and whether they have independent or interrelated effects 
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on SoA is dynamically updated, and highly dependent on context and availability of 
cues. SoA is highly flexible and adaptable to current context and task demands. 
7.2.1. Role of Awareness of Biases and Choice  
Our work shows that the effects of action selection on SoA are independent of 
whether one is aware, or not, of the stimuli that influence action selection. We 
showed a consistent reduction in SoA due to disruptions to action selection induced 
subliminally (Chapter 4), and supraliminally (Chapters 2 & 3). Previous studies used 
subliminal priming of actions to ensure that any effects found could not be attributed 
to participants knowing that their actions were manipulated. Moreover, it was unclear 
whether selection fluency might interact with awareness. We demonstrate that 
unawareness of biases is not necessary to investigate the effects of action selection 
to SoA. [But see Damen et al. (2014), and section 7.3 below.] 
The effects of selection fluency on agency were also independent of choosing freely 
between action alternatives, or following instructions (Chapter 4 & Experiment 2 in 
Chapter 2; cf. Wenke et al., 2010). Moreover, we found that free choice trials were 
associated with a higher SoA than forced choice, in the subliminal priming study 
(Chapter 4). However, there was no robust effect of choice when using supraliminal 
flankers (Chapter 2, Experiment 2). The combination of free and forced choice trials, 
combined with awareness of the flankers might have led participants to never feel 
very free, even when they could choose between a left or right key press. Freely 
choosing our actions, relative to following instructions, is thought to be central to our 
SoA. Indeed, it has been linked to SoA (Barlas & Obhi, 2013; Caspar et al., 2016; 
Wenke et al., 2010). However, it has been suggested that our sense of freedom is 
only one aspect of SoA (Pacherie, 2008). Therefore, it might serve as another 
independent cue to SoA. 
7.2.2. Lack of Relation to Outcome Predictions 
The EEG study in Chapter 4 further showed that the influence of selection fluency on 
SoA is not dependent on changes in outcome processing. We found that outcome 
monitoring, indexed by the outcome-locked feedback-related negativity (FRN) 
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component, was associated with agency ratings (Figure 4.8.b, p. 134). However, we 
did not find any direct effects of selection fluency on this measure of outcome 
processing. Additionally, we found no relation between the action-locked CRN and 
the outcome-locked FRN, even though both were associated with agency ratings. 
Therefore, the CRN and FRN components reflect two independent processes that, 
respectively, make prospective and retrospective contributions to SoA (see Figure 
4.9, p. 136). 
In line with this, the multi-study analysis described in Chapter 5 showed that 
selection fluency can have a general effect on SoA throughout instrumental learning, 
when participants rely on action-outcome interval to guide their agency judgements 
(experiments in Group 2, see Figure 5.5, p. 159). This general effect of selection 
fluency suggests that we learn to use it as a heuristic cue to SoA. Typically, dysfluent 
selection will be predictive of unsuccessful or unexpected outcomes. These effects 
may also be associated with, or the heuristics mediated by, the affective 
consequences of conflict, or dysfluency. This would be in line with other fluency 
effects on judgements (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Winkielman et al., 2015). 
7.2.3. Interactions with Outcome Monitoring 
When faced with a new environment, an optimal cue integration account might have 
predicted that the poor reliability of action-outcome knowledge in a new environment 
could be compensated by a greater influence of selection fluency to SoA. If so, as 
reliable action-outcome contingencies were learnt, less reliable cues based on 
selection fluency should have decreasing effects. Our multi-study analysis (Chapter 
5), in fact, showed that any interactions between instrumental learning and selection 
fluency were in the opposite direction. That is, the effects of selection fluency on SoA 
increased during instrumental learning (see Figure 5.5, p. 159). Interestingly, this 
occurred only when participants were focused on learning action-outcome 
contingencies (the experiments from Group 1, described in Chapters 2 and 4). 
We ruled out the possibility that people learned, in a context-specific manner, to use 
action selection processes as a proxy for true action-outcome contingency. This 
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account would not be consistent with the aforementioned finding of a general, 
heuristic effect of selection fluency on SoA, even in a new environment (Group 2 
experiments). Instead, we propose the novel suggestion that this interaction arises 
because action selection processes directly influence instrumental learning rates. 
That is, conflict during action selection could disrupt the learning of action-outcome 
associations, which would resulting in a slower learning rate (in linking dysfluent 
action - outcome), compared to fluency (i.e. linking fluent action - outcome). This 
proposal would be compatible with a heuristic use of selection fluency as a cue to 
SoA, and may perhaps even underlie the acquisition of this heuristic. Yet, it remains 
speculative, since we only measured agency ratings, rather than directly test 
knowledge of action-outcome contingencies. Notwithstanding that limitation, we 
believe agency ratings could reflect outcome knowledge indirectly, since participants 
were instructed to attend to the outcomes, and we observed an increase in agency 
ratings across the trials (for Group 1 studies, in which the interaction was found). 
This account could also explain how conflict experiences become associated with 
specific outcomes, as seen when collecting agency ratings at the end of a block (half 
of participants in Experiment 1, Chapter 2; Wenke et al., 2010). From this 
perspective, lower agency ratings for outcomes that follow dysfluent selection would 
be related to poorer knowledge about action-outcome contingency. Interestingly, 
once fully predictable action-outcome contingencies have been well-learned, 
subliminal priming of actions can influence sensory attenuation (Stenner, Bauer, 
Sidarus, et al., 2014), and sensory predictions in sensory regions, even before an 
action was made (Stenner, Bauer, Heinze, et al., 2014). This supports the idea that 
selection fluency can affect the linkage between action and outcome. Also worth 
noting, studies on metacognition have shown that high confidence errors, e.g. on 
general knowledge questions, are associated with better error correction, by learning 
from feedback, than low confidence errors (Metcalfe, Butterfield, Habeck, & Stern, 
2012). This suggests that the link between (erroneous) responses and their 
outcomes (corrective feedback) was weakened for low confidence responses. 
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More consistent with an optimal cue integration account, one study found that action 
selection had a stronger influence on SoA when outcomes were unexpected 
(Sidarus et al., 2013). This study used partial action-outcome contingency (67%), 
which meant there was some “expected uncertainty” (Yu & Dayan, 2005) regarding 
the outcomes. That is, the occasional violation of outcome predictions was expected, 
and not diagnostic to SoA. Therefore, this may have led to a reduction of the 
contribution of outcomes to SoA when predictions were violated, and a relative 
increase in the weighting of action selection processes on SoA. Moreover, results 
also showed that when action selection was fluent, outcome expectation had a 
reduced effect on SoA. This suggested a reciprocal influence between the two cues, 
depending on their signal, and not only their general reliability. 
Those studies involved distal and abstract action-outcome contingencies. Chapter 3 
used a videogame-like task to manipulate action selection, and additionally 
manipulated the proximal outcomes of action, i.e. the means to achieve a goal. 
Adding a discrepancy between participants’ mouse movements and the movements 
of a cursor on the screen, led to a large reduction in SoA, which could overshadow 
the effects of action selection (Exps. 1 & 2). These findings are also be consistent 
with optimal cue integration, as accurate motor control would be a highly reliable and 
salient indicator of agency over the game. 
Therefore, the type of outcomes (proximal means vs. distal ends), and whether 
action-outcome associations are still being learnt, or are already known, may impact 
on the effects of action selection on SoA. Additionally, knowledge about the 
outcomes may affect the mechanisms through which action selection influences 
SoA, that is, whether it changes: the learning process itself; outcome predictions; or 
the weighting of outcome information. 
7.3. Varieties of Agency Experience 
The research discussed in the present thesis demonstrates the flexibility and 
complexity of our experience of agency. We also believe that there are several 
varieties of agency experience, as mentioned in the introduction (section 1.4.1, p. 
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41). Previous work has often limited SoA to agency attribution. In contrast, our work 
examined SoA in terms of our experience of instrumental control. Moreover, while 
our work has shown that selection dysfluency reduces SoA, others have proposed 
that effort can increase SoA (Damen et al., 2014; Demanet, De Baene, et al., 2013; 
Lafargue & Franck, 2009). We now tentatively propose a model that explains 
distinctive varieties of agency experience based on two independent axes: 
attentional focus, and metacognitive signals (see Figure 7.1).  
On the one hand, agency involves self-other distinction. When our attention is drawn 
towards the self, metacognitive signals of effort can highlight the sense that **I** 
caused a given outcome, that is, the experience of explicit self-agency attribution (“I 
did that”). This may be especially relevant when action-outcome contingencies are 
well known – violations of expectations may be due to other’s actions, rather than 
real contingency changes. 
 
Figure 7.1. Four distinctive varieties of agency experience can be explained by 
independent axes related to focus of attention, and to metacognitive signals. All four 
varieties of agency experience are assumed to depend on some degree of action-outcome 
contingency, and are all assumed to contribute to explicit measures of the Sense of 
Agency. 
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On the other hand, agency also involves linking our actions to specific outcomes. 
When we are focused on tracking the outcomes of our actions, metacognitive signals 
of fluency will boost our experience of instrumental control (“I did that”). However, if 
our actions are dysfluent, or effortful, our sense of instrumental control will be low. 
This will be particularly relevant when faced with a new environment, in which we will 
be focused on understanding the instrumental relation between our actions and 
external events. During instrumental learning, agency attribution may be less 
relevant to SoA. 
Finally, the routine flow of everyday action control will normally be associated with 
metacognitive signals of fluency, as we will be familiar with the necessary actions 
and consequences. This experience may span across instances of greater focus on 
the self, or on the outcomes of action. 
7.4. Implications for Responsibility 
Previous work on decision making and social psychology has suggested that 
perceived responsibility, for our actions and those of others, in addition to behaviour, 
can be influenced by decision making processes. Difficulty, or uncertainty, in 
decision making can lead people to avoid making decisions altogether (Iyengar & 
Lepper, 2000). Even when people do act, they may feel less responsible for the 
consequences of their actions, especially for negative outcomes (Heath & Tversky, 
1991). 
Notably, social contexts can dramatically increase the complexity of decision making 
processes, as well as of outcome monitoring. On the one hand, the potential actions 
of others, and the consequences of those actions, need to be considered in addition 
to our own potential actions and outcomes. On the other, ambiguity about authorship 
of outcomes is increased. We suggest that this complexity may mediate the well-
known diffusion of responsibility effect, in which people report feeling less 
responsible for acting in the presence of others (Bandura, 1991). 
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In the EEG study described in Chapter 6, we developed a task in which we controlled 
for ambiguity about outcome attribution, but varied social context. The only difference 
between conditions was whether participants believed another agent was present, 
who could act instead of them, or not. Therefore, this could have a prospective effect 
on behaviour, outcome monitoring, and the sense of agency. Our results confirmed 
that social context led to changes in behaviour, as participants waited longer for the 
other agent to act. It additionally led to a reduction in outcome monitoring, indexed by 
FRN, and sense of agency, relative to playing alone. While these last two effects 
could be explained by counterfactual thinking after the action, a prospective effect 
seems to better explain changes in behaviour. Moreover, this study showed that 
diffusion of responsibility is not merely a post-hoc justification, linked to a self-serving 
bias, but is associated with online changes in the experience of agency. 
Nonetheless, it is important to recognise that our SoA can be affected by processes 
that do not directly reflect the relation between our actions and their consequences. 
Prospective cues to SoA may influence our sense of responsibility. Selection fluency 
may be statistically related to predicted outcomes, and hence serve as a convenient 
proxy, however, it does not actually affect action-outcome contingencies. Being 
aware of this may allow us to more strategically use selection fluency as a cue to 
SoA, or responsibility, when relevant, but not be misled by it when irrelevant, e.g. 
competence in sports inflating perceived chances of winning a bet on a game (Heath 
& Tversky, 1991). Similarly, understanding that social context can lead to a reduction 
in our SoA independently of actual changes in agency, may allow us to take that into 
account when assessing our responsibility for acting, or over the consequences of 
our actions. This may help reduce the negative consequences of diffusion of 
responsibility. 
7.5. Remaining Issues 
7.5.1. Fluency vs. Effort 
In Chapter 2, we investigated three possible factors that could influence whether SoA 
is enhanced or reduced by selection fluency vs. effort. We tested the effects of 
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awareness of biasing influences, of choice, and of the timing of conflicting stimuli. 
Yet, our results consistently showed that effort led to a reduction in SoA. We suggest 
this may be related to the fact that our experiments focus on the instrumental aspect 
of agency (see also section 7.3 above). Yet, it remains unclear whether the 
differential patterns of effects found here relative to other studies (e.g. Damen et al., 
2014) may relate to differences in the agency measures (asking about control vs. 
attribution), or in salient cues to agency (variability in outcome identity vs. action-
outcome interval). Clearly, further research is needed to clarify the conditions under 
which fluency vs. effort enhance SoA. 
7.5.2. Control over Actions vs. Control over Outcomes 
It remains unclear whether the effects of selection fluency on SoA specifically reflect 
an unintentional conflation between fluency/conflict experiences and SoA, when the 
two should be clearly dissociated. Alternatively, people may be able to adequately 
dissect the components of controlling their actions vs. controlling action outcomes. 
Whereas objective control over actions is affected by selection fluency, selection 
fluency cannot influence action-outcome contingencies. Here, we asked people to 
judge their control over action outcomes, but we found reliable effects of the ease 
versus difficulty of selecting the action itself. It has been previously shown that 
response conflict leads to a reduction in SoA over actions (Morsella et al., 2009). 
This distinction becomes especially relevant if we consider individual differences. For 
example, it will impact how we interpret the fact that a person, or group (e.g. 
patients), does not show fluency effects on SoA. If we simply ask people to judge 
SoA over action outcomes, we cannot distinguish whether the absent effect is due to 
a reduced sensitivity to metacognitive signals about action selection, or whether 
those metacognitive signals were not used in agency judgements, arguably reflecting 
someone who accurately followed instructions to judge action-outcome 
contingencies. Future work is needed to clarify how these two aspects of SoA relate 
to each other, and how they are related to the interaction between cues to SoA. 
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7.5.3. What is Prospective Agency for? 
Finally, we suggest that prospective SoA may offer a mechanism through which we 
can intervene, more quickly, and effectively, in the course of events triggered by our 
actions. Difficulty or uncertainty experienced during decision making may serve as a 
signal that further steps may be necessary to ensure the predicted, or desirable, 
consequences will follow. Such prospective interventions seem precluded by 
retrospective accounts of SoA, since outcomes must be known in order to be 
compared to predictions.  
Research on the metacognition of action similarly highlights a role for metacognitive 
signals about action selection for adjusting subsequent behaviour (Botvinick & 
Braver, 2015; Yeung & Summerfield, 2014). However, it remains unclear whether 
and how a prospective experience of agency may impact such behavioural 
adjustments. 
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 Supplementary Analyses for Chapter 2 Appendix A.
These supplementary analyses aimed to assess whether the congruency effects on 
agency ratings observed with ANOVA might be explained through RT monitoring. 
For this, we used hierarchical linear regression models to predict agency ratings 
from the experimental factor Congruency, and included RTs as an additional 
predictor. RTs were standardised within-participants, and all effects were entered as 
fixed and a participant varying effects. Other experimental factors were excluded for 
simplicity, and since they did not significantly affect agency ratings. Moreover, only 
Experiments 2 & 3 were analysed, since half of participants in Experiment 1 only 
gave block-wise ratings.  
 
Table A1. Model for Experiment 2 predicting agency ratings by experimental factors and 
RTs (Z, within-participants): parameter estimates, with bootstrapped 95% confidence 
intervals. * Based on Satterthwaite degrees of freedom estimation.
      95% CI 
 Estimate SE t df * p* Lower Estimate 
(Intercept) 6.025 0.227 26.52 23.0 0.000 0.000 5.580 
Congruency 0.207 0.061 3.39 23.0 0.003 0.003 0.087 
RT (Z) -0.158 0.032 -4.98 22.9 0.000 0.000 -0.220 
 
Table A2. Model for Experiment 3 predicting agency ratings by experimental factors and 
RTs (Z, within-participants): parameter estimates, with bootstrapped 95% confidence 
intervals. * Based on Satterthwaite degrees of freedom estimation.
      95% CI 
 Estimate SE t df * p* Lower Estimate 
(Intercept) 6.547 0.297 22.04 24.0 0.000 5.965 7.130 
Congruency 0.110 0.058 1.91 23.8 0.069 -0.003 0.224 
RT (Z) -0.093 0.032 -2.91 24.0 0.008 -0.155 -0.030 
 
Consistent with the ANOVA findings, Congruency was an important predictor of 
agency ratings in these models. Although the effect is only marginally significant for 
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Experiment 3, this was also the case in the ANOVA analyses, thus it reflects the 
weak congruency effect found in that experiment. 
In line with the findings of Chapter 4, RTs were related to agency ratings, suggesting 
that RT monitoring may serve as an additional input to the sense of agency, but it 
cannot fully explain Congruency effects. 
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 Supplementary Analyses for Chapter 3 Appendix B.
 
In our models of judgements of agency (JoAs), we used hierarchical linear 
regression to assess the effect of our experimental manipulations on JoAs, after 
accounting for a linear relation between JoAs and judgements of performance 
(JoPs). The assumption of a linear relation between JoAs and JoPs was motivated 
by the hypothesis that monitoring one’s performance would have a general influence 
on JoAs. Non-linearities in this relation could hypothetically emerge if JoAs were 
especially related to JoPs for particular levels of performance (e.g. high vs. low), for 
example. Such potential non-linearities could in turn question any conclusions drawn 
about the effects on JoAs of other predictors in the model (i.e. our experimental 
factors). 
To clarify this issue, we plotted the data across the three experiments, to observe the 
relation between JoAs and JoPs. Additionally, as the turbulence manipulation (i.e. 
discrepant visual feedback) had a very large effect on both JoPs and JoAs, this 
factor was considered as it might explain data clustering at higher vs. lower 
performance. The other factors used to manipulate action selection across 
experiments had quite small effects, thus they were not considered. 
The plots below display mean JoAs (open circles) and model predictions (lines, with 
shaded 95% CIs) as a function of JoPs, and of the turbulence factor. Model 
predictions were obtained from 10000 simulations from the posterior distribution of 
plausible parameter values under uniform priors (Gelman & Su, 2015). Across 
experiments, these figures appear to support the assumption of a linear relation 
relation between JoAs and JoPs, and demonstrate the clear impact of turbulence on 
both variables. 
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Figure B1. Experiment 1: Mean JoAs (circles) 
and model predictions (regression line, and 
shaded 95% prediction intervals) as a function 
of JoPs, and turbulence condition. 
 
 
Figure B2. Experiment 2: Mean JoAs (circles) 
and model predictions (regression line, and 
shaded 95% prediction intervals) as a function 
of JoPs, and turbulence condition. 
 
 
Figure B3. Experiment 3: Mean JoAs (circles) 
and model predictions (regression line, and 
shaded 95% prediction intervals) as a function 
of JoPs, and turbulence condition. 
 
 
Polynomial Analysis 
To further assess whether non-linearities could be present in the relation between 
JoAs and JoPs, we used model comparison to test whether quadratic or cubic 
polynomial functions might better characterize the relation between JoAs and JoPs 
than a linear function. 
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For each experiment, we compared 3 nested hierarchical linear regressions. We 
obtained orthogonal linear, quadratic and cubic JoPs polynomials. Model 1 predicted 
JoAs as a function of the turbulence factor (coded as 1 = Turbulence, -1 = No 
Turbulence), and a linear effect of JoPs. Participants were modelled as random 
intercepts, and random slopes for the turbulence factor. Model 2 additionally included 
a quadratic effect of JoPs. Model 3 additionally included a cubic effect of JoPs. Full 
results tables are displayed below. Satterthwaite approximation for degrees of 
freedom (Kuznetsova et al., 2015) was used to obtain p-values, and 95% confidence 
intervals were obtained using the Wald method (Bates et al., 2014). 
Model comparison using AIC showed that the linear model was preferred over the 
quadratic and cubic JoP models in Experiment 1 (AIC difference in favour of linear 
model over quadratic = 2.9, and over cubic = 6.7) and Experiment 3 (AIC differences 
in favour of linear over quadratic = 4, and over cubic = 6.8). For Experiment 2, the 
quadratic model was slightly favoured by AIC over linear (AIC difference = 1.6), 
though this is likely a spurious result. The linear model was still favoured over cubic 
(AIC difference = 2.5) in Experiment 2. Overall, the modelling results combined with 
observation of the data support the assumption of a linear relation between JoPs and 
JoAs. 
B.1. Experiment 1 
 
Table B1. Experiment 1, Model 1 – Linear effect of JoPs. 
      95 % CI 
 Estimate SE t df p Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 0.52 0.01 37.00 21.97 < 0.001 0.49 0.55 
Turbulence -0.15 0.02 -9.58 28.87 < 0.001 -0.18 -0.12 
JoP-Linear 3.82 0.22 17.18 443.66 < 0.001 3.39 4.26 
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Table B2. Experiment 1, Model 2 – Quadratic effect of JoPs. 
      95 % CI 
 
Estimat
e 
SE t df p Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 0.52 0.01 36.55 21.79 < 0.001 0.49 0.55 
Turbulence -0.15 0.02 -9.37 28.68 < 0.001 -0.18 -0.12 
JoP-Linear 3.86 0.23 16.85 438.59 < 0.001 3.41 4.31 
JoP-Quadratic 0.15 0.17 0.89 503.80 0.374 -0.19 0.50 
	
Table B3. Experiment 1, Model 3 – Cubic effect of JoPs. 
      95 % CI 
 Estimate SE t df p Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 0.52 0.01 36.57 21.76 < 0.001 0.49 0.55 
Turbulence -0.15 0.02 -9.38 28.83 < 0.001 -0.18 -0.12 
JoP-Linear 3.86 0.23 16.84 436.96 < 0.001 3.41 4.31 
JoP-Quadratic 0.16 0.18 0.92 489.68 0.356 -0.18 0.51 
JoP-Cubic 0.05 0.16 0.31 546.42 0.757 -0.26 0.36 
 
Table B4. Experiment 1: Model comparison. 
 df AIC 
Model 1 7 -604.7 
Model 2 8 -601.8 
Model 3 9 -598.0 
 
B.2. Experiment 2 
 
Table B5. Experiment 2, Model 1 – Linear effect of JoPs. 
      95 % CI 
 Estimate SE t df p Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 0.53 0.02 29.92 22.30 < 0.001 0.50 0.57 
Turbulence -0.16 0.02 -10.31 24.38 < 0.001 -0.19 -0.13 
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JoP-Linear 1.72 0.19 9.27 547.01 < 0.001 1.35 2.08 
	
Table B6. Experiment 2, Model 2 – Quadratic effect of JoPs. 
      95 % CI 
 Estimate SE t df p Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 0.53 0.02 31.08 22.01 < 0.001 0.50 0.57 
Turbulence -0.16 0.02 -10.45 24.37 < 0.001 -0.19 -0.13 
JoP-Linear 1.75 0.18 9.48 543.55 < 0.001 1.39 2.11 
JoP-Quadratic 0.36 0.15 2.38 559.09 0.018 0.06 0.65 
	
Table B7. Experiment 2, Model 3 – Cubic effect of JoPs. 
      95 % CI 
 Estimate SE t df p Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 0.53 0.02 31.06 22.00 < 0.001 0.50 0.57 
Turbulence -0.16 0.02 -10.45 24.37 < 0.001 -0.19 -0.13 
JoP-Linear 1.75 0.19 9.45 541.63 < 0.001 1.39 2.11 
JoP-Quadratic 0.36 0.15 2.38 558.11 0.018 0.06 0.65 
JoP-Cubic 0.01 0.14 0.10 543.52 0.921 -0.26 0.29 
 
Table B8. Experiment 2: Model comparison. 
 df AIC 
Model 1 7 -578.0 
Model 2 8 -579.6 
Model 3 9 -575.5 
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B.3. Experiment 3 
 
Table B9. Experiment 3, Model 1 – Linear effect of JoPs. 
      95 % CI 
 Estimate SE t df p Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 0.59 0.01 46.96 20.81 < 0.001 0.56 0.61 
Turbulence -0.10 0.02 -5.74 21.66 < 0.001 -0.14 -0.07 
JoP-Linear 4.05 0.17 23.50 670.19 < 0.001 3.71 4.38 
	
Table B10. Experiment 3, Model 2 – Quadratic effect of JoPs. 
      95 % CI 
 Estimate SE t df p Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 0.59 0.01 46.91 20.80 < 0.001 0.56 0.61 
Turbulence -0.10 0.02 -5.74 21.66 < 0.001 -0.14 -0.07 
JoP-Linear 4.05 0.17 23.46 672.86 < 0.001 3.71 4.38 
JoP-Quadratic 0.01 0.15 0.05 761.74 0.958 -0.28 0.30 
	
Table B11. Experiment 3, Model 3 – Cubic effect of JoPs. 
      95 % CI 
 Estimate SE t df p Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 0.59 0.01 47.03 20.80 < 0.001 0.56 0.61 
Turbulence -0.10 0.02 -5.73 21.66 < 0.001 -0.14 -0.07 
JoP-Linear 4.04 0.17 23.45 671.96 < 0.001 3.70 4.38 
JoP-Quadratic 0.01 0.15 0.05 760.75 0.964 -0.28 0.30 
JoP-Cubic -0.15 0.13 -1.16 771.93 0.248 -0.42 0.11 
 
Table B12. Experiment 3: Model comparison. 
 df AIC 
Model 1 7 -954.1 
Model 2 8 -950.1 
Model 3 9 -947.3 
 
  
 
213 
 
 Supplementary Data for Chapter 4 Appendix C.
C.1. Target N2 
 
Table C1. Target N2 model: parameter estimates, with bootstrapped 95% confidence 
intervals. * Based on Satterthwaite degrees of freedom estimation. 
 
      95% CI 
 Estimate SE t df * p* Lower Upper  
Intercept 6.77 0.86 7.88 23 < .001 5.15 8.27 
Choice -0.020 0.170 -0.11 23 0.91 -0.37 0.34 
Priming 0.34 0.14 2.42 34 0.021 0.080 0.60 
RTs (Z) -1.98 0.12 -17.04 8325 < .001 -2.18 -1.77 
Choice x Priming -0.11 0.13 -0.84 37 0.41 -0.40 0.16 
Choice x RTs -0.071 0.12 -0.61 8494 0.54 -0.29 0.16 
Priming x RTs -0.25 0.12 -2.13 8449 0.033 -0.47 -0.0010 
Choice x Priming 
x RTs 
-0.099 0.12 -0.85 8353 0.39 -0.34 0.13 
 
C.2. Action CRN 
C.2.1. Action CRN model  
 
Table C2. Action CRN model: parameter estimates, with bootstrapped 95% confidence 
intervals. * Based on Satterthwaite degrees of freedom estimation. 
 
      95% CI 
 Estimate SE t df * p* Lower Upper  
Intercept 3.23 0.53 6.05 23 < .001 2.27 4.21 
Choice 0.13 0.15 0.86 21 0.40 -0.15 .41 
Priming -0.27 0.13 -2.12 24 0.044 -0.51 -0.020 
RTs (Z) -0.54 0.10 -5.55 8485 < .001 -0.72 -0.35 
Choice x Priming 0.12 0.10 1.16 58 0.25 -0.090 0.32 
Choice x RTs 0.17 0.10 1.73 8696 0.084 -0.023 0.36 
Priming x RTs 0.37 0.10 3.85 8667 < .001 0.19 0.55 
Choice x Priming 
x RTs 
0.048 0.10 0.50 8458 0.62 -0.14 0.24 
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C.2.2. Action CRN model with Target N2 
 
Table C3. Action CRN model with Target N2: parameter estimates, with bootstrapped 95% 
confidence intervals.  * Based on Satterthwaite degrees of freedom estimation. 
 
      95% CI 
 Estimate SE t df * p* Lower Upper  
Intercept 3.23 0.53 6.05 23 < .001 2.15 4.30 
Choice 0.13 0.150 0.88 21 0.39 -0.14 0.42 
Priming -0.24 0.13 -1.91 24 0.069 -0.48 0.011 
RTs (Z) -0.71 0.10 -7.27 8495 < .001 -0.91 -0.51 
Target N2 (Z) -0.94 0.09 -10.02 8775 < .001 -1.13 -0.75 
Choice x Priming 0.11 0.10 1.08 55 0.28 -0.093 0.31 
Choice x RTs 0.16 0.10 1.68 8693 0.093 -0.029 0.36 
Priming x RTs 0.35 0.10 3.62 8663 < .001 0.16 0.56 
Choice x Priming 
x RTs 
0.040 0.10 0.42 8451 0.68 -0.13 0.21 
 
C.3. Outcome FRN 
C.3.1. Outcome FRN model 
 
Table C4. Outcome FRN model: parameter estimates, with bootstrapped 95% confidence 
intervals. * Based on Satterthwaite degrees of freedom estimation. 
 
      95 % CI 
 Estimate SE t df * p* Lower Upper 
Intercept -0.22 0.97 -0.23 23 0.82 -2.42 1.54 
Choice -0.015 0.17 -0.085 22.90 0.93 -0.36 0.31 
Priming -0.094 0.13 -0.75 42.30 0.46 -0.33 0.15 
Choice x Priming 0.13 0.13 1.00 29 0.33 -0.16 0.39 
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C.3.2. Outcome FRN model with Action CRN  
 
Table C5. Outcome FRN model with Action CRN: parameter estimates, with bootstrapped 
95% confidence intervals. * Based on Satterthwaite degrees of freedom estimation. 
 
      95 % CI 
 Estimate SE t df * p* Lower Upper 
Intercept -0.22 0.97 -0.23 23 0.82 -2.20 1.57 
Choice -0.015 0.17 -0.085 23 0.93 -0.35 0.34 
Priming -0.095 0.13 -0.75 42 0.46 -0.33 0.17 
Action CRN (Z) -0.087 0.11 -0.76 8778 0.45 -0.31 0.12 
Choice x Priming 0.13 0.13 1.00 29 0.32 -0.15 0.39 
 
 
C.4. Outcome N1 
 
Table C6. Outcome N1 model: parameter estimates, with bootstrapped 95% confidence 
intervals. * Based on Satterthwaite degrees of freedom estimation. 
 
      95 % CI 
 Estimate SE t df * p* Lower Upper 
Intercept -1.91 0.41 -4.63 22.90 < .001 -2.77 -1.14 
Choice -0.29 0.12 -2.38 25.30 0.025 -0.54 0.034 
Priming 0.061 0.094 0.65 269 0.52 -0.14 0.25 
Choice x Priming -0.0042 0.11 -0.039 25.10 0.97 -0.22 0.20 
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 Supplementary Analyses for Chapter 5 Appendix D.
Independent models. 
In addition to fitting a three-level multilevel regression model to all experiments 
simultaneously, we also fit separate two-level regression models to each 
experiment’s data. We used the same coding for the variables for these models as 
the one presented in Chapter 5, but included all trials for each experiment. The by-
subject varying effects (all average effects were allowed to vary within subjects) were 
modelled as uncorrelated because specifying correlated random effects led to non-
convergence. 
Tables D1-D7 present the results of these models, for each experiment. Effects of 
primary interest are highlighted in bold. 
D.1. Group 1 
The results from the independent models fitted to experiments from Group 1 led to 
identical conclusions as the model presented in Chapter 5. Importantly, Congruency 
and Trial number exerted a positive influence on agency ratings across experiments, 
but action-outcome interval (AOI) did not. Congruency and Trial number interacted in 
all experiments, except in Experiment 2. 
The lack of a Congruency by Trial interaction in Experiment 2 (Table D2) may result 
from two important differences in experimental design relative to other Group 1 
experiments: there were 3 congruency conditions – congruent, neutral, and 
incongruent; and 3 AOIs. Notably, even though there were 3 AOIs, as in the 
experiments of Group 2, this factor did not influence agency ratings. While the 
neutral condition was excluded from the present analyses, it may have impacted on 
the learning of action-outcome contingencies, as well as on potential interactions 
between congruency and outcome identity. The significant effect of trial number 
shows that outcome identity was still driving agency ratings, but the slope of the 
increase in agency ratings across trials was reduced relative to other Group 1 
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experiments (see also Figure 5.3, p. 155). Therefore, this reduced the potential for 
dynamic changes in the effects of selection fluency on the sense of agency. 
 
Table D1. Multilevel model of agency ratings for Experiment 1.  
    95% CI 
Average Effect Estimate SE t p Lower Upper 
Intercept 5.13 0.17 30.09 < 0.001 4.80 5.47 
Trial 5.69 0.89 6.43 < 0.001 3.96 7.43 
Trial (quadratic) -1.78 0.40 -4.44 < 0.001 -2.57 -1.00 
Congruency 0.23 0.09 2.48 0.019 0.05 0.41 
AOI 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.861 -0.04 0.04 
Trial x Congruency 0.94 0.44 2.13 0.044 0.07 1.81 
Congruency x AOI 0.04 0.04 1.01 0.321 -0.04 0.12 
 
 
Table D2. Multilevel model of agency ratings for Experiment 2.  
    95% CI 
Average Effect Estimate SE t p Lower Upper 
Intercept 5.16 0.50 10.28 < 0.001 4.18 6.15 
Trial 3.99 1.34 2.98 0.013 1.36 6.61 
Trial (quadratic) -1.29 0.60 -2.16 0.054 -2.46 -0.12 
Congruency 0.30 0.13 2.35 0.034 0.05 0.56 
AOI 0.00 0.02 -0.13 0.895 -0.04 0.04 
Trial x Congruency 0.08 0.75 0.10 0.919 -1.39 1.54 
Congruency x AOI 0.03 0.04 0.69 0.490 -0.05 0.11 
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Table D3. Multilevel model of agency ratings for Experiment 3.  
    95% CI 
Average Effect Estimate SE t p Lower Upper 
Intercept 5.98 0.23 25.46 < 0.001 5.52 6.44 
Trial 5.23 0.83 6.33 < 0.001 3.61 6.85 
Trial (quadratic) -2.25 0.36 -6.20 < 0.001 -2.96 -1.54 
Congruency 0.42 0.13 3.21 0.003 0.16 0.68 
AOI 0.03 0.02 1.88 0.061 0.00 0.07 
Trial x Congruency 0.82 0.42 1.96 0.063 0.00 1.64 
Congruency x AOI -0.04 0.04 -1.12 0.263 -0.11 0.03 
 
Table D4. Multilevel model of agency ratings for Experiment 4.  
    95% CI 
Average Effect Estimate SE t p Lower Upper 
Intercept 6.44 0.30 21.55 < 0.001 5.85 7.03 
Trial 7.47 1.11 6.71 < 0.001 5.29 9.65 
Trial (quadratic) -3.58 0.55 -6.48 < 0.001 -4.66 -2.50 
Congruency 0.34 0.13 2.64 0.014 0.09 0.58 
AOI 0.00 0.01 0.73 0.465 -0.01 0.02 
Trial x Congruency 0.74 0.31 2.39 0.025 0.13 1.34 
Congruency x AOI 0.03 0.01 2.22 0.027 0.00 0.05 
 
D.2. Group 2 
The independent model fits presented here further corroborate the results obtained 
from the three-level multilevel model presented in the main article. Congruency and 
AOI both exerted noticeable effects on SoA. Importantly, Trial number and Trial by 
Congruency effects were not reliable in the studies in Group 2. There was a small 
effect of Trial number in Experiment 6 (Table D6; see also Figure 5.3, p. 155). The 
slight increase in agency ratings over trials found for this experiment may be due to 
the fact that it had the longest block length of these experiments (Table 5.1, p. 154). 
This suggests that focusing on AOI may slow down the learning of action-outcome 
contingencies, thus requiring longer before outcome identity influences SoA. 
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Table D5. Multilevel model of agency ratings for Experiment 5.  
    95% CI 
Average Effect Estimate SE t p Lower Upper 
Intercept 4.31 0.16 26.58 < 0.001 3.99 4.62 
Trial 0.47 0.32 1.46 0.158 -0.16 1.11 
Trial (quadratic) -0.43 0.32 -1.33 0.197 -1.05 0.20 
Congruency 0.20 0.07 2.91 0.006 0.06 0.33 
AOI -0.21 0.08 -2.65 0.015 -0.37 -0.06 
Trial x Congruency -0.90 0.49 -1.83 0.082 -1.86 0.07 
Congruency x AOI 0.02 0.03 0.68 0.499 -0.04 0.09 
 
Table D6. Multilevel model of agency ratings for Experiment 6.  
    95% CI 
Average Effect Estimate SE t p Lower Upper 
Intercept 4.93 0.13 38.32 < 0.001 4.68 5.18 
Trial 0.99 0.39 2.50 0.027 0.21 1.76 
Trial (quadratic) 0.12 0.24 0.52 0.601 -0.34 0.59 
Congruency 0.31 0.11 2.75 0.016 0.09 0.53 
AOI -0.33 0.08 -4.07 0.001 -0.49 -0.17 
Trial x Congruency -1.03 0.54 -1.90 0.080 -2.09 0.03 
Congruency x AOI 0.01 0.03 0.28 0.785 -0.05 0.07 
 
Table D7. Multilevel model of agency ratings for Experiment 7.  
    95% CI 
Average Effect Estimate SE t p Lower Upper 
Intercept 4.31 0.35 12.21 < 0.001 3.62 5.00 
Trial 0.41 0.52 0.78 0.452 -0.62 1.44 
Trial (quadratic) -0.32 0.35 -0.91 0.364 -1.00 0.36 
Congruency 0.33 0.13 2.43 0.015 0.06 0.59 
AOI -0.30 0.14 -2.08 0.062 -0.59 -0.02 
Trial x Congruency 0.72 0.81 0.89 0.390 -0.86 2.30 
Congruency x AOI 0.08 0.07 1.14 0.255 -0.06 0.22 
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